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FACTS
ABOUT
HUNGARY

Compiled and edited by
IMRE KOVÁCS

1958
HUNGARIAN COMMITTEE

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TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE FREEDOM FIGHTERS
WHO SACRIFICED THEIR LIVES FOR HUNGARY

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INTRODUCTION

Apart from how the Hungarian Revolution is regarded, it is already history; however, this fact does not exempt mankind from its moral obligation to solve the Hungarian Question.

What is the essence of this question? Can a nation be kept under foreign domination against its will while the slogans of non-interference echo throughout the world and no definite nor successful action has been taken to put an end to the massive and brutal Soviet interference in Hungary?

One can only welcome the increasing tendency to submit all conflicts between states and peoples to the consideration and judgment of an international forum—primarily the United Nations—whose decisions must be respected, whatever they may be. The prestige of the United Nations would be greatly enhanced if the fourteen resolutions passed by the General Assembly on the Hungarian Question were implemented. First of all there should be withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary and free elections, preferably in the presence of United Nations representatives.

Numerous books, articles, reports and commentaries have been published on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, voicing contradictory opinions, too. Until now, however, a single comprehensive volume containing the most important material has not been available. To meet this need, we have compiled the best analyses, evaluations and essays on Hungary and the Hungarian Revolution covering all stages of development. This book, FACTS ABOUT HUNGARY, should answer all questions and enable the reader to draw his own conclusions regarding the Hungarians' rights.

Unless one knows the history of Hungary, its unique revolt against Soviet domination and communist rule cannot be fully understood. The Revolution itself was so strange —a brilliant flash which illuminated the darkness for one quick moment and threw a sharp light on every problem and on the whole sphere of Soviet influence—that even among Hungarians opinions are divided as to its meaning and significance.

The most discussed aspect of the Revolution was its program which combined a multi-party system, parliamentary democracy, observance of individual and human rights, and an economic system based on social justice. Society would have received a larger share of properties than individuals, and a considerable portion of production would have been placed under social control. It would not be historical or scientific to begin speculation now as to whether the attitudes and policies of the Hungarians would have changed as Soviet interference has deprived the world and the experts from observing their development.

The chapter History of the Hungarians *is original; the first part was written by myself—the second part was written by* Prof. William Juhász, *author and senior editor of the Free Europe Press, formerly Associate Professor of Comparative Cultural History at the University of Szeged, Hungary, 1945-48.*

The chapter Communist Conquest of Hungary *is an excerpt from the article* The Methods of Communist Conquest: Hungary 1944-47, *which appeared in WORLD POLITICS, Volume III, No. 1, 1950, published by the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, written by* Dr. Stephen D. Kertész, *Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, and former Secretary General of the Hungarian Peace Delegation in Paris, 1946 and Hungarian Minister to Italy, 1947.*

The article entitled Road to the Revolution *is an excerpt from THE ANNALS, American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, May, 1958. The title of the original article is* Limits and Problems of Decompression: The Case of Hungary, *by* Paul Kecskeméti, *Ph.D., Senior Research Associate with RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C.*

Ideology of The Revolution *is from a study published by Free Europe Press, New York, 1957, written by* Edmund O. Stillman, *member of the New York Bar and Chief of the Publications Department of Free Europe Press.*

The author of The Bibo Plan *is former Minister of State* István Bibó, *a leading Hungarian intellectual, recently sentenced to life imprisonment because of his participation in the Revolution.* Reconquest of Hungary, *appearing in print for the first time, is written by* Maj. Gen. Béla Király, *who was Commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Forces.* Timetable of a Failure, *written by* Gordon Gaskill, *a free-lance*

American journalist and writer presently living in Rome, Italy, is a condensation from the article first published in the VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW, Volume 84, Spring, 1958, Charlottesville, Virginia.

The legal analysis of the Nagy trial, (Legal Observations), *was first published by the Mid-European Law Project of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1958, under the title* The Case of Imre Nagy: Legal Observations. *The author is* George Torzsay-Biber, *Ll.D., formerly a member of the Budapest Bar.* Judicial System of the Kádár Regime *was written by* Dr. Leslie LeNard *of the Mid-European Law Project and was first published in HIGHLIGHTS (Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe) Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., January 1957.*

The original article Soviet Troops in Hungary: Legal Aspects *was written by* Dr. Ferenc Váli, *Visiting Associate Professor, Cornel University Law School, Ithaca, New York, formerly Professor of International Law, University of Budapest, 1935-1949.*

Three million Hungarians live outside Hungary, in neighboring Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Rumania and Yugoslavia; they were deeply affected by the Revolution, and for their solidarity they have to bear the consequences, too. The article Hungarian Minorities under Communist Rule *is original, written by* István Révay, *consultant to the Free Europe Press, formerly director of the PÁL TELEKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Budapest, 1945-49.*

All other material contained in this volume was selected from publications of the United Nations, Free Europe Press and the East Europe Institute, New York, by the Research Staff of the Hungarian Committee.

I wish to express my appreciation to the institutions, publishers and authors who have graciously allowed the Hungarian Committee to reprint their published material and to those who provided original articles.

We hope that this book, FACTS ABOUT HUNGARY, will prove to be of good service to all who wish to be informed on the Hungarian Question. We also believe that the book will serve as proof that a solution to the Hungarian Question can no longer be delayed.

October 23, 1958, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

IMRE KOVÁCS
Head, Information Department
HUNGARIAN COMMITTEE

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION		5
PART ONE:	HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIANS	9
PART TWO:	THE POST-WAR ERA	
	Communist Conquest of Hungary	47
	Map	48-49
	Road to the Revolution	68
PART THREE:	THE REVOLUTION	
	Those Heroic Days...	81
	Ideology of the Revolution	87
	The Bibo Plan	100
	Reconquest of Hungary	106
	World Reaction to Soviet Intervention	111
PART FOUR:	HUNGARY AND THE UNITED NATIONS	
	Timetable of a Failure	119
	Summary of United Nations Actions	144
	Report of the Special Committee: Conclusions	166
PART FIVE:	THE NAGY CASE	
	Official Announcement	175
	Legal Observations	183
	World Reaction to the Executions	197
	Special Report of the Special Committee	206
PART SIX:	SUPPLEMENT	
	Soviet Armed Forces in Hungary: Legal Aspects	221
	Judicial System of the Kádár Regime	226
	Hungarian Minorities Under Communist Rule	240
PART SEVEN:	Appendix	249
	Chronology	259

PART ONE

History of the Hungarians

I

At the very end of the ninth century a people, coming from Asia, settled in Europe: the Magyars. No people before them had succeeded in establishing a permanent state in the Carpathian Basin, and among similar ethnic groups which reached Europe, only the Magyars, the Finns and the Bulgarians were able to remain in the European community.

The metamorphosis of the Hungarians into a European people is a dramatic story. The assimilation was made difficult not only by the different characteristics of the two continents, the difference between East and West, but also the historic development which pushed the Hungarians into the feudal system, thus forcing them to live differently from their inherent inclinations and abilities. Although they have gradually assumed the European character and accepted Western attitudes, traces of their former Asian culture and elements of the Eastern way of thinking have lingered on, often causing emotional, intellectual and political conflicts, particularly in critical situations.

As if not wanting them to leave, Asia often reached out after the Magyars. Up to the thirteenth century the sporadic but violent raids of nomad tribes disrupted their gradual consolidation. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottoman Empire subjugated them, but the Hungarians stubbornly resisted its despotic political methods and oppressive economic and social

system. And a mere decade ago, the Soviet Union extended its sphere of interest to the Danube. Among the troops which crushed the recent Hungarian Revolution were a great many "kinsmen"—Mongols, Khirgizes, etc., with similar builds and skull formations—from the vast Russian steppes which the Magyars had left centuries before.

Nomadic Life

A good many thousand years ago, when the various races of mankind—Aryans, Hamites, Semites and Chinese—had already emerged, another primitive people existed who were called *Ural-Altaics* after their home, the Ural-Altain mountains. Anthropologic, ethnographic and comparative linguistics research have established the Ural-Altaic origin of the Hungarians, as have early historiographic records. Their direct lineage leads back to the Ural stock from which the Samoyeds separated some four thousand years ago, leaving behind the Finno-Ugrians.

The Finno-Ugric people's original home was along the middle section of the Volga, approximately the region bordered by the Vyatka River, the lower reaches of the Kamma and Belaya rivers and the middle sections of the Ural mountains. About 3,500 years ago the Aryans penetrated the peaceful, gleaning, fishing and hunting people, forcing one branch, the Finnish, to move on towards the northwest. This group finally settled on the territory of present-day Finland, eventually forming the Finnish nation. Another group, now called the Ugrians, was pushed back to Asia, where its people settled in the sparse forests of the Ural slopes and along the Ob, Tobol, Ishim and Irtish rivers.

This territory comprises roughly 300,000 square kilometers, and provided twenty to thirty thousand Ugrians, or pre-Magyars, with a livelihood. They lived under a loosely-knit social system based on blood-relationships, in which the smallest organized unit was the clan (or what is called in Hungarian the "large family"), consisting of two or three sets of grandparents and their

intermarried descendants, some fifty to one-hundred individuals.

There was full equality among members of the clan, and the land on which they lived, hunted, fished and gleaned was considered common property as were the tents or huts and large items of equipment such as boats, fishing nets and special traps. They had almost no personal possessions, just the bows, small nets, harpoons, primitive hatchets and hammers indispensable in their daily life and, of course, their clothing. The primitive methods of hunting, fishing and gleaning then customary, required that all work be done by groups. The clan's head was the oldest member, who guided their common efforts, divided war spoils fairly, led them on their wanderings, engaged in negotiations with other clans or larger communities, was in charge of bartering, and led the "army" in case of war. (The ancient Ugrian name for "clan" was *had,* the equivalent of the Hungarian word for "army.") In conducting negotiations and making decisions, he was guided by custom and tradition, and he was responsible to the people's assembly.

The growing needs of the increasing number of Ugrians sent them out onto the Steppes and extended their original settlement all the way to the Altain mountains, south to the Syr-Darya river and Lake Aral, and west to the Caspian Sea. At that time, about 1500 B.C., the area known today as the Kirghiz Steppe was in the path of the great Migration of Peoples. First the nomadic Turans started westward, dividing the European and Indian Aryans into two groups and pushing the ancestors of the Hindus toward what is now India. They were followed by other restless peoples, among them scattered groups of Finno-Ugrics and then the Huns.

The Hun Empire in Central Asia was overthrown by the Chinese at the end of the first century A.D., and the Huns, rushing westward, swept the Ugric people along with them. Sometime between the first and fifth centuries the Ugrics intermingled with a Turkish people of Altaic origin, creating the ethnic group which has been known ever since as the Magyars. (The name

"Magyar"—in its original form Magyeri—comes from Män'si-eri. *Män'si* means *men.*)

Existence on the Steppes completely changed the Hungarians' way of life. The people turned from gleaning, fishing and hunting to stock-breeding, which transformed their political, economic and social structure. Pastureland was still common property, but control over livestock, tents and major equipment gradually came into the hands of the head of the clan. Even clan structure changed: the matriarchal system of indirect inheritance, under which all possessions went to the mother's brothers or her sisters' male children, was replaced by male-line or direct-line inheritance. The Ugric democracy was replaced by a patriarchal system in which the head of the family held the real power.

The Ugric and Turkish peoples merged in western Siberia; during the second half of the fifth century the Magyars moved from there to the area bordered by the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the lower Don River. In the course of their long journey and temporary settlements, they often engaged in warfare. Tempers flared easily on the Steppes and a victory usually meant considerable loot in men and stock. Captured prisoners were sold or kept to do manual work.

Land cultivation was limited to the small area around the settlement, where millet and buckwheat were planted, and harvested with sickles. For the people of the Steppes, a settlement did not mean immobility. If the animals used up the land, the people moved on to new pastures. Winter quarters were more permanent and often grew into large villages with haphazardly pitched tents and improvised corrals. During the summer the villages were either completely abandoned, or old people, women and children were left behind with some of the slaves, while the men moved with the cattle, searching for better pastures, or engaged in warfare.

In the ninth century when the Magyars moved again, they first settled between the Don and Dnieper rivers, then in the area bordered by the Dnieper and Dniester rivers and finally penetrated the Carpathian Basin. They were then a people of seven tribes with 108 clans,

numbering at least half a million souls. The tribal system was controlled by intertribal council. The membership of this supreme political and judicial organ included the tribal leaders, those holding important offices, such as the shaman (high priest), medicine men and chief judge, and specially invited tribal members. At its meetings, which were presided over by the chief of the tribal alliance, the membership discussed such things as the fair distribution of pastureland, smoothed over clan arguments or plotted some war action.

THE ORIGIN OF THE EARLY MAGYAR PEOPLE



The chief was responsible to the tribal alliance, but did not have to account for every decision, and was actually a despotic ruler. He was faced with many varied difficulties during the long wanderings on the Steppes, and his errors and miscalculations might easily have cost the life of his whole people. Moving westward, the Magyars had to cross about half-a-dozen large rivers and innumerable small ones. Women, children and small animals were floated across on leather drums while the men pushed into the stream on horseback, driving the cattle ahead of them. Each crossing was made along a good-sized stretch of river-bank, and measures had to be taken to forestall surprise raids by enemy tribes who tried to capture or destroy stock in the confusion. On such occasions the tribal chief was in absolute charge and his orders had to be carried out without question.

Occasionally such a people on the move grew like an avalanche into a huge nomad empire by absorbing smaller groups along its way. These empires were usually held together by a "Titan of the Steppes," but

they seldom survived their founder, for there was nothing to keep them together. The conquered peoples continued to live according to their own customs and codes, spoke their own tongue and generally maintained their culture. The only tie with the Khan was the submission of their own chieftain, who unconditionally carried out the orders of an Attila or a Ghenghis Khan. Each group of submerged people was given sufficient land and pasture and had its place in the army during a war or while traveling. The conquered peoples were usually sent ahead to man the more dangerous points, or brought up the rear. When the Khan or Mogul died and his empire disintegrated, the various tribes, their social systems and cultures untouched, went on their own ways toward the fulfillment of their destinies.

The Magyars were caught in the sweep toward the West at the same time Julius Ceasar was occupying Gaul, a vast area including what is now north Italy, France and Belgium. The Roman Empire was besieged, and the tremendous outside pressure forced the fortification of the *Limes* and the abandonment of some Eastern colonies.

According to Hungarian legend, it was a miraculous stag that led the ancient Hungarians during their wanderings. The legend tells that old King Nimrod, a giant, had two sons, Hunor and Magor. One day the two princes went out hunting and saw a wondrous, regal stag in the distance. They couldn't kill it, but kept pursuing it through more and more beautiful country and luxurious pastures until it disappeared south of the Sea of Azov in the Meotis marshes.

The legend of the mythical stag reflects the religious ideas of the nomadic herdsmen. They were influenced by Central Asian religious philosophy, symbolized by the struggle between Fire and Darkness. The people of the Steppe imagined the fight between Evil and Good with the Demon as a large beast of prey, often a mythical monster, attacking a tame animal, usually a doe, stag, sheep or goat, and inflicting a deadly wound. They drew pictures of such scenes, in which the monster cannot always be seen, but the terrible evil is

clearly expressed through the horror of the escaping animal. These animals in flight were accurately carved in leather or cast in gold, and some of them were worn by those nomadic chiefs who persecuted weaker peoples.

In 896 A.D., when the Hungarians led by Prince Árpád crossed the Carpathian mountains with their innumerable heads of cattle to settle down in their present country, after vicissitudes of three thousand years and wanderings covering many thousands of miles, their social system was both democratic and despotic. A wealthy group of clans had risen above the others, and were gaining increasing privileges. Other clans which had been ruined in war or otherwise impoverished, formed a middle layer in transition toward the position of outcasts or captured slaves.

This society, clearly divided into social strata, was partially administered by councils of clans, tribes and tribal alliances, which served the interests of the community. However, the leaders could take arbitrary measures, in accordance with the practice prevalent on the Steppes. Military democracy seems the most appropriate name for this system, a democratic society constantly on military alert. It was finally united by a military organization headed by an elected leader, at the time of the Conquest—Prince Árpád.

Europe's Challenge: Feudalism

The Hungarians, with their pagan religion, nomadic customs and numerous animals, ended their wanderings in the Carpathian Basin, which reminded them of the Steppes. Here the Huns and the Avars had established their states too. Attila's capital had been somewhere along the River Tisza; "The Scourge of God," as the trembling peoples called him, was buried in the river-bed when he died in his sleep of a nasal hemorrhage after a pagan orgy, and the Huns drifted back to Asia. The Avars, who built earthen forts and ruled over the territory of present-day Hungary in the seventh and eighth centuries, had been routed by Charlemagne.

The Continent the Hungarians encountered was a

Europe that had stopped Attila's great onslaught and prevented the Avars from establishing an empire similar to his and thus becoming a constant threat to the Christian world. It was difficult for a people of the Steppes to understand this world. They wanted to continue the life they had lived beyond the Carpathians in these new but physically similar surroundings. They tilled only as much soil as was absolutely necessary, and if farming and animal husbandry did not cover their needs, they organized predatory campaigns, the custom of the Steppes, in order to loot and exact ransoms from the wealthier neighboring peoples.

Hungary was inhabited at the time of Prince Árpád's conquest by remnants of Zalan's, Pribina's and Svatopluk's Slav states. The conquered Slavs had a systematic and fairly well-developed agriculture. They were added to the staff of servants of the wealthier clan and tribal chiefs, and some of them even came into the service of poorer freemen. The approximately one hundred thousand square kilometers of thin woodlands, meadows and pastures was not large enough for the Hungarian population, which including the Slavs numbered five to six hundred thousand, to lead a nomadic life, and they therefore gradually shifted to agriculture and livestock breeding.

The tribal chiefs were surrounded by freemen who had deserted their own poor or weak clans and entered the service of richer clans. In peacetime they tended the animals or supervised the work of the slaves, and in war they fought under the chief or were officers of auxiliary troops composed of slaves. They were often joined by loot-hungry leaders or adventurous youth from the smaller clans. The Hungarians starting out on predatory or adventurous campaigns were led by the chieftains or chief officers of the tribes living along the Western border, who had the best knowledge of the roads leading West. For this reason and because they had five to six thousand horsemen, their power grew, to the detriment of the Prince. The raiding horsemen were strictly disciplined by their lieutenants, often applying the whip.

At first, Europe trembled. Eventually, however, the other nations learned the Magyar tactics, and with the superior war techniques of feudalism, repelled their attacks. In a final battle in 955 A.D., the army of the bravest Hungarian leader, *Bulcsu,* was totally defeated. In due time the Hungarian people learned their lesson and realized that the only way they could hope to survive was to conform to the European order.

In 962, during the Byzantine revival, Otto the Great assumed the title of German Emperor and began to establish the Eastern provinces *(Markgravates).* At that time, to be German emperor meant to defend the Christian world against barbarian harassments. A German alliance with Byzantium might well have driven the entire Hungarian nation back to Asia.

The weakened Hungarian tribes were fighting each other, and the tribal chiefs strove for power, some by seeking alliance with Byzantium. The intertribal rivalry ended with the victory of Prince Geza. His son, Vajk, became a Christian and the first king of Hungary, under the name István (Stephen). He was canonized in 1083.

The crown used at his coronation in 1000 was sent by Pope Sylvester II and dramatically symbolized the conditions for survival set by Christian Europe: join the Christian faith, or be destroyed.

At that time Europe's political, economic and social system was feudalism. At the peak of the pyramidal feudal society stood the supreme ruler. Sloping gradually downward to a wide base were the noblemen and landowners, personally dependent on the ruler. The very bottom of the structure was composed of the working masses. The hierarchic chain of vasselage linked everyone to his immediate superior, from the poorest through the richer to the wealthiest up to the ruler, according to rank and position.

King Stephen married a German royal princess: the cortège accompanying her to Hungary included priests and knights. The priests converted the Hungarians and the knights defeated the rebels. Those who sided with the defeated lost all their possessions, even their free-

dom. Victorious King Stephen gave generously of the vast spoils, and German and Italian soldiers of fortune obtained enormous landed estates with many servants.

With the acceptance of the principle of landed property the clan system disintegrated, and the Hungarians were able to participate in the development of Europe in the following centuries. The modern state replaced the system of clans and tribes. Its foundation was laid by Saint Stephen and based on the Frank pattern.

The basic unit of the Frank state was the county. Saint Stephen took over some counties surviving from the Slav states and established new ones. At first he only confiscated the "unappropriated" lands located between the territories of tribes and clans and organized them into royal counties. But rivalries and murderous struggles between groups gradually resulted in the incorporation of tribe and clan lands into the country system. Public administration became simply the administration of royal estates. On the fiefs, the landlords had absolute power over their slaves, appointed judges to administer justice and the *jus gladii* of great landowners even empowered them to pass death sentences and carry out executions.

The king appointed bailiffs to administer the counties. These officials protected or punished the people under their authority, collected taxes and became commanders of conscripted men during wartime. The upper stratum of county society was composed of freemen in supervisory positions. Of equal rank were those freemen who had lost contact with their clans and were managing their own small estates, usually with a few slaves. There was also a gradually increasing class of specialized freemen, described in the chronicles as ploughmen, vine-dressers, fishermen, hunters, swineherds, horse-herds, coopers, smiths, cartwrights, carpenters, etc. These people lived either in the center of the royal estate or in villages. There were also freedmen, slaves gradually liberated as a result of Christian teachings, who were still servants *(servientes)* and did heavy field work. The more skillful among them were taken into the "courts": the households of the king,

landlords, bailiffs, or important freemen. They became cooks, footmen, chambermaids, coachmen, dog or falcon trainers, etc. If the king gave away one of his estates, which happened fairly frequently, all the servants went with the estate and had to serve the new master.

The feudal aristocracy severed all links with the common Hungarians. The blood ties of the clan and tribal systems had been long disrupted, and the people serving the upper class were strangers or, if not, were forced to maintain a strictly subservient relationship. The great lords received high ranks from the king in addition to their estates. Although they numbered only a few hundred, their influence and power became so great that the king was unable to act without them. In time they incorporated their privileges into law and formed a Royal Council. In matters of national interest the decisive word became theirs.

At first the large estates (*latifundia*) were nothing more than the group of servants and freemen under the personal power of each landlord, that is, in the landlord's ownership, who lived throughout the country in rural communities among other people. The landlord was confined to receiving a share of the produce grown by his serfs. This system was replaced in the thirteenth century by great estates formed by land accumulation, and they remained the prevalent economic structure until the middle of the twentieth century.

II.

The symbol of the nation's founding, Saint Stephen's coronation in 1000 A.D., involved no pledge of fealty. Emperor Otto III, who took part in the coronation ceremonies, looked on Hungary as an equal and independent partner in the great Western Christian community. The church life of the era was imbued with a strict ascetic spirit of reform fostered by the reshaped Benedictine order and the renewed Papacy. Saint István (Stephen) associated himself closely with the work of

religious reform. In the stern, virile personality of this ascetic monarch, the Christian spirit joined with the magic inheritance of the Eastern khans and ancient high priests.

Magyar encampments gave way to villages, then cities. A network of bishopal sees and cloisters arose in addition to the royal administrative seats, propagating the ascetic spirit. An ever greater area than that of the original tribal holdings was occupied by the royal, and later, the clerical, estates. Stephen received foreigners —knights, craftsmen, tradesmen—with open arms, and they, in turn, helped bring prosperity to the cities. The king's typically Eastern tolerance towards strangers was voiced in an admonition to his son, the saintly Imre: "Weak is the land of one language."

The transcendental and spiritual content of the shamanist view of the world facilitated the nation's inner acceptance of Christianity, and inspired a live, original folk religiosity which—side by side, but never at odds with the church—permeates the peasantry to this day. Even before Saint Stephen, the Hungarians had become familiar with both Western and Eastern Christianity, and many became Christians.

The adoption of the forms and achievements of Western culture, the personalities of the ruling house and the presence of Western émigrés caused the land to look Westward, but, for all that, it was not unmindful of its Eastern heritage. The contact with the great nomad cultures of the Scythians, Huns and Avars survived with startling vividness through the poetic tales of Hungarian chroniclers of the eleventh through fourteenth centuries. Architecture, arts and crafts showed oriental impulses as well as the dominant Western influences in their part Eastern-pagan, part Byzantine works. The influence of Byzantium lasted until the end of the thirteenth century, although greatly subordinate to Western ideas.

Hungary was the easternmost area of Europe where the artistic and spiritual attainments of the Middle Ages rooted in congenial soil; and this is as true of early and late Gothic, and Renaissance architecture and

sculpture, as of the medieval legends and religious poetry. Hungarian spiritual life joined the great stream of medieval Western culture, while retaining its own individual color. Hungarian music, although strongly affected by the Gregorian and West European classic traditions, still clung to the age-old pentatonic scale in its folk music, and this area became the westernmost point of its spread.

The rising German Empire, which fought the Papacy throughout the Middle Ages, sought to extend its feudal rule over Hungary. This attempt, led by Emperor Conrad II, was foiled by Saint Stephen. His successors, kings of the House of Árpád, beat back each such try.

Again and again the Hungarian State was threatened by incursions of pagan nomad horsemen—Petchenegs, Cumanians which were parried by King Saint László (1077-1095) and others. Much more serious, however, was the invasion of Hungary in 1241 by several hundred thousand mounted troops from Genghis Khan's Empire, which extended from southern Russia to the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Yellow Sea. Within a year, they utterly sacked the land, and slew about half the population, dragging off many survivors as slaves—a blood-bath from which the country .hardly recovered. A year later, the invaders left the ravaged land, as if sensing that they had come to a wholly alien world, but for centuries they held the Russian steppe region, decisively influencing the life and culture of the emerging Russian empire.

Saint László and Kálmán the Learned pushed Hungary's domain southwestward, and their successors pressed southward and to the north Balkan zone whose political and spiritual orientation was uncertain for centuries (and still is) with respect to the West, Byzantium and its Balkan rivals, the Bulgarian and shorter-lived Serbian powers. The sole enduring result of Hungary's north Balkan expansion was to gain Croatia, the area between the Adriatic Sea and the Drava and Sava Rivers, a close geographical adjunct of Hungary. A running battle with the Venetian Republic for the possession of Dalmatia, on the narrow eastern coast of the Adriatic,

drew on the nation's resources, especially during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, under the kings from foreign ruling houses.

Hungarian Renaissance

The latter, after a brief interregnum, were followed by Robert Károly (1308-1342) and his son Lajos the Great (1342-1382), two monarchs of the French-Italian House of Anjou—the kin to the kings of Naples—who in the fourteenth century raised Hungary to heights which were outwardly, even greater than that of the Árpád era. When their male line died out in the first half of the fifteenth century, Sigismund of Luxembourg (1387-1437), who also became Emperor of Germany, came to the throne, to be followed by a Polish king and two kings from the House of Hapsburg, who, in the last decades of the fifteenth century, were succeeded by a national monarch risen from the lesser nobility, Mátyás Hunyadi (1458-1490). Under him the nation attained a new, sunset age of splendor. The varied series of rulers from the so-called mixed houses was completed by two Jagiello scions.

Meanwhile the religio-magical spirit of the monarchy had faded. The nobles' vast estates, with their military might, constituted veritable princedoms. Against them a weak but ambitious young king, László IV, (1272-1290), vainly sought the aid of the still primarily nomadic, pagan Cumanians, who had settled the plains.

The kings of Hungary were chosen by a conclave of freeholders, high nobility, prelates and lesser nobles. These rulers—owing to their foreign origin and the mode of selection—could hardly be expected to evoke great respect for the throne. That respect was transferred to a symbol, the crown given the nation by the Pope, the leader of Christendom. Until modern times (even under the centuries-long rule of the Hapsburgs) the crown enjoyed the devout regard of the freeholders and nobles, who avowed themselves supporters of this symbol of power.

In 1222, just six years after the declaration of the

English Magna Charta, King Endre II, under whom the power of the feudal lords had waxed great, issued the first Hungarian written constitution, at the demand of the militant freeholders, to safeguard their rights. The *Golden Bull* gave a firmer status, in public law, to the landed nobility. Yet at the same time a portion of those already free fell into a state of dependency, and the ever-expanding multitude of serfs progressively lost their political, social and economic independence. This led to the great peasant revolt of 1437, linked to the name of Antal Budai Nagy, and then to the rebellion under György Dozsa in 1514, which involved the whole peasantry. The precipitating cause of the Dozsa rebellion was the high nobility's attempt to void the citizenship rights of peasants concentrated in the rural towns. The codification of the constitution after the revolt was crushed, and the following retaliation, deprived the peasantry of the rights of free movement and property ownership, and placed it beyond the pale of the constitution, which applied only to the privileged classes.

The heresies so permeating the whole life of the Middle Ages formed a major counterpoint to the paramount spiritual power, the Catholic Church headed by the Pope. The Bogumil doctrines stemming from the Balkans—which sharply differentiated soul and body in terms of light and dark, relinquishing the world of the body to the devil—exerted no deep influence on Hungarian spiritualism, which perceived and respected the supernatural through its appreciation of the sensual world. This same leaning towards the sensuous also kept the liturgical, introspective mysticism of the Byzantine Church from making much headway. A far stronger influence on the Hungarian soul was the religious movement launched by Jan Hus, early in the fifteenth century, with its social and political aspects. Its effect might have been deeper and more enduring had not hostile hordes of Hussite forces broken into upper Hungary. Their assault, while directed primarily against the nobles and prelates, did not spare the people. Yet they left strong traces on the religious life

of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for example, in the first Hungarian Bible translation, as well as in many Hungarian Hussite songs and hymns.

The bases of contact with Western culture were primarily the cloisters and the students who, during the Árpád era and later, thronged to the West's great universities—in medieval times to those of Padua, Bologna and Paris; later, from the fourteenth century on, to those of Cracow, Vienna and Prague; and in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, also to the Protestant universities of Leyden, Utrecht, Wittenberg and Oxford. Because of these students pouring abroad, the Hungarian universities—that of King Lajos at Pécs and that of King Mátyás at Pozsony—survived only a short time. The pull of the Hungarian intellectual élite toward the West—ever tinged with disillusion—was as alive then as it is now.

In the mid-fourteenth century Hungary was invaded by another mounted nomad people, who, although their central base was Asia, were able, partly with Western help, to forge a firm empire at the edge of Europe and Asia. The advance of the Osman Turks towards Hungary began in the middle of the fourteenth century during the reign of Lajos the Great, of Anjou, and engaged Hungary's full strength for three centuries. It had a fateful effect on the nation's destiny: on its historical, political and social development.

During the fourteenth century, well before the capture of Constantinople, the Osman Turks conquered a great portion of the Balkans and met Hungarian forces in the north. The clash between Turks and Hungarians was religious as well as political and military. For the first time since joining the West, Hungarians found themselves facing a Moslem power.

The grave Hungarian and European defeat at Nikopol in 1396, which occurred under the reign of King Sigismund, was due to the fact that the heavily armored mounted knights which the West had hurried to the aid of the Hungarians could not cope with the ancient nomad tactics of the mobile, lightly-armed horsemen from the East.

Under the weak kings succeeding Sigismund, in a country riven by strife among its feudal lords and increasing alienation of the peasants from the leading classes, there was grave danger that the Turks would conquer all the Balkans and engulf Hungary and even Central and Western Europe, where they would have met no force able to counter them. However, a brilliant general sprung from the folk, János Hunyadi, fended off this peril for decades. He found his way to the hearts of the peasant masses, partly through the common bond of the deepening spirituality born of dire times. This unification led to the heroic defense of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), achieved in collaboration with the renowned folk preacher, János Kapisztrán. To this day, that victory is commemorated each noon throughout the world by tolling church bells.

While the Turkish power beat at the gates of the North Balkans, János Hunyadi, one of the most powerful personalities in Hungarian history since the days of Saint Stephen and Saint László, established a national unity and order transcending special interests and privileged classes, and raised Hungary to great power status.

Hunyadi's son, Mátyás, was a Renaissance prince, who deliberately maintained a power policy in the belief that this would mobilize great European forces against the Turks. He conquered rich Silesia from the Czechs, and took Vienna and part of Austria. The courts of Mátyás and his prelates became the easternmost foci of humanism and the Renaissance. Mátyás' court in Buda sheltered many eminent Italian and Austrian humanists, historians and natural scientists; he fostered Renaissance architecture and pictorial art. The small fragment of his Buda library still extant, the Corvina, includes some of the finest examples of Renaissance illuminated manuscripts. Despite all alien influences, Renaissance architecture found its own distinctive expression in Hungary, as had Roman, Gothic and Renaissance painting and sculpture. The crenellated friezes of Renaissance houses in the towns of upper Hungary give ample evidence of this influence.

The culture of the Renaissance, in contrast to that

of the Middle Ages, remained essentially alien to most of the peasantry, and hardly reached the middle classes. But Mátyás' humanism, as a viewpoint and attitude, was understood and preserved in many anecdotes about this king whom his people called "Mátyás The Just."

Two Millstones: Istanbul and Vienna

After Mátyás' death, jockeying for power among the court cliques, dwindling of royal power, squabbles between high and lesser nobility, and their joint strife with the serfs, disrupted the nation at the very moment when Turkish power reached its zenith, and, having vanquished the northern Balkans, took two key Hungarian, and European, fortresses, Belgrade and Pétervárad (Petrovaradin). In the decisive battle at Mohács, in 1526 in southern Hungary, the great majority of the high clergy and the aristocracy perished, and the country was opened to the Turks.

At the time, the throne had two claimants: Ferdinand of Hapsburg, nephew of Charles V, and János Zápolya, the Hungarian noble who had crushed the Dozsa peasant rebellion in 1514. The rivalry for the throne was a sign not only of disintegration, but of tragic inner conflict. Some of the country's leaders believed that only a strong western power could save the land from Turkish subjugation, and the subsequent annihilation of the nation and its Christian culture. Many of them clung to Hapsburg rule even if this meant being reduced to the status of an Austro-German colony. Another faction rallied round the idea of a national kingdom headed by Zápolya, deeming that the country could better preserve its independence through a certain degree of accommodation to Turkish suzerainty than by subjection to Austria, whom they felt did not particularly desire Hungary's liberation. However, at this time and during the subsequent century and a half of Turkish rule, Hungarian leaders saw that the goal of subsistence under the twofold pressure from Turks and Germans could be achieved only by accommodating outwardly to both, inwardly to neither. The more positive policy supported Hapsburg rule in Hungary, de-

spite actions inimical to the nation, while the other group represented the passive force which has sustained long-suffering Eastern peoples even under the most awful tyrannies. More than once this dual stand was taken by a single individual who, to generalize roughly, looked both West and East.

The first national leader to heroically bear this grave conflict within himself was György Fráter, the keyman at the courts of János Zápolya (1526-1540), and of his widow and son, János Zsigmond, the first Prince of Transylvania (1559-1571). Fráter was first a soldier on the frontier, then a Paulist monk, and finally Bishop of Várad and Cardinal. He had to endure failure in both his stands: the German Hapsburg power could not defend the country against the Turks or even restore its independence, while the Turks would not permit even a quasi-national kingship. Two impossibilities neutralized each other, as it were, to provide the sole possibility of action. To implement his dual policy, Fráter supported the creation of an independent Transylvanian princedom, which split Hungary into three parts: the Hapsburg area in the west, the central Turkish zone to the north—largest of the three—and to the southeast the nominally free area of little Transylvania, which, although it acknowledged Turkish dominance, decisively contributed to the survival of Hungarian spiritual independence.

The intellectual leaders of Hungary never allowed the opposition viewpoint to perish. This was true of pro-Hapsburg Catholics like Cardinal Péter Pázmány, the royal viceroy Miklos Esterházy, and the great general and poet of the fight against the Turks in the XVIth Century, Miklos Zrinyi, Croatian by descent; and Protestants who co-operated with the Turks but at the same time defended and bolstered an independent Transylvania, men like István Bocskay, Gábor Bethlen and György Rákoczi I, of the early XVIIth century. The Transylvanians, who recognized Turkish dominance, would always negotiate with the Hapsburgs, even when warring on them, and pro-Hapsburg statesmen more than once saved Transylvania from destruction.

This grave and insoluble German-Turkish conflict was increased by yet another: the religious rift. A trend towards worldliness and slackening morals on the part of many prelates, the attempt of powerful nobles to seize the ecclesiastical estates, the unpopularity of the Catholic Hapsburg power, the Turks' relative tolerance of the Protestants, and, even more, the strong practical sense of a goodly segment of the Hungarians, enabled Protestantism to win over the great majority of the population in the decades after the Mohács defeat. However, most of the people again became Catholics at the end of the sixteenth century. One reason for this shift was that the Catholic Church enjoyed Hapsburg support; then too, there was the moral and religious upsurge within the church and the proselyting of the new Jesuit Order; moreover, many preferred Catholicism's mystic aura to the barer Protestant ritual. However, the Catholic Church never again achieved a preponderance over the three main Protestant faiths—the Reformed, the Lutheran and the Unitarian.

In almost all European states at this period, either the Catholics or the Protestants achieved decisive numerical and political superiority. This was also true of the kingship and Transylvania. Most of the Catholic leaders naturally were more drawn to a Catholic great power, while the majority of Protestants leaned towards the Transylvanian princedom which championed Protestant religious freedom. Essentially, however, the Catholics were no more "pro-German" than the Protestants were "pro-Turkish." No religious war of extermination ever occurred in Hungary, where Eastern tolerance created an acceptance of varying beliefs. That tolerance was uniquely manifested by the Transylvanian parliament at Torda in 1552, which guaranteed complete freedom of religion, stipulating that no one could be barred from public office for religious reasons.

In the seventeenth, and to a lesser extent in the eighteenth century, the Viennese Court persecuted Protestants; in the second half of the seventeenth century it actually sought to force a single religion on all its territories, citing the principle, *"cuius regio, eius religio."* It

looked on the Protestants as rebels, hostile strangers, and deemed that Protestantism heightened Hungarian independence efforts and anti-German feelings. Although most of the high nobility had become Catholic, it was perhaps in some measure due to these maneuvers of the Viennese Court that the lesser nobility and citizens of the towns generally remained so firmly Protestant. The lesser nobility organized the ancient counties into citadels of Protestantism and national resistance.

Bocskay and Bethlen, with their troops, forced the German power to sign a peace one of whose cornerstones was recognition of Protestant religious freedom. Both men had seized large areas from the Germans. Both rejected the Hungarian crown offered to them, knowing that acceptance would lead to a clash between Turks and Hapsburgs and thus imperil Transylvania's independence.

One of Transylvania's greatest princes, István Báthory (1571-1581), was chosen by the Poles as their king in 1576. His reign inaugurated a bright era in Polish history. His victory over the forces of Czar Ivan the Terrible saved Poland and Central Europe from Russian invasion. Both Báthory and his contemporary, Cardinal Péter Pázmány, Archbishop of Esztergom and the greatest leader and writer of the Counter-Reformation, sought to establish a European league of nations, the first against Turks and Russians, the latter against the Osman peril.

The battles between the royal and the Turkish forces —always fought on Hungarian soil—caused the people, especially the peasantry, untold grief. Apart from the havoc wrought by regular troops, Turkish and Tartar robber bands slaughtered or drove off thousands, not sparing women and children. On the Great Plain the peasants left their villages for the fortified shelter of the great rural towns, where at least they could escape the raids of the irregulars. The peasants under Turkish rule were despoiled not only by the Turks but by feudal lords in Hapsburg territory who also demanded tribute.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, at the peak of the Turks' advance, about two-thirds of the country had fallen into Turkish hands. During the seventeenth century the Turkish Empire began its slow disintegration. At that time, especially after the victory at Szentgotthárd, the Hungarians came to believe that the Viennese Court was not too anxious to free the land, fearing that a united country might carve out its independence. However, it was the Thirty Years War, and then the French wars, which kept the Hapsburgs from pitting their full strength against the Turks. In 1683 the Turkish forces, already in steep decline, made a last desperate attempt to destroy Hapsburg power. They were routed, while besieging Vienna, by a coalition of Austria, Poland, Venice and the Papacy, but primarily by the direct intervention of King Jan Sobieski of Poland. As a result, Austria and several other European countries resolved upon a war of liberation, during which Hungarian forts taken by the Turks were recaptured. In 1686 they freed Hungary's ancient capital, Buda, the center of the Turkish forces of occupation.

Freedom Fights

The liberating army swiftly retook most of the country; only the south remained in Turkish possession for a few more decades. Eugene of Savoy, the great general of Charles VI (on the Hungarian throne between 1711-1740, Charles III), and Louis of Baden—who replaced him after his death—freed the south too, beating back the Turks' last attempts at conquest and extending Hapsburg sway to the North Balkans, including the onetime sphere of Hungarian influence. And finally a reunited Hungary, along with essentially separate Croatia, became part of the Hapsburg Empire. (In 1691 Transylvania also lost its autonomy, partly due to inner decline and a lack of able leaders, partly to the end of the Turkish counterpoise.)

The excesses of the foreign soldiery, confiscatory taxes and harsh economic exploitation plunged the country

into an impoverished colonial status. The bitterness of the lesser nobility was augmented by the growing persecution of Protestants. In 1644 scions of the ancient high nobility holding prominent posts in the land, headed by Viceroy Ferenc Wesselényi, joined with the lesser nobility in an attempt to free Hungary from German rule. Trusting in the promises of Louis XIV, they decided to revolt, but French aid failed to materialize. The Viennese Court executed the leaders of this revolt, which had existed only on paper, and launched an era of absolutist terror in Hungary.

From the end of the sixteenth century on, the serfs, fleeing persecution and ruin, joined with the lower nobility and burghers in Cossack-style troupes, such as the *Hajdus* led by Bocskay. These free forces, the so-called *Kuruc* Army, fought foreign mercenaries and others in the service of the King. Imre Thököly, a descendant of the high nobility, became their able general. At the time of the last great Turkish drive before the fruitless siege of Vienna, Thököly's *Kuruces* occupied a large part of upper Hungary, where some of his less-disciplined troops launched vengeful Catholic persecutions. With the Turkish fiasco the star of Thököly and his forces declined and he himself died a captive of the Turks.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, a new national revolt, the first universal fight for freedom against foreign oppressors, broke out, sparked by a mass rising of peasants in northeast Hungary. The movement took on country-wide import when Hungary's wealthiest and most distinguished aristocrat, Ferenc Rákoczi II—with holdings vast as a small country—assumed its leadership after an inner struggle. Three of his ancestors had ruled Transylvania, his father had participated in the Wesselényi attempt; his mother, Ilona Zrinyi, a scion of great soldiers and statesmen, had heroically defended the Fort of Munkács against Caraffa, chief executor of absolutist terror, on behalf of her second husband, Imre Thököly. Rákoczi had been schooled first by Austrian Jesuits, then at the Viennese Court. He himself was deeply Catholic—his "Confes-

sions" are a masterpiece of spiritual literature. Later, in France, he was drawn to the stern ascetic views of the Jansenists.

Louis XIV promised much, but he did only enough to allow the patriots of a small nation to disquiet the menacing Hapsburg power. Rákoczi also received like promises from the Russian Czar, which were honored only in their breach.

Actually the French and their allies, the Bavarians, were in no position to lend Rákoczi any potent aid, because the forces of the Hapsburg-English-Dutch coalition led by Eugene of Savoy and Marlborough roundly defeated them, preventing a breakthrough towards central Europe.

When the possibility of contact with the French troops ceased, the fate of the fight for freedom was sealed. In 1705 the parliament of the insurgents chose Ferenc Rákoczi as their monarch, dethroning the House of Hapsburg—mainly at the wish of the French. For a decade the impoverished country again became a battlefield. Drained of all its strength, further fighting would have been suicide, and the *Kuruc* forces surrendered in 1711. Rákoczi and his adherents fled to Poland. He met with Peter the Great in a vain attempt to gain Russian support, and then emigrated to France, where the court of Louis XIV received him as a distinguished but politically inconsequential guest. He died as an émigré in Turkey, where, after his death, his son also vainly tried to organize forces against the Hapsburg empire.

Was Rákoczi's fight for freedom in vain? Were the 1848 Hungarian fight for freedom, and the revolt of October 1956 useless? In the consciousness of Hungarians, Rákoczi—as later, Kossuth too—is not associated with national defeat and collapse. The Rákoczi freedom fight awakened powerful forces among the people. Within a few years it brought about an amazing national renaissance, a reconciliation of the classes, and rich forms of art, music and poetry which evoked the Hungarian outlook and spirit. The seeds of the Rákoczi revolt ripened later. His battle for liberty made it impossible for Austrian absolutism to continue its ter-

roristic oppression and the Rákoczi uprising ended enslavement. Even though oppression did not cease, the old methods could never again return. The Hungarian people had given proof of their vigor and will to live.

Maria Theresa's humanistic absolutism—she ruled from 1740 to 1780—took account of Hungarian strength and national aspirations. Hungarian troops played a major part in defending her realm from attacks on all sides. Hungarians played an outstanding role in her courts and government. The noble youth of her Hungarian bodyguard brought the ideals of French enlightenment to Hungary. She reformed public education, which had been solely in the hands of the Catholic orders and the Protestant denominations. New laws somewhat ameliorated the situation of the peasantry, although their lot was not radically changed. Economic exploitation also was eased, though it did not cease. The Viennese court still blocked the development of Hungarian industry, for Austria looked on Hungary as a source of raw materials and food, and an outlet for her industrial products.

Joseph II (1780-1790) was the standard bearer of enlightened absolutism, modeling himself on his ideal, Frederick II of Prussia. His social measures sought to alleviate the plight of the peasantry, though these reforms were opposed by the privileged orders, as had been those of his mother, Maria Theresa. Some of the peasantry expected miracles of him, and the very backward Rumanian peasantry of Transylvania somehow got the idea that the king meant to destroy the Hungarian landowners with their help. For the first time in Hungarian history oppression spread to the tragic area of minorities, when the revolt of the Rumanian peasantry led to horrible destruction. At the same time, however, Hungarian Transylvania was the site of early Rumanian cultural efforts. It was here that the books were printed that stirred the Rumanian national culture and consciousness.

Joseph II continued to promote tolerance towards Protestants. However, though he himself was a devout

Catholic, his anti-church measures alienated some of the Hungarian Catholics, whose national pride was offended by the king's effort to streamline administration by making German the obligatory state language. Some of the high nobility scarcely knew Hungarian, and all the privileged orders used Latin rather than Hungarian in official affairs, especially legal matters. Even so, however, the result of Joseph II's action was a far-reaching spiritual revolt which underlay the national resurgence great liberty movement of the 19th century. The country's youth and writers fought not only to preserve the national language but to make it sovereign. These two groups have initiated every freedom movement in Hungary through today.

1848: Kossuth

Joseph II finally had to withdraw his Germanizing decree. That victory, however, was only the first phase of the battle for the Hungarian language and national literature and culture, and beyond all these, for the recognition of Hungary as a social and political entity.

Hungarian literature never was of *l'art pour l'art* school. The ancient shaman texts, the heroic epics and even the old love songs are poetic works, but at the same time religio-magical texts in which each phrase, each image has significance with regard to the people's destiny: their earthly and heavenly future. The Hungarian writer, whether writing in Latin or in his own tongue, never completely broke away from his ancient poetic-priestly and political role. He was never satisfied with expressing his inner intentions in artistic form; artistic creation was also a communal act, for the people and for society, even when he was apparently in conflict with it. The great poets of the reform era, Mihály Vörösmarty, Ferenc Kölcsey, Dániel Berzsenyi, Mihály Csokonai Vitéz, later the great novelists of the age of the revolt: Mor Jókai, Zsigmond Kemény, Joseph Eötvös, played the leading roles in the formation of national life.

The basic aim of the writer, in the reform era—as in

modern times—was to portray the people to the upper classes and intelligentsia. The writers' subject was primarily the peasantry (which then made up about eighty per cent of the population); their outlook, human and social interests, wealth of traditional experience, and also needless suffering and poverty. Poetic creation was the bridge between the two worlds. This is the deeper content of Hungarian folk literature as exemplified by that era's great apostles of poetry, Sándor Petöfi and János Arany.

The idea for which the statesmen and youth of the reform era fought in the National Assembly and at county meetings, as well as in books and in periodicals, can be listed under five headings:

1. The serfs should be freed and given land.
2. The rights of man must be assured.
3. A system of popular representation should be established, with free elections and a government responsible to parliament.
4. Special privileges and unequal taxation must be abolished.
5. There must be social and economic reform, including reform of public administration and the prisons; a modern credit system should be established and the guilds abolished.

These reforms were opposed not only by the Viennese Court, but by most of the Hungarian high nobility, prelates, and lesser nobility, who feared the consequences of abolishing serfdom, which was the basis of their economic and social existence. However, for the most part they too condemned Austria's oppression of Hungary.

The influence of the 1848 Paris revolt, which swept through Europe and temporarily overthrew the reactionary system associated with the name of Metternich, was decisive. This influence, absorbed and then projected by the young Hungarian intellectuals, launched the 1848 struggle for freedom.

Two positions, for gradual reform and for radical change, crystallized around two great personalities. Ist-

ván Széchenyi, who had effected a long series of cultural, economic and technical reforms, considered further reforms as the pre-condition of national and political transformation.

Heading the camp that advocated swift revolutionary change stood Lajos Kossuth, who, as a young envoy, sat in the National Assembly and soon became the idolized leader of the country's youth. Defying censorship, he continued to issue reports on happenings in parliament and at county meetings, becoming a champion of freedom of the press. Like Széchenyi, he had a broad western education. Thrown into prison, he gained so fluent a command of English there that later he was able to address English and American audiences in almost Shakespearan cadences. Kossuth's stand can be briefly summarized: freedom first—meaning the highest attainable degree of national independence and democracy—then everything else. Kossuth concentrated the ideals and endeavors of the reform age into a single focus: the achievement of liberty.

The youth of Pest, dissatisfied with the work of the National Assembly, staged an enthusiastic mass demonstration in March, 1848, in collaboration with two great geniuses, the poet Petöfi and the novelist Mór Jókai. Defying the censor, they published Petöfi's rousing call to freedom, "Arise Hungarians!. ." as well as a twelve point manifesto. This tradition was continued by Hungarian youth, when in October, 1956 they again listed their demands by points—in many respects identical to those of 1848—in the face of another foreign oppression, this time Soviet Communist tyranny.

Petöfi, through his life and poetry, fulfilled the historic mission of Hungarian literature. His championing of the people's cause was reflected even by his death at the hands of Russian Cossacks who invaded Hungary to help end the fight for freedom.

Hungarian youth's March demands were: freedom of the press, a responsible cabinet, equality before the law, equal taxes, the abolition of serfdom, union with Transylvania (then governed separately so as to divide the

Hungarians). The demonstrating throng freed the political prisoners, among them Mihály Táncsics, leader of the workers, who had as yet played hardly any political role.

The March events forced the Viennese Court to approve the laws of April 11 which the National Assembly had passed, fired by the dynamism of Hungarian youth. The first responsible Hungarian cabinet was formed. Kossuth became the soul of the freedom movement, both in the government and among the people. He blended youthful verve with responsibility in running the country.

Széchenyi was shattered by the thought of the destructive storm the revolt would bring. He felt sure that the cause of Hungarian independence must fail in a showdown with Vienna and the aroused minorities. He retired to an Austrian sanitarium, and, in 1860, committed suicide.

Until this period, there had been no real minority question in Hungary. The status of peasants of other nationalities was the same as that of the Hungarians. The Turks had by and large destroyed the Hungarians on the Great Plain, and spared the minorities who dwelt in the hills. Thus, when they withdrew, the proportion of other nationalities had risen sharply. Surging Hungarian national consciousness spurred that of the minorities too, and the Viennese Court fanned the flames so as to keep Hungary in check. From the first decades of the nineteenth century this nationalistic trend also was aided by Russian pan-Slavism. As a counterpoise to the Hungarian freedom movement, the reactionary Austrian Court, curiously enough, supported the liberal and even radical efforts of minority leaders, whose nationalistic and democratic movements relied largely on the aid of Austrian reactionary circles. The Viennese Court even went so far as to encourage revolts by minorities whose intelligentsia was primarily embittered by the use of Hungarian as a state language, a parallel to the former rift between the Hungarians and Austria.

Seizing a moment when the fight for freedom seemed in control, the Viennese Court stripped Hungary of her constitution. At this, the National Assembly dethroned the House of Hapsburg on April 4, 1849, proclaiming Hungary's emancipation from Austria, and chose Louis Kossuth as governor of independent Hungary.

The revolutionary army had fine leaders, especially Arthur Görgey, a former officer of the guards, and Joseph Bem, hero of the Polish war for freedom, who also participated in the Viennese revolt. Among the officers were idealistic foreigners, too, defending the cause of universal freedom on Hungarian soil, while the rank and file was made up of the Hungarian peasantry. But money and arms were lacking. Nevertheless the army scored crucial victories and at one point drove the Austrians completely out of the country. But the military revolt was sealed when young Franz Joseph called in the Russian Czar, Nicholas I, to suppress it. Without arms and outside help, facing overwhelming force, further resistance would have been just as suicidal as in the days of Rákoczi's battle for freedom, and Görgey, as plenipotentiary of the fleeing Kossuth, surrendered at Világos on August 13, 1849.

The Austrian terror then loosed by General Haynau took thousands of victims. Most of the military and political leaders of the revolt were executed, among them thirteen generals. Others escaped by fleeing abroad. Kossuth emigrated to Turkey, where Bem joined the Turkish forces to fight for the third time against Russian czarism. Kossuth sailed for Britain on an American naval vessel and his electric presence contributed to the fall of the English Conservative Party. Then he went to the United States, to be celebrated as no one since Lafayette. Finally he settled in Torino, the center of the Italian freedom movements, where he evolved a significant plan for a Danubian Confederation, linking Hungarians, South Slavs and Rumanians into a bloc strong enough to ward off Austrian encroachment.

Grave defeats, the loss of the Italian provinces and her complete elimination from the German empire, forced Austria into a settlement with Hungary. Most Hungarians saw that under the circumstances, a compromise was the only realistic solution, so Ferenc Deák engineered the Compromise of 1867 between Hungary and Austria, by whose terms the ruling house entered into a personal union with Hungary. Foreign and defense affairs, as well as tariffs and monetary matters were to be handled jointly. Until the first World War the Compromise was recognized as a basis of national policy by all leading Hungarian statesmen, among them Julius Andrássy, supporter of the monarchy's pro-German foreign policy, and Kálmán and István Tisza, broadly cultured representatives of the landowning lesser nobility, who were backed by the semi-liberal majority party.

The movement for complete independence continued, though now based more on dreams than reality. Indeed the Independence party was accused—not without some truth—of waging a campaign to distract public opinion from urgent social and cultural reforms. Yet it is also true that the conservative framework of the Monarchy precluded any radical reform. An essential for such reforms was national independence.

Within the shelter of a European great power, in the calm of the Franz Joseph era (1848-1916), the country thrived, developing industrialization and international trade. Travel and communications improved, a network of banks appeared, and urbanization—especially in Budapest—made great strides.

At the end of the century came the first labor movements and strikes, and the first meaningful agrarian and socialist movements. Demands for social improvement led inevitably to political demands—above all the right to a universal secret ballot. Here the workers of Budapest played an energetic role.

The transitory period, lasting well into the first decade of the twentieth century, was intellectually a time

of retrospection, drawing its inspirations from the preceding great decades. It concentrated on imitating creations of the past rather than dealing with the grave and timely problems, the hidden social and human conflicts, which it should have explored.

Music, creative arts, architecture, and the humanities drew their inspiration from the experiences of the Reform Age and the Freedom Fight to an even greater extent than did literature. The music of Franz Liszt, one of the greatest composers of the period, was the precursor of modern music, and it was shaped to a great extent by the revolutionary experiences of the Hungarian nation. The same inspiration moved the other important composers of the epoch (Ferenc Erkel, Mihály Mosonyi); its painters (Mihály Munkácsy, Lászlo Paal); sculptors (Miklos Izso, János Fadrusz); architects (Miklos Ybl, Frigyes Feszl) and those engaged in the cultivation of the flourishing historical sciences.

In the years before World War I, Hungarian writing resumed its old communal mission. The new literature had two complementary faces. The first found Hungarian spiritual life stagnant through its loss of contact with Western currents of life, literature, art and science. These writers declared that only communication with the West could rouse Hungarian society from its vegetative stupor. Their revolt was expressed by the magazine "Nyugat" (The West), founded in 1908. This literary spirit facing Westward was represented by the poets Endre Ady, Mihály Babits, Dezső Kosztolányi, Árpád Toth and later by the novelist Sándor Márai. Ady was also a brilliant publicist, and Babits and Kosztolányi, outstanding novelists and short story writers.

No less important was the new literature's other face, which did not gaze into the distance, but was concerned with nearer depths, the Hungarian land and the country's subterranean forces. This group was the impetus of a key phenomenon of modern Hungarian spiritual life: the folk movement, or folk literature movement. For writers, artists, musicians, teachers, historians and agrarians, life in Hungary—especially the life of Hungarian peasants—became an artistic and hu-

man experience with basic social and political overtones, bringing an awareness that Hungarian society and culture could not be reborn without ending the physical and spiritual impoverishment of the villages. Endre Ady also represented this side of the new literature, together with the great and prophetically passionate "unmasker" of the postwar era, Zsigmond Moricz. They were joined by the novelist Dezsö Szabo and the poet, Gyula Juhász. Moricz and Szabo were social and political publicists in the deeper sense of the word.

Among the first generation of new creativity was the eminent musical genius, Béla Bartok, a great initiator even from the standpoint of world culture. In his being and art this duality of the new Hungarian spirit, melding Western and folk elements, was harmoniously at one. No composer has ever given more vital voice to Nature, in the word's universal, religious sense—meaning not pantheism but the symbol language of being. His revolutionary achievement (which was shared by his great partner, the composer Zoltán Kodály) was to create a wholly individual language of form which gave the world of individual feeling and passion a mythic perspective. By their rediscovery of Hungarian folk music, these two men made their nation aware that it belonged among the Hungarian spirit's treasures, and could express the most sharply differentiated individual intents. The personal influence of these two composers, their brave, open resistance to all tyranny, swayed youth as much as their art.

This populist trend has found expression in the style, composition, and color of the last fifty years of Hungarian painting, from the pioneers (Pál Szinyei Merse, László Mednyánszky, Simon Holossy, Károly Ferenczy, Jozsef Rippl-Ronai) through the seekers of new forms (Gyula Rudnay, József Koszta, István Csok, Tivadar Csontváry) to the present generation (József Egry, István Szönyi, Aurél Bernáth). Present day Hungarian sculptors express this populist approach in their search for new forms to represent the human figure (Ferenc Medgyessy, Miklos Borsos, Tibor Wilt, Dezsö Bokros-Bir-

man, Géza Csorba). Architecture, like music, has developed a modern airy, sunny style drawn from the ornamental elements and forms of the people's art (Ödön Lechner, Béla Lajta, etc.).

The Western face of the new revolutionary spirit more than once seemed master of the field, but never could obliterate the folk spirit entirely. Where this western outlook prevailed, it produced a wholly urbane literature and art which, though often seemingly at odds with folk art and literature, actually formed a rich equation, trend balancing trend.

As a result of the defeat of the Monarch in 1918 Hungary suffered an almost unprecedented loss of a great part of her population and territory, despite the fact that she could not be accused of any imperialistic aims. Hungary was permitted to keep 28.6 per cent of her former territory, 31.5 per cent being annexed to Rumania, 19.6 per cent to Yugoslavia, 18.9 per cent to Czechoslovakia, 1.2 per cent to Austria, and small fragments to Poland and Italy. The country lost 71.4 per cent of its total territory and 61 per cent of its total population. Over three million Magyars, more than a fourth of the total population, became subjects of these "successor states."

The lost war tore open inner wounds. The October 1918 revolt, which can hardly be called that, since it had practically no opponents and therefore occurred quite bloodlessly, finally achieved the inevitable break with Austria and the ruling house, and afforded a chance for the country, which had at last regained its freedom, to take the road of democratic and social transformation. That road, however, was blocked not only by a latent and ever more strongly organized inner subversion, but primarily by the Western Powers' hostility to Hungary, notably that of France, then dominant in continental affairs. These forces swept the country towards communism which—then, too—was forced on the people by a tiny minority well schooled by the Soviet Union, consisting mainly of former war prisoners trained in Russia. They sweetened the bitter pill with a promise that the Soviet Union, then advancing towards Po-

land, would help restore a great portion of Hungary's territorial integrity. Since such Soviet aid did not materialize, the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary crumbled after a few victories, in the face of Czech, Rumanian and Hungarian counterrevolutionary forces backed by the French. Actually, however, it was not outside force that caused its collapse after four months, but the peasantry, which, despite all social oppression, abhorred terror.

Neo-Baroque Society

After the fall of the first Hungarian "Commune," the country was reorganized by the neo-conservative counter-revolutionary and political forces, whose spirit the most noted modern Hungarian historian named the neo-Baroque, alluding to its overemphasis of old forms to cover lack of content. With the aid of military forces, the Parliament elected as Regent the leader of the troops entering Budapest, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, last commander of the Austro-Hungarian fleet. The law it enacted dethroned the Hapsburg ruling house, but in principle retained the Hungarian kingship, despite the fact that the returning Charles IV had been turned back twice by force of arms. The troubled country was consolidated by Count Stephen Bethlen, Prime Minister between 1921-31.

The neo-Baroque society, in baroque style, socially and spiritually ostracized the nation's two great basic strata, the vast majority of the population: the peasants and the workers, the latter by now organized along social-democratic lines by the trade unions. It scoffed at land reform, an inescapable condition for a unified society and refused all co-operation with attempts to bring the economic status of workers and peasants into balance. This led to the emergence of a sort of half proletariat, intellectual and non-intellectual, which strongly affected public opinion and proved fertile soil for Fascist ideas.

After the triumph of Italian Fascism and then of German National Socialism, the influence of the anti-

democratic forces grew apace, much aided by fear of increasing Soviet power beyond the border, as well as by a tacit knowledge that the great social problems remained unsolved. This political orientation, combined with the ruling neo-baroque society's views, led to growing isolation from the era's progressive current of ideas.

The writers again undertook to lead the country out of its political, social and spiritual impasse, voicing and writing out solutions for the fateful problems which the official world was utterly unwilling to face. Hungary was still a predominantly agrarian state and each social, economic and spiritual crisis was linked in some way to the widening gulf between leading classes and peasantry.

Labor also became sociologically significant, though it was not an important spiritual factor because its rigid Marxist dogmatism alienated youth, especially the young intellectuals.

The folk literature continued to reveal the Hungarian world, depicting its great human, spiritual and moral values, but also the inhuman conditions many millions of Hungarians had to suffer. Above all, it never ceased to stress that the key to any future Hungarian renaissance was improvement of the peasant's lot by radical land reform.

Poets, novelists and dramatists, essayists, publicists, agronomists and teachers belonged to the great community of folk writers which, with that generation, became a true movement. Gyula Illyés, József Erdélyi, Imre Kovács, László Németh, János Kodolányi, Péter Veres, Zoltán Szabó, Ferenc Erdei, József Darvas, Pál Szabó, György Sárközi, Géza Féja, Sándor Karácsony are its best known writers. Many eminent spirits of the age were kin to them without being openly engaged in their activities. Thus the magic style of Áron Tamási, the Transylvanian novelist, short story writer and dramatist, which gave mythical perspective to the life of the peasant, and the exquisite music of Lörinc Szabó's verses, also blazed the way for the young literary élite. They kept in close touch with the greatest figure of

the new generation of poets, the spokesman of socialism, or rather of the city proletariat, Attila József.

But all in vain. Hungary fell under the spell of the Nazi and Fascist movements, and the pent-up resentment of the lower middle class found an outlet in strong anti-Semitism. Broad strata of the population were influenced by Hitler's and Mussolini's clever move, the so-called Vienna Decision (1938-40), which restored to Hungary significant Hungarian populated areas of Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

In 1941 the Germans forced the government to participate in the campaign against Yugoslavia, using as bait the return of that country's southern, Hungarian-populated areas. Premier Paul Teleki, realizing the fateful significance of Hungarian restitution from terroristic regimes, committed suicide.

The new Prime Minister, László Bárdossy, was an ardent follower and supporter of German policy. Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union, then on the Western Allies, and participated energetically in the German campaign against Russia. In March 1942 Miklós Kállay took over the premiership and, as events turned against Germany (the Allied landing in Africa and especially in Italy, the battle of Stalingrad), he established relations with the West. In August 1943, the Kállay government declared its readiness to accept the Casablanca formula of unconditional surrender, should the Allied forces reach the frontiers of Hungary. The Germans, suspicious of such negotiations, occupied Hungary in a surprise move on March 19, 1944, and appointed a Quisling government.

One immediate result of the German occupation was that several hundred thousand Jews were hauled to death camps abroad. In October, 1944, when the Soviet advances already threatened Hungarian soil, Regent Horthy and his circle, once more tried to break off hostilities. The Germans arrested him, along with many thousands of Hungarians; other thousands only escaped by going underground. The Germans entrusted the government to the extreme rightist Arrow-Cross faction led by Ferenc Szálasi; all the hopes faded.

FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE

... The four horsemen of the Apocalypse rode behind the Red army as it poured its hordes like a dark flood over the Hungarian plain. The 13th century chronicles describing the Tatar invasion pale in comparison to the horrors which the Hungarian people had to suffer while the Red barbarians turned their gardenlike state into a valley of endless wails. They raped and dishonored our women in ways so fiendish that they are unbelievable of decent human beings.

... When the Red army invaded the country in 1944 *and* 160 *well-trained Communists of Hungarian extraction arrived directly from Moscow, the detailed blueprints for the liquidation of our social, political and economic structure and for the complete communization of the country were at hand ... So confident were the Communists of their success, that of all their conquests in Eastern Europe they singled out Hungary as the first country to hold general elections. Here they expected their greatest victory.*

The elections were to be held in two stages: first in the capital and then in the country ... The future of the whole resistance was going to be decided at the polls in Budapest. Great was our surprise when the final count resulted in my party's winning the absolute majority by polling 50.5 *percent of the votes. Nobody expected any party to gain the majority of the Budapest City Council, but the mystery of this miraculous success cleared up when the count in the newly formed suburban precincts disclosed larger majorities of the Smallholders than in the old city. Great was our rejoicing, because this victory won on October* 7, 1945, *heralded an ever greater triumph in the national elections to follow a month later. Here the Communists suffered a smashing defeat by being reduced to a minor party. They polled only* 17 *percent of the total vote, in spite of all the support of the Red army and in spite of all the pressure, terror, and intimidation. The Smallholders captured more than* 57 *percent of the total vote ...*

(*From a Statement by* Msgr. Béla VARGA *before the Subcommittee on Hungary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., U.S., on August* 20, 1954)

PART TWO

The Post-War Era

COMMUNIST CONQUEST OF HUNGARY

In the general picture of Eastern European developments the Hungarian scene has some peculiar features. Hungary did not succeed in changing sides effectively during the war and at the close of hostilities was probably in the worst political position among the former Axis satellites. She did not enjoy much sympathy in the West, and was positively disliked by the Russians. In point of time Hungary was the last of the Axis satellites to conclude an armistice treaty with the three major Allies (January 20, 1945).

The invading Russian army found in the devastated country an almost complete vacuum of political power. The old administration was nonexistent or not recognized by the occupying army which with the help of experienced Communist advisers created an entirely new political organization. Despite or perhaps because of these circumstances, Hungary is the only former Axis satellite state where free and unfettered elections took place according to the Yalta Agreement.

Hungary was politically isolated in the months following the close of hostilities. She had neither diplomatic representatives abroad nor friends among the victorious states. She was occupied by Russian troops, and until September 1947 lived under the strict control of the Russian-ruled Allied Control Commission. In

Ostrava
Olomouc
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Brno
Žilina
Morava
Váh
Hron
AUSTRIA
VIENNA
Bratislava (Pozsony)
Nové Zámky (Érsek-ujvár)
Lučenec (Losonc)
Miskolc
Salgótarján
Eger
Győr
Komárom
Vatrán
BUDAPEST
HUNGAR
Szombathely
Balaton
Veszprém
Székesfehérvár
Kecskemét
Dunaújváros
Kaposvár
Szeged
Pécs
Mecsek Mts
Subotica (Szabadka)
Zagreb
Sombor
Osijek (Eszék)
Novi Sad
Danube
(Ujvidék)
YUGOSLAVIA
Sava
Beograd
Šabac
Vrbas
Bosna
Tuzla


Lvov
U. S. S. R.
Kolomyia
Uzhgorod
(Ungvár)
Mukachevo
(Munkács)
Chernovtsy
Khust
(Huszt)
Satu Mare
(Szatmárnémeti)
Oradea
(Nagyvárad)
Cluj
(Kolozsvár)
Tirgu Mures
(Marosvásárhely)
Mures
ROMANIA
Mures
Olt
Oraşul Stalin
(Brassó)
Rasita
Jiu
HUNGARY
A GENERAL MAP
International Boundary
HUNGARIAN
Ethnic Areas

the armistice period she could not renew diplomatic relations without the permission of the A.C.C. This permission was in some cases delayed, in others, refused. The Hungarian people still retained vivid recollections of the 1919 Communist regime of Bela Kun. They also remembered that the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49 had been crushed with the help of the Russian Army.

While Budapest and western Hungary were still in German hands, the Moscovite Communists, moving around the liberated areas in Russian army cars, picked up a few members of the former opposition parties and escorted them to Debrecen, the chief town in northeastern Hungary. This group of hand-picked politicians approved a Communist proposal to convoke at Debrecen a Provisional National Assembly. In the larger villages and towns the National Committees organized meetings which elected representatives by acclamation.[1]

The Provisional National Assembly consisted of 230 deputies of whom 72 were Communists, 57 Smallholders, 35 Social Democrats, 19 representatives of trade-unions, and 12 members of the Peasant Party. The rest of the deputies were without apparent party affiliation or belonged to insignificant parties. Seven Moscovite Communists became members of the Assembly. The elected representatives were transported by Russian army cars to Debrecen where they were lavishly entertained by the Russian High Command.

At the first session of the Assembly (December 21, 1944) one of the leading Moscovites, E. Gero, emphasized that "the policy of the Hungarian Communist Party is a Hungarian, Democratic, and national policy." The next day the Assembly elected the Provisional National Government and authorized the new government to conclude an armistice with the Allied Powers.

The exterior appearance of the Provisional National

[1] Altogether thirty-eight towns and villages, representing 1,381,000 people in the Russian liberated areas, took part in these "elections" whereas on the same territory lived about three and a half million people. Regular elections, of course, could not have taken place in those apocalyptic days.

Government was excellent. Even conservative people were agreeably surprised. The Communists, the Smallholders, and the Social Democrats each had two portfolios, and the Peasant Party one. Besides these seven party men there were five non-party men in the cabinet. The prime minister, Bela Miklos, and two ministers were generals of the Horthy regime. There was even a Count in the cabinet, Geza Teleki, the son of the popular late prime minister, Count Paul Teleki, who killed himself when Hungary joined Germany in the attack on Yugoslavia.[2] A fifth non-party appointee, Erich Molnar, turned out later to be an old member of the Communist Party.

The whole political setup created at Debrecen, and particularly the composition of the new government, exposed clearly one of the main principles of Communist politics. It was and has remained in the following years a constant pattern to give formal authority to non-Communists while retaining effective control in the hands of Communists or fellow travelers. Communists in the new government had all the key positions in terms of real power. Fellow travelers, moreover, were tolerated only while they proved to be useful as a front, i.e., as non-party advocates of Communist policy. Communist and Russian consent was necessary to the appointment of all important officials, particularly of cabinet ministers.

Political Conditions

The Debrecen government endeavored to function under miserably difficult conditions. All governmental offices were jammed into one small building, and the effectiveness of all governmental measures depended en-

[2] Count Geza Teleki and General Gabor Farago were sent by Regent Horthy to Moscow in September 1944 to negotiate an armistice agreement. General Miklos was the commandant of the first Hungarian Army fighting against the Russians and General Janos Voros was the chief of the General Staff. Both Miklos and Voros went over to the Russians after the armistice proclamation of Regent Horthy. Farago and Voros became members of the Miklos cabinet.

tirely on the goodwill of the Russians. The central government truly was not much more than a show-window. There was no regular railroad, telegraph, or postal communication. The *Official Bulletin* published in Debrecen could not be forwarded beyond the outskirts of the town. The real power lay in the hands of the occupying Russian forces. In addition, Communist-dominated local National Committees and Communist-organized police actually administered the country. The Debrecen government's feeling of deprivation and absolute dependency on the Russians had moreover an important psychological impact even in the later period when the situation improved somewhat.

The Russians had a wide choice of means for exerting pressure, for they had practically unlimited power. The daily bread of the population, personal liberty, and other primary necessities of life depended entirely upon them. The devastated country had to feed an occupying force of several hundred thousand men. Factory equipment was removed at will as war booty. Food supplies were seized. Civilians by thousands, and from eastern Hungary even women, were taken to Russia as war prisoners. Public safety did not exist; there was no authority capable of giving protection against the Russians. Even when the period of large-scale kidnapping came to an end, people were arrested and judged by Russian military tribunals on fantastic charges, sometimes for having carried out the instructions of the Hungarian Government. In such cases, of course, there was no question of legal assistance or of due process of law. The accused simply disappeared. Even the relatives lost contact with him.

When the government moved in April 1945 to the badly damaged Budapest, the Russians, the Communist Party, and the various Communist-sponsored organizations already were occupying the best buildings. Since many government buildings were entirely destroyed during the siege, the government agencies obtained only badly battered tenement houses. It was characteristic of the situation that the foreign ministry had to move into a shabby old apartment house, while the Commu-

nist-organized "Democratic Youth Movement" resided in a magnificent palace.

Using the stipulations of the Socialist-Communist agreement of October 1944 which provided for the immediate unification of the workers through the unions, the Communist Party seized control of the trade-unions. In Hungary the trade-union movement in the past had been intimately connected with the Social Democratic Party. Under the German occupation, the trade-unions of course were dissolved and their leaders arrested.

In 1944, the thirty-one trade-unions in Hungary had a membership of about 100,000. Immediately after the liberation twenty new trade-unions were formed and the membership in the trade-unions rose to 850,596 in December 1945 and to 1,288,905 in January 1947. Unions appeared in all branches of state administration, private enterprises, and free professions. Practically all working men had to belong to a union, and the unions as one of the most important of mass organizations became important tools in the hands of the Communist policy-makers. Leading positions in the National Federation of Trade-Unions and in the Trade-Union Council were in the hands of Communists. A delegate of the trade-unions sat in every denazification committee, in every People's Court, and in every National Committee, on equal footing with the representatives of the four political parties. This in each case resulted in double Communist representation. In the factories various committees were organized through which the Communist Party found additional means to strengthen its grasp over the workers.

The fate of the Social Democratic Party was similar to that of the trade-unions. After Charles Peyer, the old leader of the party, was deported by the Germans, Arpad Szakasits, former editor of the Social Democratic Party newspaper, assumed its leadership. Szakasits, a typical fellow traveler, was eager to accept Communist suggestions when he reorganized the party after the Russian liberation. Left-wing Socialists were put into almost all key positions. The moderate and independent elements of the party were considered rightist

deviationists, traitors to the unity of the workers. They were not allowed to play any role. When in May 1945, Peyer returned from the Mauthausen concentration camp, he was offered a diplomatic post as a means of honorable exile. He did not accept this offer but courageously carried on a losing battle. Eventually he was excluded from his own party and finally fled the country with a great many other Socialists. In his absence he was tried and sentenced as a spy and traitor.

Under these conditions Communists soon had an absolute majority in all agencies established by the coalition parties. The delegate of the trade-unions and of the Social Democratic Party supported invariably the Communist point of view. Since the attitude of the National Peasant Party was uncertain, the Smallholder representative usually remained isolated.

The history of the National Peasant Party is characteristic of the political evolution in Hungary. The party was founded in June 1939 by a peasant writer, Imre Kovacs, as a more radical party than the Smallholders. During the war years it worked underground and had only a few scattered groups without parliamentary representation. Radical peasant writers—the so-called village explorers—and a group of progressive intellectuals formed the core of the party. Some members were secretly Communists. After the war these secret Communists with the help of radical slogans and friendly interventions of the Communist Party gradually seized control in the party. Progressive intellectuals lost all power positions.[3]

Russians and Communists controlled mass media of communication, like the radio, movies, and newspapers. First the Russians, later the Communists, allocated all newsprint. Publication of newspapers was authorized through a licensing system. At the outset only the Communist and Socialist Parties, and later only political

[3] The founder of the party, Imre Kovacs, resigned as Secretary-General when the party joined the leftist bloc in 1946, and resigned from the party when the Secretary-General of the Smallholder Party, Bela Kovacs, was arrested by the Russians on February 25, 1947.

parties belonging to the coalition, could publish newspapers. Communists exercised strict control over all publications through the allocation of newsprint. There were also other means of pressure. For instance, printers refused to handle articles unfavorable to or objected to by the Communist Party.

At the end of 1945 a Supreme Economic Council was established, of which Zoltan Vas became the Secretary-General. The functions of this Council were more important than the activities of the ministries dealing with economic and financial problems. In the most important questions it had supervisory competence. Zoltan Vas became actually economic dictator of the country, and it was almost immaterial to which non-Communist parties the ministers concerned belonged.

But despite all these and other difficulties, a strange optimism prevailed in all the coalition parties. It is an important fact which one cannot overlook that the non-Communist parties in the coalition were almost as progressive on social, economic, and cultural questions as the Communists themselves professed to be.[4] All the coalition parties were in opposition during the Horthy regime and cooperated underground with the Communists during the German occupation. As throughout Nazi-oppressed Europe, so in Hungary the common fight against the Nazi foe developed a sort of camaraderie between the Communist and non-Communist politicians. It was like a miracle that Hungary was able to avoid complete annihilation at the end of the war, and the leading politicians of the new regime seemed determined to make the most of a desperate situation. This task needed courage and an optimistic outlook, especially as regarded the possibilities of cooperation with the Russians and Communists. And above all there was a great common task before the parties: the rebuilding and rehabilitation of the devastated country. And in that respect the Communists displayed a great zeal and

[4] Cf. Oscar Jaszi, "The Choices in Hungary," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (1946), 462. Jaszi points out that "the Small Landholders' Party is not reactionary, nor even conservative; it is a progressive party in favor of social and cultural reforms."

energy. Non-Communist leaders "thought it natural that the Communist Party should be more radical than other parties, but expected it would work shoulder to shoulder with the others in reviving the country."[5]

All political parties recognized the impact of Russia's overwhelming power position in the Danubian area, but a spirit of wishful thinking nevertheless prevailed. Soviet Russia appeared a newcomer in the society of great powers. Her harsh manners seemed due to a different tradition and not to ill will. After the armistice period she would withdraw into the vastness of Russia and refrain from interfering in internal politics of Hungary. So some politicians said. Even a few non-Moscovite Communists, who sincerely pictured the future on a line that would be considered today Titoism, shared these views. At that time this way of thinking was not a crime. Communist leaders and the Russians, morever, professed and openly encouraged it.

It took some time to realize that Communists hated left-wing politicians or Socialists of independent views more than they did the former Nazis. In a number of cases former Nazis were welcome in the Communist Party and became obedient tools. Gradually it became clear that in decisive questions the Communists did nothing but carry out the orders of Moscow and that the Communist Party was in reality a disguised third branch of the Soviet administration represented in Hungary outwardly by the Russian Army and diplomacy. Not having popular support, they could rely only on the Russians. Under these conditions genuine cooperation between Communist and non-Communist parties never took place. Political expediency at all times guided the Communist attitude. They sought control. This was the aim and driving force of all Communist actions. Economic and social reforms played a secondary and rather tactical role beside this chief goal. In pursuing this policy the Communists sometimes changed their attitude quite suddenly and without any apparent motive or reason. Always, however,

[5] Ferenc Nagy, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain,* New York, Macmillan, 1948, p. 72.

they invoked the "will of the people." This "will," of course, they cleverly manipulated through the Communist-dominated press and through Communist-organized mass demonstrations.

Free Elections

The elections held in the autumn of 1945 were the turning point in postwar Hungarian politics. It was a part of the Communist tactics to have the Budapest municipal elections on October 7, a month before the general elections. The Communists felt sure that the working-class districts of the capital would assure a sweeping victory of the united Communist-Socialist ticket. But the outcome of the elections was the first major disappointment of the Communist brain trust, for the Smallholders obtained an absolute majority—even in the capital.[6]

Feverish Communist activities followed this defeat. They proposed a single electoral ticket for the forthcoming general elections. A.C.C chairman Voroshilov himself intervened and eventually offered 47.5 per cent of the single electoral list to the Smallholders, who refused. The embittered Socialists also strongly insisted on separate electoral lists because they attributed their defeat in Budapest to the anti-Communist feeling of the population. Instead of setting a single block ticket, the four parties agreed to continue the coalition government, whatever the results of the election might be. The Communists still were optimistic. They enjoyed tremendous practical advantages. Besides the support of the occupying forces, they had plenty of newsprint, transportation, and other propaganda facilities, in quantities not available to non-Communist parties.

It was a great surprise to the Communists and the

[6] The results of the Budapest municipal elections were:

	Votes	*Seats*
Smallholder Party	285,197	121
United Socialist-Communist ticket	249,711	103
Civic Democratic Party	22,392	9
National Peasant Party	11,741	5
Hungarian Radical Party	5,013	2

Russians when at these general elections held on November 4, 1945 the Communists polled only 17 per cent. The Smallholders obtained almost 60 per cent of the seats in Parliament.[7] This defeat proved that the Communists had not gained overwhelming support from the former agrarian proletariat, which had been their greatest hope. A considerable number of the new landowners, no matter how small their allotment was, had become class-conscious and staunch supporters of private ownership. The idea of Communism did not appeal to them.

After the elections Voroshilov was quick to point out to the Smallholder leaders that "the Soviet Union wished to base its friendship with Hungary on its relations with the Smallholders party."[8] The Smallholders, enjoying their victory, were greatly pleased by this statement. They visualized a new era of constructive Hungarian-Soviet cooperation. The fact of the apparently passive Soviet attitude at the elections encouraged everybody.

The Communists were flabbergasted for a short time but not greatly disturbed. They had to change their tactics and Matyas Rakosi, leader of Communism in Hungary, had to give explanations to Moscow. As a whole, however, the political situation remained favorable to them. The aristocracy and landowner classes had already been liquidated. Land reform had also deprived the Church of its main economic basis. People from the middle class lived in complete insecurity, and gradually were selling off their belongings in order to exist. An inflation on an unprecedented scale, more-

[7] The results of the general elections were:

	Seats in Parliament	
	Total number	*Percentage*
Smallholder Party	245	59.9
Communist Party	70	17.11
Social Democratic Party	69	16.9
National Peasant Party	23	5.6
Civic Democratic Party	2	0.49
Total:	400	100.00%

[8] Ferenc Nagy, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

over, increased the general confusion and difficulties. The Communists possessed all key positions, and exercised effective control throughout the country by means of the National Committees and the police. Trade-unions and factory committees were firmly in Communist hands. Fifth columns were carefully planted in all parties. The continuance of the coalition government was secured by the pre-election arrangement. Thus the Communists hoped to be able to rule the country conveniently behind the screen of a coalition, as in the case of other satellite countries.

After the elections the coalition parties agreed that the minister of interior should be a member of the Smallholder Party. Five days later the Communists explained that the Ministry of Interior must be given to them, since Voroshilov was astonished to hear that in Hungary the situation would be different in that respect from other countries friendly to the Soviet Union and he had vetoed the proposition. The Smallholders yielded. Otherwise they obtained an imposing number of seats in the cabinet but, of course, not the real power positions and had no majority. The prime minister, one minister of state, seven other members of the cabinet, the Speaker of the Assembly, and later the President of the Republic[9]—all were Smallholders. The Communist and the Socialist Parties each obtained three portfolios, and the Peasant Party one. In addition, the Communist and Socialist Parties each had a deputy premiership.

The honeymoon period for the coalition parties did not last long. Mass meetings and other Communist-organized demonstrations of the workers, synchronized with Russian political and economic demands, pressed the government towards a leftist policy. The most skillful tactical step in undermining the Smallholder position was the formation of a left-wing bloc by the Communists, Socialists, Peasant Party, and the Trade-Union Council. Thus the Communists isolated the Smallholders within the coalition, took an offensive attitude, and

[9] Hungary was declared a republic by a law promulgated on January 31, 1946.

began to address *ultimatums* to them in the name of the progressive Hungarian people. Politicians opposing the demands of the leftist bloc were denounced as "Fascists" and "enemies of the people." A revolutionary atmosphere of increasing tension was created, making impossible a normal functioning of parliament.

Gradually the Smallholder Party was maneuvered into a self-liquidating process which began in March 1946 with the expulsion from the party of twenty-one deputies, attacked by the Communists as "reactionaries." This was followed in the coming months by other unwarranted expulsions and by the adoption of various Russian- and Communist-dictated political and economic measures.

In the first days of 1947 newspapers announced discovery of a large-scale conspiracy against the Hungarian Republic. The Communist newspapers soon connected the conspiracy with the Smallholder Party. One of the Smallholder ministers and several members of the party were arrested. Their "confessions" implicated the participation of Bela Kovacs, the Secretary-General of the Smallholders. Parliament refused to suspend his immunity but he offered to give evidence to the political police. Upon return from this hearing, Soviet authorities arrested him, February 25, 1947, under charge of espionage against the Soviet Army.

In the ensuing political crisis the cabinet was reorganized. Three Smallholder ministers resigned and three left-wing Smallholders became their successors. In April the Peoples' Court sentenced three conspirators to death and the others to long terms of penal servitude. On May 18 the exhausted Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy went to Switzerland on a holiday. On May 28 the Russians very belatedly forwarded Bela Kovacs' "confession" of March 9 to the Hungarian Government whose head conveniently happened to be, in the absence of Nagy, Deputy Prime Minister Matyas Rakosi.[10] Kovacs' con-

[10] This text was published in *White Book Documents on the Conspiracy Against the Hungarian Republic and Democracy* (in Hungarian), published by Ministry for Propaganda, Budapest, 1947, pp. 110-13.

fession implicated some of the leading Smallholders, among them the Prime Minister himself. Nagy, notified of these events, decided to return immediately, but was advised from Budapest not to do so. He resigned on June 2 and has since remained in exile.[11] Another Smallholder leader, Msgr. Bela Varga, speaker of the assembly, fled Hungary on June 2 to avoid arrest.

With liquidation of the Smallholder leadership the stage was set for the next act: the new elections of August 31, 1947. Under the new prime minister, Lajos Dinnyes, whose appointment was engineered by General Sviridov, deputy of Marshal Voroshilov, Smallholder cooperation became a total submission to Communists. A modification of the new electoral law was voted and the Communist Party felt it necessary to adopt different tactics than in 1945.

In 1945 opposition parties were not allowed. Only two insignificant non-coalition parties took part in the elections. These were mere fronts as bourgeois parties. The one obtained two seats, the other none. A Catholic party was not authorized.

In 1947 the opposite tactics seemed to be opportune for the final disintegration of the Smallholder Party. Besides the four coalition parties, the Allied Control Commission authorized six opposition parties. The formation of some was even encouraged by the Communists. This gave a democratic aspect to the elections and confused the Smallholder electorate, disgusted anyway by the subservient party leadership. In addition, the new electoral law assured important advantages to the coalition parties, especially by granting them the so-called premium seats, and made possible the quasi-unlimited exclusions from the votes under various pretexts.

Furthermore, it was felt necessary to eliminate from the public life by the provisions of the new electoral law the most important opposition leader, Dezso Sulyok. He was designated Prime Minister in January 1946, but

[11] Ferenc Nagy gives an account of the "conspiracy," abduction of Bela Kovacs by the Russians, and his enforced resignation. *Op. cit.*, pp. 311-425.

his premiership was vetoed by the Communists. Sulyok was excluded from the Smallholder Party in March 1946, and after much haggling the A.C.C. authorized in October the formation of the Freedom Party under his leadership.[12] The publication of the party newspaper *Tomorrow,* however, was made impossible and party meetings were constantly broken up by Communist-organized mobs. Police protection was not forthcoming. The activities of the Freedom Party thus becoming practically impossible, it dissolved in July 1947.

In accordance with the Communist policy aiming at the disintegration of the non-Communist parties, one of the leading members of the Smallholder Party, Zoltan Pfeiffer, was authorized to found the Independence Party. Most of the terror and violence of the regime was concentrated against him and his party during the election campaign. The Independence Party was considered in a way as the successor to the Freedom Party. The Communists supposed that the other opposition parties, authorized in the last minute before the elections, and not having an organization, skilled leadership, money, or courage to make propaganda for their ideas, could not obtain a substantial number of votes.

The results of the election proved, however, that the Communist policy-makers miscalculated again. The four coalition parties barely obtained a majority. They received about the same proportion of votes as the Smallholders alone in 1945.[13] The Communist Party polled 22 percent instead of 17, but the five per cent gain was easily explained by the use of "flying squadrons" and other frauds.[14] One of the losers of the elections was the Social Democratic Party, which polled only

[12] Concerning the history of the Freedom Party, see Desiderius Sulyok, *Zwei Nächte ohne Tag, Ungarn unter dem Sovietstern,* Zürich, 1948, pp. 358-379.

[13] Election results on the following page.

[14] The new law permitted the vote to persons absent from their residence with so-called blue tickets. These tickets were issued to Communist brigades who were transported from one community to the other and voted ten to twenty times. A great many persons were excluded from the elections under ridiculous charges.

14.9 per cent. They protested bitterly, citing the many electoral frauds and irregularities organized by the Communist Minister of the Interior, Laszlo Rajk.

The great surprise of the elections was that the Catholic Democratic People's Party polled most of the votes, after the Communists. The other striking phenomenon was the complete disintegration of the emasculated Smallholder Party, recording only 15 per cent of the votes. The opposition had divided into two major and four smaller parties. As a whole, nevertheless, the proportion of the anti-Communist votes did not change basically despite electoral abuses and tricks.

It is understandable that the Communists were definitely disgusted by the parliamentary elections, and hence decided to liquidate even the appearance of parliamentarism. The Russian Minister to Hungary, Georgi M. Pushkin, remarked with bitternes that the Hungarian people did not appreciate the numerous Russian gestures, not even Moscow's ratification of the Hungarian peace treaty, which was purposely announced two days before the Hungarian elections.

After the second electoral failure, the Communists started their new policy with the elimination of the opposition parties. The forty-nine members of the Hun-

	Seats from the constituencies		Premium seats	Seats on the national list	All seats in Parliament
	No.	%			
Coalition Parties:					
Communist Party	79	22.27	18	2	100
Smallholder Party	54	15.4	12	2	68
Social Democratic Party	53	14.9	12	2	67
National Peasant Party	29	8.31	6	1	36
Opposition Parties:					
Democratic People's Party	58	16.41	—	2	60
Hungarian Independence Party	47	13.42	—	2	49
Ind. Democratic Party	18	5.21	—	—	18
Radical Party	6	1.68	—	—	6
Christian Women League	4	1.39	—	—	4
Civic Democratic Party	3	1.01	—	—	3
Total:	351	100%	48	12	411

garian Independence Party were attacked shortly after the elections as Fascists and deprived of their seats in the National Assembly. The leader of the party fled Hungary. The Democratic People's Party followed a cautious policy and continued to exist for a few months. In connection with the ensuing Mindszenty trial, however, the Communists wanted to use this Catholic party for their own purposes. To avoid this the leader of the party, Istvan Barankovics, dissolved his party and fled from Hungary in February 1949. This the two major opposition parties disappeared from the scene.

Naturally the new distribution of political forces affected the composition of the cabinet. Of the fifteen members of the government, the Smallholders and the Socialists now had four portfolios each, five ministers were Communists, and two were National Peasants. But the shift in distribution of portfolios did not reflect more important changes within the parties.

The Smallholder majority was not only smashed and split, but the remnant was thoroughly intimidated. Docile fellow travelers took over its leadership. They ruthlessly eradicated all inclinations toward an independent policy. The show-window, however, did not change for a while. Both the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister remained Smallholders. Later, on July 30, 1948, a change took place, when the President of the Republic, Zoltan Tildy, was forced to resign,[15] and was succeeded by Arpad Szakasits, pro-Communist Socialist leader.

Before the complete liquidation of the parliamentary system, the last important item on the Communist timetable appeared to be the absorption of the Social Democratic Party, as provided in the Rajk-Szakasits agreement of 1944. This task was carefully planned and prepared, step by step. Leading Socialists, unwilling to become Communist stooges or fellow travelers, were gradually eliminated. The new Socialist leader, Arpad Sza-

[15] The reason for Tildy's resignation was the arrest of his son-in-law, Victor Chornoky. He was recalled for "consultation" from his post as Minister to Egypt, then arrested, charged with treason, sentenced, and hanged on December 6, 1948.

kasits, was usually not more than the mouthpiece of Communist leader Matyas Rakosi, but under the pressure of the immense majority of the Socialist workers even he tried to resist the Communists from time to time. On such rare occasions he would be attacked by the Communist press as a rightist deviationist. Finally, after a series of Communist-organized purges, the Social Democratic Party became entirely Communist-ruled, and, deciding to merge with the Communist Party, voted itself out of existence on March 8, 1948.[16]

Two months later the name of the united Socialist-Communist Party became the "Hungarian Workers' Party." All independent political parties having ceased to exist, the Republic of Hungary became a "Peoples' Republic."

Nothing could reveal better the transformation of Hungarian political life and characterize the background of the Communist "elections" than the following official explanation published for Western consumption:

> Since the elections of 1947 the political and economic structure of Hungary has undergone a thorough change. The opposition parties, which at the elections of 1947 received a proportion of the votes, have since disappeared from the political scene. . . . It became evident that beyond their anti-communist and anti-labor slogans, the agents of capitalists and large-estate owners, the saboteurs of production and nationalization, were seeking cover. The leaders of these parties fled from the country, deserting their followers, and the parties themselves were dissolved. . . .
>
> The old Parliament did not represent any longer the will of the people. Therefore, it became necessary to set a date for new elections. . . . Two opposition parties [Father Balogh's Independent Hungarian Democratic Party, and the Hungarian Radical Party] have become convinced in the interval since 1947 that they can do good work for the sake of the people only if they go along with the other three parties [Hungarian Working People's Party, Smallholders Party, and National Peasant

[16] In the course of 1948, the unification of the Communist and Socialist Parties was carried out throughout Eastern Europe.

Party] which at the beginning of February 1949 formed the Hungarian People's Independence Front to replace the Hungarian National Independence Front, and joined the People's Front.[17]

Of the votes cast at the May 15, 1949 elections, 5,478,515 were for the list of the People's Front, i.e., 95.6 per cent, and 165,283 against. The number of ballots invalidated was 86,721.

Monolithic Dictatorship of the Proletariat

"A people's democracy is, according to its function, a dictatorship of the proletariat without the Soviet form," once explained the Communist dictator of Hungary, Matyas Rakosi.[18] To establish this kind of totalitarian dictatorship the Soviet satellites have been isolated from the West. The Communists pursued throughout Eastern Europe a ruthless policy of elimination of all actual or potential opposition. In Hungary simultaneously with the liquidation of the non-Communist parties the Catholic and Protestant Churches were intimidated and saddled,[19] extreme nationalization accomplished,[20] foreign investments seized, and a

[17] *Hungarian Bulletin,* May 21, 1949, pp. 1, 7-8. This Bulletin is distributed in the United States by the Hungarian Legation.

[18] *New York Times,* January 23, 1949.

[19] The order of persecution of Catholics and Protestants is only a question of timing. The Catholic Church is enemy number one, for Catholics are more numerous in Eastern Europe and the centrally organized Catholic Church is a world-wide obstacle to Communist expansion. In Hungary, however, Lutheran Bishop Ordass was imprisoned before the Mindszenty trial. His successor became a Lutheran priest, member of the Communist Party. The first great onslaught against the activities of the Catholic Church had been staged in July 1946, when the Government was forced to dissolve all Catholic youth organizations on unsubstantiated Russian accusations. Their office buildings were given to Communist organizations. The Church Schools were nationalized in June 1948. The Calvinists accepted a compromise solution negotiated with the Government and thus kept some of their schools. Since Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty followed an uncompromising policy, he was arrested and sentenced to life in February 1949.

[20] In the course of 1946 the coal mines, and the electric power stations of a capacity above 20,000 kilowatts, were nationalized and the five largest heavy industrial enterprises of the country

large-scale purge carried out in the Communist Party.[21] In the course of this action, the former minister of interior and foreign minister, Laszlo Rajk, and a group of Communist leaders were arrested under the charge of Titoist conspiracy. The subsequent trial and executions were designed to provide ammunition for the anti-Titoist propaganda. These also served as deterrents to deviation from the official party line and acted to eliminate Communist leaders who were considered as a potential center of a national Communist movement.

In all phases of Hungarian politics, energetic Russian intervention helped the Hungarian Communist Party. If the Hungarian Government was not responsive enough to suggestions, there quickly followed threats, ultimatums, and use of sheer force. The methods by which the transformation of Hungary's political structure has been manipulated were repeatedly admitted and even described by leading Communists. Joseph Revai, one of the Chief Communist theorists in Hungary, pointed out in an article:

> We were a minority in Parliament and in the government, but at the same time we represented the leading force. We had decisive control over the police forces. Our force, the force of our Party and the working class, was multiplied by the fact that the Soviet Union and the Soviet army were always there to support us with their assistance.[22]

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placed under state control. In November 1947 the large banks were nationalized. In March 1948 all industrial plants employing one hundred or more workers were nationalized. The nationalization decree of December 28, 1949 seized all enterprises in which the total number of employees reached ten, and in some cases even five.

[21] Rakosi explained in an address to the Czech workers at Prague that 200,000 persons had been expelled from the Hungarian Communist Party (*New York Times,* June 24, 1949). This action means reversal of the first stage of Communist policy which was a drive for mass membership.

[22] Joseph Revai, "On the Character of our People's Democracy." The original article appeared in the *Társadalmi Szemle,* Budapest, March-April, 1949. An English translation of the article was published in *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 28 (1949) pp. 143-52.

Moreover, the preamble of the new Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic, which entered into force on August 20, 1949, did not try to conceal but rather emphasized the fact that the assistance of Soviet Russia has been the deciding factor in the postwar transformation of Hungary's political structure.[23]

Besides the use of naked force, the provisions of the Hungarian armistice agreement, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Hungarian peace treaty opened the door to all sorts of Russian abuses clothed in an appearance of legality. By arbitrary interpretation and application of these instruments, Hungary has been economically enslaved to Russia ever since 1945. The Russian procedure has been similar to the worst colonial pattern of the past.

ROAD TO THE REVOLUTION

When Stalin died, Matyas Rakosi was the undisputed boss of Hungary. Not content with the position of Secretary General of the Hungarian Communist party (officially designated as Hungarian Workers' party), he also assumed the office of Prime Minister in August 1952—up to that time, he had been Vice-Premier in a number of successive cabinets of varying composition. Such a cumulation of offices, however, could not endure long after Stalin's death. The new Soviet leadership proceeded to dilute authority at the top: control of the party apparatus was separated from leadership in the

[23] "*The armed forces of the great Soviet Union* liberated our country from the yoke of the German fascists, crushed the power of the great landowners and capitalists who were ever hostile to our people, and opened the road of democratic progress to our working people . . . the Hungarian working class, in alliance with the working peasantry and *with the generous assistance of the Soviet Union,* rebuilt our war-ravaged country. Led by the experiences of the socialist revolution of 1919 and *supported by the Soviet Union,* our people began to lay down the foundations of socialism and now our country is advancing towards socialism along the road of a people's democracy." [Italics added]—*Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic,* Budapest, 1949.

administration. Hungary, of course, had to follow suit, but Rakosi was not allowed to redistribute authority as he saw fit. It would have been easy for him, if left alone, to divest himself of part of his offices and fill them with his own dummies; and this was precisely what he set out to do when Moscow instructed him to replace "one-man rule" by "collective leadership." But the center was in dead earnest about diluting authority. In May 1953 Rakosi was summoned to appear in Moscow *ad audiendum verbum* and to take along, not only his faithful henchmen Erno Gero and Mihaly Farkas, but also two mavericks, Imre Nagy and Istvan Dobi.

This was a straw in the wind. It indicated that Moscow not only wanted to replace one-man rule by collegiate government in Hungary, but also was interested in giving authority within the new governing body to people who did not see eye to eye with Rakosi on certain important matters. The choice of the outsiders whom Rakosi was instructed to take along much against his will was significant. Dobi was not even a member of the Communist inner circle but a former Smallholder party man turned Communist; Nagy, an old party wheelhorse and former émigré in Moscow, had only recently been reinstated as member of the Hungarian Politburo after being under a cloud for Titoist deviations. Both were known to be extremely critical of Rakosi's policy of forced collectivization of peasant holdings. By giving them the nod, the Moscow center intimated its desire for concessions to the peasantry.

Appearing early in June before the Moscow Presidium with his ill-matched companions, Rakosi was forced to listen to a scathing denunciation of his stewardship during the past years. Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich took him severely to task. He was told that his attempt to build up a gigantic heavy industry in Hungary under his Five Year Plan of 1950, expanded further in 1951, was unsound, extravagant adventurism. His farm policy, determined in the needs of industrialization, had also been disastrous. It drove hundreds of thousands of peasants from the countryside, swelling the ranks of industrial workers who

could only produce at a loss while leaving the land without people to work it. The country lacked food and the mood of the people was bitter. If the situation was not remedied, the government would eventually be "booted out."[1]

"Thaw" in Hungary

The Hungarian delegation returned to Budapest with precise instructions. The Central Committee was to meet and condemn Rakosi's policy of overindustrialization and forced collectivization. Rakosi was to abandon the premiership and hand it to Imre Nagy, whose mission was to placate the peasantry by stopping the collectivization drive and to emphasize production of consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry. There were also to be other reforms, notably the relaxation of police terror. At the same time, Rakosi was to remain head of the party apparatus; the party under Rakosi and the administration under Nagy were to work hand in hand to correct the mistakes of the past and create more tolerable conditions.

The Hungarian Communist party did as told: meeting on June 27-28, the Central Committee duly condemned Rakosi without deposing him as party leader and adopted new policy directives in accordance with Moscow's wishes. On July 4, Nagy was appointed Premier. Presenting himself before the National Assembly on the same day, he announced a bundle of reforms. Peasants, he said, will no longer be forced to join kolkhozes or even to remain in them against their will; the people will be given more consumer goods; police terror will be abolished.

[1] A deliberately vague summary of the Soviet leaders' denunciation of Rakosi's policy is found in *Imre Nagy on Communism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 66. The last remark about the Hungarian government facing the risk of being "booted out" is attributed there to Khrushchev. Nagy also states that at the June meeting, Molotov and not Beria *(sic)* told the Hungarians that there was no objection to permit the dissolution of kolkhozes *(ibid.,* p. 153). The covert meaning of this pointed reference to Beria will become clearer as we proceed with our narrative.

This was the beginning of "decompression" in Hungary. While Rakosi's regime had been, in some respects, the most Stalinist of all, the "thaw" under Nagy was the most sudden and most radical. To be sure, the Hungarian innovations were not unique; but it was only in Hungary that the announcement of the new course created the impression of a substantial change in the nature of the system itself.

The Moscow center neither anticipated nor desired this, and Nagy himself was too orthodox a Communist to conceive his role in such terms. He neither wanted to change the nature of the system nor aspired to set up a "national Communist" regime independent of Soviet tutelage. In fact, in all he was doing, he felt he was merely carrying out Moscow's instructions, as implemented by the Hungarian party's Central Committee. Hence, from Nagy's point of view, there was no reason why Rakosi should not go along with him. The differences between them concerned only tactics, and the highest party authorities had pronounced his, Nagy's, tactical approach to be the corect one. As a disciplined Communist, Rakosi had had no choice but to co-operate in putting Nagy's reforms into practice.

Rallying the party apparatus which he still controlled, Rakosi gave out the watchword that Nagy's drive was full of danger and must be stopped. In fact, within a few days after Nagy's speech, the whole countryside was in uproar; the peasants decided to disband the kolkhozes before the harvest rather than wait for the directives which the government promised to issue after it was completed. This led to many clashes, a situation which Rakosi exploited to discredit Nagy. At a meeting of the Budapest party organization on July 11, he sounded the alarm about kulaks moving to destroy the Socialist order. All those present understood that Rakosi's real target was the Nagy government. Thus, the beginning of the "thaw" in Hungary also marked the beginning of the split in the Communist leadership.

At first, the split was not a matter of clashing doctrines. Rakosi did not say that Nagy's reform program was wrong in principle. What Rakosi told his

followers was to keep their powder dry; he, Rakosi, would soon be back in Moscow's favor, and the apparatus would then be restored to supreme authority. There were, indeed, capital developments in Moscow which nourished Rakosi's optimism: Beria, who had carried the ball at the Moscow conference which condemned him, was liquidated soon afterwards.

Rakosi, however, expected in vain that Beria's "unmasking" would lead to his rehabilitation, even though he kept urging the point in Moscow. The center, apparently, was quite happy about things as they were, with the state machinery and the party apparatus locked in stalemate. Moscow also was far from being dissatisfied with Nagy's reform policy as such, in spite of such initial mishaps as the peasant revolts of the summer of 1953 which Rakosi took such pains to exploit against his rival. In 1953 and 1954, when Malenkov's authority was at its height, there was not much chance of undermining a policy based upon making concessions to the people and relaxing terrorism.

In May 1954, the Hungarian leaders went on another pilgrimage to Moscow, asking the center to arbitrate their differences. Rakosi trotted out his Beria argument; but was told that Beria, scoundrel though he was, had for once been quite correct in so far as he, Rakosi, was concerned. This is what Khrushchev, according to Nagy, said on that occasion:

> In June, 1953, we correctly passed judgment on the Hungarian Party's leadership, and that judgment is still entirely correct today. They can't hide behind Beria as Rakosi is trying to do. We were there, too, when these errors were ascertained, every one of us! We were right, and what we decided then is also right today. This should have been acted on already![2]

The last cryptic sentence in Khrushchev's speech is particularly revealing. Nagy does not explain it; this is understandable, since his book is a brief he composed after his exclusion from the party in the fall of 1955, arguing the case for his reinstatement. To the party

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

audience for which Nagy's text was written, the allusion was perfectly clear. What Khrushchev had in mind was that the Hungarian party's Third Congress, scheduled to meet on April 18 to elect a new Politburo from which some of Rakosi's followers were to be dropped, had been postponed at Rakosi's urging to give him a chance to plead his case once more in Moscow. The delay, Khrushchev implied, was totally unnecessary: the prearranged script was not to be changed. Thus, the pilgrims having returned from Moscow, the Congress convened on May 24; on the 30th, it elected the new Politburo minus the three Rakosites whose elimination Moscow had prescribed.

Freeing of Political Prisoners

The Moscow meeting of May 1954 also decided in Nagy's favor a policy dispute of long standing between him and the apparatus, a decision which was to have extremely far-reaching consequences in the sequel. The dispute concerned the release of many thousands of political prisoners detained in concentration camps and penitentiaries. In his inaugural speech of July 1953, Nagy had promised to put an end to the system of arbitrary police arrests, to dissolve the concentration camps, and to review the cases of all those who had been incarcerated on political charges during the Rakosi era. Rakosi fought this policy tooth and nail and with considerable success. To be sure, there were no more political arrests after Nagy assumed the government, and many totally innocuous and obscure interns were freed. Rakosi had no objection to this; but he was vitally interested in blocking the review of the cases of hundreds of people, mostly Communists and Social Democrats, who had been arrested, tortured, and sentenced on fictitious charges in the vast purges he had instituted in 1949-52. For about a year, Rakosi had his way, but Nagy continued to press the matter. When the question came up at the May conference, the Soviet leaders expressed displeasure with the dilatory way in which the issue was being handled and ordered the re-

lease and rehabilitation of the victims of Rakosi's purges. For Moscow, this was a matter of course. There had been a political amnesty in Soviet Russia the year before; no satellite government could be allowed to follow a different path.

The Hungarian case, however, was not comparable to the Russian. No mass purges had occurred in Russia since before World War II, and the amnesty of 1953 was not calculated to raise grave moral problems among Communists brought face to face with the enormity of synthetic trials and extorted confessions. By contrast, when hundreds of Hungarian Communists and Social Democrats returned from prisons and concentration camps and told their friends what had happened to them, the moral effect was devastating.

These tales, of course, were not published at that time. The public comments made by Nagy and the spokesmen of his regime after the rehabilitation campaign was nearly completed in the fall of 1954 were stern enough but still remained on a general plane. Nagy, for example, wrote in an article in *Szabad Nép* on October 10, 1954:

> The Party's June resolutions[3] have been put into effect by the rehabilitations, by the liberation of unjustly sentenced comrades. . . . In this sphere, too, we must and will liquidate the grave mistakes of the past. This demonstrates the Party's sense of justice and its strength, as well as the wisdom of collective leadership.

There was nothing in this to disturb the peace of mind of the general reader. There had been faults, but the party in its wisdom had seen to it that they should be corrected. At the nerve center of the party, however, the rehabilitations had entirely different repercussions.

Many of the former political prisoners were left-wing intellectuals, writers, and journalists who had always

[3] The reference is to the Central Committee's resolutions of the previous year (June 1953) which censured Rakosi's policy and spelled out the "New Course." Nagy and the publicists of his regime were constantly invoking the "June resolutions" which, however, were withheld from the general public: Rakosi had succeeded in obtaining a party decision blocking their publication.

moved in the Budapest literary set and now made it a point to tell all to their erstwhile cronies. Nights were spent going through what had happened—a story of unspeakable, gruesome tortures, revealing the Communist state apparatus as a monster of depravity. The recipients of these confidences wished they were dead, for as Communist writers they had provided a richly orchestrated literary accompaniment to the purges. They had exhausted the remarkable resources of the Hungarian language to vilify the victims and render thanks to their torturers for saving humanity and socialism from harm. Now they felt they had no excuse whatever and began to hate themselves and Communism, the cause of their utter moral degradation. This was one of the decisive impulses behind the revolt of the Communist writers which set the stage for revolution two years later. It must be stated here that the greatest figure among the Communist writers, Tibor Dery, did not need this kind of shock to see the light: he never lent his name to Rakosi's manhunts and was in opposition throughout the latter's reign.

Another momentous consequence of the rehabilitations was that many party functionaries who had gone through the inferno of Rakosi's jails and camps were restored to high or middle party offices. The best known of these is Janos Kadar, one of the architects of the October revolution who was to betray it; he was made First Secretary of the Communist party organization of the Thirteenth District of Budapest, a working-class quarter which early in 1956 became one of the focal points of the intraparty revolt against Rakosi.

Nagy's Fall

In October 1954, Nagy's position seemed impregnable and Rakosi appeared to be on his way out. He was absent from the Central Committee meeting of late October which again condemned the forced industrialization policy of the Rakosi era and gave the green light to Nagy for a reorganization of the economy with emphasis upon consumer goods. A few months later, however, Nagy was ousted; and Rakosi was back. The wind

suddenly changed in Moscow: Malenkov was forced to resign in February 1955; and on March 9 the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist party, following instructions from Moscow, condemned Nagy's reform policy as a "rightist deviation." From then on, Nagy's political decline was rapid. On April 14, the Central Committee not only deposed him as Premier but also dropped him from the Politburo; in November he was expelled from the party.

Nagy, as we see, was treated far more rigorously than Rakosi had been when he fell out of favor. The Soviet center, in fact, no matter how displeased with Rakosi's conduct of Hungarian affairs, always viewed him as an insider, an important figure in international Communism, whereas Nagy was expendable. To be sure, after Nagy's fall, Rakosi was not permitted to combine his party office with the premiership; the latter post went to Andras Hegedus. But this separation of offices had no real significance: Hegedus, a nonentity, was completely dominated by Rakosi. Hungary seemed to have returned to one-man rule in substance if not in form.

The main reason for Nagy's fall was that his key policy, the reconversion of industry, was anathema to the anti-Malenkov group which got the upper hand in Moscow. The chief stumbling block was that new capital would have been needed to put reconversion into effect, but Hungary had no money and Moscow firmly refused to foot the bill. It was now Nagy's turn to be criticized for extravagance. He pleaded for an expansion of trade exchanges with the Soviet Union, but Moscow told him that Soviet supplies to Hungary would be cut in half in 1955. He then proposed to increase trade with the "people's democracies," but learned that these were moving toward autarchy. In desperation, Nagy decided to try to finance his experiment by trade with the Western countries.[4] This definitely was the last straw; the idea of financing his domestic schemes by sources outside the "camp of peace and democracy" put Nagy's Communist loyalty in doubt. Rakosi's past

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 184 ff.

crimes were venial by comparison. Nagy had to be dealt with harshly; he had no roots in the apparatus, and he dabbled in heresy.

Nagy's policy appeared costly and dangerous in other ways too. The economic report submitted to the October meeting of the Central Committee admitted that labor productivity in 1954 had dropped 3.3 per cent; this was due to the relaxation of Rakosi regime's slave-driving methods. That tendency, too, had to be stopped. Whatever the merits of Rakosi industrial policies had been, Moscow now decided that Hungary had better get along with the industrial plant that was there, forgetting about reconversion and higher standards of living. Rakosi's reinstatement was the logical consequence of this decision.

It would be a mistake to interpret Rakosi's comeback as a return to Stalinism. The *status quo ante* was restored in some respects, notably as regards labor policy; conservatism was the order of the day, and all ambitious reform plans were shelved in the chilly new climate of retrenchment. But wholesale terror was not resumed, no new collectivization drive got under way, and most important, the policy of rehabilitation was not rescinded. Rakosi had to endure the presence in the apparatus of returnees from the camps who thirsted to get even with him. Khrushchev's pet foreign political scheme, the reconciliation with Tito, also was potentially dangerous for him, since Tito was not likely to forget the exceptional viciousness of Rakosi's conduct toward him —and, incidentally, toward Yugoslav minorities and residents in Hungary—during the conflict. Rakosi's enemies in the party could count upon the warm support of Tito whose star was rising in Moscow.

Rakosi, in fact, regained only the shadow rather than the substance of his erstwhile power. The old party bureaucracy continued to back him almost to a man, but the newly integrated functionaries back from prison hated him; and the Communist intellectuals, too, now were his fierce enemies. These opponents adopted Nagy as their hero, the man who had attempted to humanize the regime but was brought low by Rakosi's intrigues.

It was after his fall that Nagy became the center of a cult among disgruntled Communists.

Open Rebellion

The first symptoms of overt rebellion in the party appeared in the fall of 1955 with a bristling note to the Politburo denouncing the regime's cultural policies and signed by all prominent Communist writers of the country. The Politburo reacted with a sharp resolution verbally castigating the writers, but nobody was arrested; there were only a few disciplinary punishments which the writers shrugged off. In the winter, critical articles began to appear in the official organ of the Writers' Association, the *Literary Gazette*.

These were only isolated incidents. After the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, however, all hell broke loose. Khrushchev's secret speech became known overnight. Khrushchev spoke only about Stalin, but his revelations seemed to suit Rakosi to a T; and the latter's foes in the Hungarian party immediately concluded that the new party line, as formulated by Khrushchev, authorized them to denounce the boss openly and in public.

The subsequent press campaign against Rakosi and his system, conducted mainly in the columns of the *Literary Gazette,* has since been described in Western publications, and so has the series of explosive meetings in the Petofi Circle, a discussion club operating under the auspices of the Communist Youth League.[5] It is less well known that rebellious voices of extreme bluntness were frequently heard in the spring of 1956 at party meetings in various working-class districts of Budapest. The party rebels at first did not know the magnitude of the risks they were taking; they reckoned with the possibility of being arrested. But it soon became clear that there would be no arrests: the police was not permitted to touch Rakosi's critics.

[5] See United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary,* New York, 1957, paras. 379-385. The fullest documentation on the intellectuals' report is found in a special issue of *Les Temps Modernes,* Paris, Vol. 12, Nos. 129, 130, 131 (January 1957).

After the Twentieth Congress, the Old Guard was retreating step by step. On March 2, Rakosi publicly admitted that the most prominent victims of his purges, Rajk and the other alleged Titoist conspirators executed with him, had been innocent. This admission gave new impetus to the outcry against the boss. He was now commonly referred to as the "bald-headed murderer"; his authority in the party and in the country sank to zero. Moscow at first sought to keep him in power: the only real alternative, in fact, was Nagy, but the center still regarded him as impossible. In the end, a weak intermediate solution was adopted.

Realizing that Rakosi had outlived his usefulness, Moscow let him go. The axe fell on July 18, but this time there was no pilgrimage to Moscow: instead, Mikoyan came to Budapest. He told the Hungarian party to remove Rakosi as First Secretary and replace him with Erno Gero.

This did not appease the critics; Gero, in fact, had always been closely identified with Rakosi; and he had been one of the driving forces behind Rakosi's Five Year Plan, the source of Hungary's misfortunes. He was in a difficult position. He could not change basic economic policy since Moscow's objections to reforms in this field remained in force. But the people now demanded tangible improvements, and the Poznan riots of June 1956 had shown that violent outbreaks were no longer unthinkable. In his quandary, Gero tried to create a better atmosphere by wooing the party opposition. He promised freedom of criticism and sought to improve his position by diverting popular wrath against the political police. The solemn reburial on October 6 of Rajk and some of his co-victims was an astonishing spectacle; it was essentially a demonstration under the government auspices against the political police. A few days later, Mihaly Farkas, the chief torturer of Rajk and his associates, was arrested. But this move could as little save Gero as Strafford's execution could save Charles I. Nor was Nagy's readmission to the party on October 13 sufficient to stem the rising tide of revolt.

OUR LOVE OF LIBERTY . . .

There is no country which in the course of its thousand years of history has suffered more than we have. Hungarians have had to wage incessant struggles for our independence, mostly in defense of the Western countries. These struggles interrupted the continuity of our development and we always had to rise again by our own efforts. In the course of history this is the first occasion that Hungary has enjoyed the sympathy of all other civilized nations. We are deeply moved by this, and every member of our small nation is joyous in his heart that, because of our love of liberty, the nations have taken up its case. . . .

Yet we, even in our extremely grave situation, hope that we have no enemies, for we are the enemies of no one. We want to live in friendship with all people and all countries. . . . We Hungarians want to live and progress as the standard-bearers of the family of peaceful European nations. We want to live in a spirit of friendship with all the people of Europe and not on the basis of an artificially-created friendship. And turning our eyes toward more distant parts, we, a small nation, want to live in friendship, in undisturbed, peaceful and mutual esteem with the great United States, as well as the powerful Russian Empire, and in good-neighborly relations with Prague, Bucharest, Warsaw and Belgrade.

. . . Now we need general elections, free from abuses, in which all parties can nominate candidates. The elections should be held under international supervision.

. . . I must stress that we have a classless society and a State where laws prevail. We support private ownership which is rightly and justly limited by social interests. This is the wish of the Hungarian people.

As head of the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church I declare . . . that we do not oppose the justified development of our country. We only desire that this development should be sound. . . .

(*From a Radio Statement of Jozsef Cardinal MINDSZENTY, Nov.* 3, 1956)

PART THREE

The Revolution

THOSE HEROIC DAYS . . .

October 23.

Student demonstration in Budapest takes place in front of the statue of General Bem and the Polish Embassy. Students demand reforms, democratization, the return of Imre Nagy. Police try to disperse crowd when students attempt to be heard over Budapest radio. Tear gas is used and then students are arrested. The crowd attempts to free the students and the police open fire. The demonstration turns into a riot and street fighting breaks out.

Martial law is declared, a call for Russian troops issued, and, during the night, Soviet tanks and jets are reported used against demonstrators.

October 24.

Additional Soviet military units enter Budapest at the request of the Communist regime. Fighting breaks out between Soviet troops and the Hungarian people. Changes in the Party Central Committee and in the government are announced. Imre Nagy replaces Andras Hegedüs as Premier, but Ernö Gerö remains First Secretary of the Party. Nagy appeals to the people to stop fighting. Surrender deadlines are announced as fighting continues. The deadlines are moved forward several times, and finally altogether abandoned. Rebels capture factories in Budapest. Fighting reported in Debrecen, Szolnok, and Szeged.

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October 25.

The Nagy government claims its forces have restored order in Budapest, but admits fighting continues. Ernö Gerö is relieved as First Secretary of the Party and replaced by Janos Kadar. Nagy and Kadar announce that, following restoration of order, negotiations for withdrawal of Soviet troops will be initiated. Nagy promises to reconvene parliament and to consider a reform program and reorganization of the government.

October 26.

Fighting continues throughout the country. Insurgents take the entire area between Magyarovar and the Hungarian frontier station of Hegyeshalom. The Party Central Committee pledges: (1) election of a new government based on the Patriotic People's Front; (2) correction of past mistakes; (3) negotiations with the Soviet Union for withdrawal of Soviet troops; (4) the establishment of relations between the two countries on the basis of complete equality; (5) acceptance of workers' councils and raising of wage rates; (6) a complete amnesty to all participants in the fighting.

October 27.

Formation of a new government is announced. The cabinet is headed by Imre Nagy. Non-Communist personalities in the government include Zoltan Tildy, former President of the Republic, and Bela Kovacs, former Secretary General of the Smallholders' Party.

October 28.

Local negotiations with Soviet troop commanders reported and in some cases Soviet forces join the insurgents. The government announces a cease-fire and Nagy states that Soviet troops will withdraw from Budapest immediately, and that the security police will be dissolved.

An emergency committee, composed of Janos Kadar, Antal Apro, Karoly Kiss, Ferenc Münnich, Imre Nagy and Zoltan Szabo, assumes temporary leadership of the Party.

Spontaneous rise to power of revolutionary workers' councils and local national committees. A series of political and economic demands accompanies this rise. The major ones include: withdrawal of Soviet troops, political and economic equality of relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary, revision of the economy, greater democratization of life, changes in government organization and personnel, dissolution of the security police, protection of those taking part in the revolution, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, Hungarian neutrality, a call for free elections, free speech, press, assembly and worship.

The Patriotic People's Front announces that a countrywide Committee has been created to coordinate the activities of these various national committees. The Budapest Chief of Police announces formation of Hungarian National Guard units.

October 29.

Central Party organ Szabad Nep answers the Soviet Pravda attack on the revolution and defends the Hungarian uprising.

Radio Free Miskolc calls for immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian soil, not merely their return to bases outside Budapest. The Minister of Defense announces withdrawal of Soviet units from Budapest; Hungarian Army units are replacing them.

Heavy fighting continues in Budapest, particularly at Kilian (Maria Theresia) Barracks.

October 30.

Nagy announces abolition of the one-party system, a return to the political conditions prevailing after 1945, and negotiations for immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungary. A new coalition government is formed with Imre Nagy as Premier. Three non-Communists—Bela Kovacs, Zoltan Tildy and Ferenc Erdei—are included.

The recall of the Hungarian representative to the U.N., Peter Kos, is announced.

Tildy calls for reconstituting the Smallholders' Party; Ferenc Erdei makes a similar appeal for the Peasant Party, and Kadar implies to Communist Party members that he agrees with both reconstructions.

Cardinal Mindszenty is freed.

Revolutionary Home Defense Committee formed. Co-chairmen: Gen. Béla Király and Gen. Pál Maléter.

Hungarian Air Force threatens to bomb Soviet tanks unless they leave Budapest. Insurgents storm security police headquarters in Pest, and burn down Party headquarters in Buda. The security police appeals to the Writers' Union to intervene for its 10,000 members: they will surrender if guaranteed amnesty.

October 31.

Radio Free Kossuth broadcasts Soviet declaration concerning changes in relations between Soviet Union and Satellite States. Ministry of Agriculture announces suspension of compulsory deliveries of farm produce.

Cardinal Mindszenty arrives in Budapest.

Independent Smallholders' Party announces formation of a new executive committee and resumes control of its former newspaper, "Kis Ujsag." Hungarian Social Democratic Party is reorganized in Budapest, with Anna Kethly as president, and "Nepszava" as its official publication.

Pal Maleter replaces Lajos Toth as First Deputy Defense Minister and Istvan Kovacs takes Toth's former job as Army Chief of Staff. Nagy announces that the Hungarian government is prepared to leave the Warsaw Pact and has asked for negotiations on withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary.

The Council of Ministers appoints Maj. Gen. Béla Király as military commander of the capital.

A Trans-Danubian National Council is organized from various area councils. It requests immediate evacuation of Soviet troops, repudiation of the Warsaw Pact, free elections, a declaration of Hungary's neutrality, and freedom of speech, press, assembly and worship.

November 1.

Imre Nagy announces Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, proclaims Hungarian neutrality, and asks the United Nations to put the Hungarian question on its agenda. "Nepakarat," newspaper of the Free Hungarian Trade Unions, is published for the first time. The National Peasant Party, now called Petöfi Party, is reorganized. Kadar attacks past leaders and policies of the Hungarian Communist Party and announces the reorganization of the Party under the name of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

Coordinating and controlling all the Revolutionary forces, National Guard formed. Commander-in-chief: Béla Király. Deputy: Police Colonel Béla Kopácsy.

Soviet units surround Hungarian airfields, allegedly to protect evacuation of Soviet dependents from Budapest. Budapest ringed by Soviet tanks. The Hungarian Army asks all personnel to maintain discipline and avoid clashes with Soviet troops.

November 2.

Hungarian government protests to the Soviet Embassy the re-entry of Soviet troops on Hungarian soil. The United Nations is notified of Soviet activities in the second official note within two days, and is requested to appeal to the great powers to recognize Hungarian neutrality.

Soviet troops take rail line from Zahony to Nyiregyhaza; hold Budapest International Airport, and Kalocsa Airfield. United Hungarian Youth Federation is organized in Budapest.

November 3.

Considerable Soviet reinforcements and troop movements to the Austro-Hungarian border are reported. Russian tanks surround uranium mines at Pecs.

The Hungarian government is reorganized after resignation of most of its ministers. The new ministers, many of them non-Communists, take over the administration. New cabinet includes: Imre Nagy, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Zoltan Tildy, Istvan

Bibo, Anna Kethly, Ferenc Farkas, Geza Losonczy, and Janos Kadar as Minister of State, and Pal Maleter, Minister of Defense.

The Budapest National Committee elects József Kovágo as its president, i.e., Mayor of Budapest.

Negotiations for withdrawal of Soviet troops continue, and further Soviet troop movements are reported.

Cardinal Mindszenty addresses the people.

The National Council of Dunapentele appeals to all free radio stations to broadcast to Soviet troops in Russian to counteract Soviet propaganda.

November 4.

Imre Nagy announces Soviet attack on Budapest. Russian forces take over most of the country: airfields, highway junctions, bridges, railway yards. Heavy fighting reported in Csepel and Köbanya. Soviet paratroops in action near Györ. Fighting at Pecs as Hungarian troops resist Soviet efforts to take uranium mines and airfields. Heavy fighting in Budapest. Györ and Sopron fall to the Russians. Fighting continues in all parts of the country and the situation remains confused.

New government changes announced from Szolnok: Janos Kadar, Premier; Ferenc Münnich, Deputy Premier and Minister of Security; Imre Horvath, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Istvan Kossa, Minister of Finance; Antal Apro, Minister of Industry.

Repeated free radio broadcasts call for Western help.

The Hungarian Writers' Union appeals for Western aid: "To every writer in the world, to all scientists, to all writers' federations, to all science academies and associations, to the intelligentsia of the world!... HELP HUNGARY!"

Soviet-held radio stations order surrender of arms, and resumption of work. Many free radio stations fall. Radio Free Kossuth goes off the air after broadcasting repeated SOS calls.

IDEOLOGY OF THE REVOLUTION

From October 23, the first day of the rebellion, the Hungarian nation issued demands in astonishing volume, and in the form of resolutions, manifestos, handbills, and brief tracts. Later, as radio stations were seized by the revolutionaries, political demands were broadcast daily, and almost by the hour. It was as if a nation, long silenced, were indulging itself in the sheer functional pleasure of speech.

The radio broadcasts provide the best single source on the ideology of the revolution, for *all* of them were monitored abroad and each station broadcast the demands of the significant groups within its locale. This is not to say that *every* ideological current in Hungary between October 23 and November 9 may be studied in this record for, undoubtedly, there were isolated groups, on the periphery of the revolution, who rejected the general tenor of the demands; but they do not seem to have qualified as major forces since the radio stations were, unquestionably, in the hands of those with broad popular backing.

It is not this burgeoning of demands everywhere that is so surprising, for demands as such are a standard feature of revolutions. As G. S. Pettee, a student of revolutions, observes: "The attacks on the dominant classes . . . [are] one of the most characteristic symptoms of a coming revolution, and naturally . . . [they] continue in ever increasing volume during the course of the revolution until the position of the obnoxious . . . institutions is completely undermined."

What is impressive in the Hungarian demands is their virtual unanimity. There were traces of ideological differences between, say, Radio Free Miskolc which seemed to represent the Hungarian "left" and Radio Free Gyor which took its stand with what might be termed the "center"; but even Gyor was explicit on October 28, when it stated flatly:

> This is not a counter-revolution, but the national movement of the Hungarian people. *The workers and peasants in Gyor-Sopron counties do not want the restora-*

tion of the power of manufacturers and landlords; the national revolution is not aimed at the restoration of the old regime. (Italics added.)

From the date of the first revolutionary outbreak through November 4, when the Soviet armies returned to the attack, a totalitarian society was in dissolution. But just as surely contact between classes, or between regions, was never wholly lost. As the revolt progressed a consensus slowly emerged. "In the course of our several days of fighting for freedom the joint demands of the entire country are beginning to take shape. Therefore, we workers, students, and armed forces under the leadership of the worker's council and student parliament of Miskolc submit the following proposals. . . ."

This growth of cohesion among the revolutionary forces is one of the most striking features of the revolt. Despite the disorganization that followed the collapse of the Gero regime on October 23-24, anarchy was short-lived. Within a matter of days "revolutionary councils," "workers' councils," "*kolkhoz* [collective farm] councils," and "student parliaments" sprang up everywhere as a kind of counter-government. Very slowly they began to establish links—by courier and radio. It was as if social discipline were an ingrained feature of the revolutionaries; and as the authority of the central government disintegrated in town after town, or in government department after department, the need for a new source of authority was increasingly felt.*

* Soviet writers on the Revolution of 1917 are fond of dwelling on a similar phenomenon, which they call *dvoevlastie,* or "dual power." As the revolutionaries seceded from the moribund Czarist regime, in Petersburg, Moscow, and other regions, they set up a revolutionary counterpart in the form of workers' and peasants' *soviets.* These soviets at first represented all shades of revolutionary opinion and were only later captured by the Bolsheviks under Lenin's direction.

Crane Brinton discusses the issue of *dvoevlastie* in his *Anatomy of Revolution:* "In *all* our revolutions [1642, 1775, 1789, and 1917] . . . the legal government finds opposed to it, once the first steps in actual revolution have been taken, not merely hostile individuals and parties . . . but a rival government, better organized, better staffed, better obeyed. . . . At a given revolutionary crisis they [the leaders of the new representative

Gradually these councils took on functions of local administration, and even some of the attributes of central power. Thus existing institutions—press, civil defense, sanitation, production, and even foreign affairs—fell into the revolutionary orbit. The Hungarian News Agency, itself revolutionized by that date, reported on October 30:

> The Revolutionary Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided: (1) No time should be lost in elaborating the basic principles of an independent Hungarian foreign policy. . . . (2) We condemn the declaration made by Peter Kos, the Hungarian UN representative. . . . (4) The workers of the Foreign Ministry declare that they will take part with all their energy in assuring order. . . . (5) Finally, the Revolutionary Committee of the Foreign Ministry calls on [ministerial] workers . . . to turn up at their offices on Wednesday morning.

It is this gradually emerging order among the revolutionaries which accounts, in part, for the multitude of demands. After a decade of enforced silence, the people, organized or represented in councils, were declaring themselves. The demands are then as much a statement of the fundamental of a new Hungarian social order—an attempt to establish the broad consensus—as a series of peremptory ultimata on a disintegrating regime.

Demands in Detail

Between October 23 and November 9 a total of 225 major demands were broadcast by the revolutionary stations and monitored abroad. By category these demands were:

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bodies] step naturally and easily into the place of the defeated government."

It is a wry comment on history that the nearest analogue to this proliferation of democratic, or revolutionary, councils in Hungary in 1956 should be the soviets of 1917. But within a generation a derivative of those soviets, the Hungarian Worker's Party (Communist), had come to stand for the *ancien régime*.

DEMAND	NO. OF INSTANCES	PER CENT OF TOTAL
National Independence	78	35
Political Reform	69	31
Economic Reform	63	28
End of Censorship	8	3
Religious Freedom	7	3
Total	225	

(All percentages rounded)

The largest single category thus dealt with the issue of national sovereignty and the Gero regime's subservience to the Soviet Union, and confirms the initial impression that this was a national revolt, or better still *rebellion,* against a foreign power as well as a foreign political *system.* Again, of these demands, 162 dealt with issues which may be termed political or social, in contrast to economic—and even in this last category the number of demands dealing with purely economic matters such as wages, as against quasi-political issues like worker-management of industry, is comparatively small. The great weight of demands addressed to the need for political and social reform further suggests that poverty, while real, was only a secondary complaint, subordinate to freedom as such. (This impression is reinforced by conversations with representative Hungarian refugees. Thus of 18 Hungarian students and intellectuals interviewed in detail shortly after the revolution, given a hypothetical alternative fully 15 chose political freedom as preferable to economic security under totalitarian conditions. Only one refugee chose economic security at the price of "freedom," while two were in doubt.)

Despite this emphasis on the political and social, the overwhelming majority of the demands are specific and practical. There were very few generalities. The typical formulation of demands in Hungary was—"We demand that our uranium mines be placed under immediate Hungarian control," or "We demand that free elections be held at once, without the supervision of any foreign state," or "Far-reaching financial assistance

must be granted to independent [i.e., non-collective] peasants." Occasionally demands for reform are put in terms of principle—"Complete rejection of Stalinist peasant policy," or "true Socialist democracy"—but these are exceptions to the general rule. The impression is overwhelming that these demands are addressed to the immediate issues of the day: there is *no* single instance of a "philosophical law" put forward in justification of the revolution. This is in marked contrast to such revolutionary documents as the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* in 1789, which state: "Men are born and remain free and equal.... Law may rightfully prohibit only those actions which are injurious to society...." In the Hungarian revolution all matters of theory were deferred until such time as Soviet troops might withdraw and conditions of political security prevail. In this respect the Hungarian demands show a clear ancestry in the pre-revolutionary "literature of protest" which similarly avoided any approach to abstraction.

On the other hand, if the Hungarian revolutionaries rejected theory, there is ample evidence for the general shape of the society they wished to see. Few of the demands could be classified as "rightist" except by a doctrinaire of the discredited "Stalinist left." There was, for example, no case of demands for the return of pre-war governments—Hapsburg or Horthyite—or for the restoration of capitalism as such. Disclaimers on this point were frequent and explicit. The nationalization of large- and medium-scale industry was to be left intact; and so far as de-nationalization was an issue at all, it centered on agriculture and small trade.

Thus the Communist policy of *forceful* collectivization, or peasant oppression, was frequently the target of the demands; but the collective farms, as such, were seldom attacked. Indeed, of 22 demands dealing with the question of agriculture, eight specify that collectivization must be voluntary, or rid of the element of compulsion. The three separate demands for financial aid to private farming would suggest that the peasants foresaw a "Socialist" sector of agriculture as continuing if local farmers wished it so.

The nine demands of the "Hungarian agricultural population," as broadcast by Radio Budapest on November 1, are a good summary of the peasant position mid-way through the revolt:

—Complete rejection . . . of Stalinist policy. A decree must be issued ordering the dissolution of weak [agricultural] collectives and collectives established by means of violence. Peasants must be granted the right to leave collectives. . . . The land, property, and animals which they brought to the collectives must be returned to them and they must be given State support. The present system of State assistance to collectives must be discontinued. State support must be administered by a collective center . . . elected by collective members.

—An agricultural delegation composed of peasant representatives, members of new parties, agricultural experts and journalists must be sent to study the system of large-scale farming in Western Europe—Denmark, Holland, England, the northern countries [Scandinavia]—and the United States, and their experiences must be used to benefit Hungarian agriculture.

—The present setup of the machine tractor stations [MTS] must be discontinued. . . .

—Far-reaching financial assistance must be granted to independent peasants.

—We approve the discontinuation of the compulsory delivery system . . . but this is only a first step. The extremely high peasant taxes must be reduced immediately and the present system of taxation must be revised. . . .

—The old system of selling and purchasing land must be restored.

—State farms whose output and profits are inadequate must be liquidated.

—The Ministry of Ingathering [produce collection] must be abolished, the Ministries of Agriculture and State Farms merged, and the bureaucratic apparatus reduced.

—Peasant Revolutionary Committees must be established in all villages. Members of the Committees should be recruited from the democratic parties and should take power until elections are held.

The moderate position is significant since, on November 1, the general impression was that the Hungarian revolution had "won." Consequently, there was little tactical advantage to be gained at that point by hiding fundamental beliefs.

So far as demands dealing with industry go, the majority had a distinct left-wing flavor, and were in every sense normal demands of a militant Central European working class. Thus there were four separate demands for worker management of industry, a quasi-"Titoist" or, perhaps, syndicalist feature; six demands for the right to strike; six for the establishment of free trade unions; and five for the abolition of the "speed-up" and norm system in the factories. All were compatible with the modern socialist state.

Radio Free Miskolc probably spoke the consensus of the Hungarian industrial workers on October 25, when it declared:

> . . . Let them withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. Strike!
>
> We have had enough of this. Enough of the autocracy of certain leaders. We too want Socialism but according to our own special Hungarian conditions, reflecting the interests of the Hungarian working class, the Hungarian nation, and our most sacred national sentiments.

Proceeding to the specific, Miskolc demanded:

> . . . the elimination, without any other considerations, of all persons who compromised themselves by the cult of personality.
>
> We demand that those Communists and non-Communists who, in obeying the principles of proletarian internationalism, honor above all our Hungarian national tradition and thousand-year history be given the most important positions in the Party and government.
>
> We demand the revision of the institutions of the State security authorities and the immediate elimination of all leaders and functionaries who are the slightest degree compromised. . . .
>
> With regard to the grave errors committed in the field of planned economy, we demand the immediate dismissal of the responsible leaders of the planning organs.

We demand an increase of real wages.

We believe our demands will be realized if our parliament ceases to be an election machine, and the members of parliament cease to be yes-men.

We demand that March 15 be proclaimed a national holiday. . . .

Thus there was very little of the doctrinaire in the demands of the Hungarian working class. Surprisingly, this was as true of the Communists who joined the ranks of the revolutionaries (in large numbers) as of the non-Communist left. A mobile transmitter which called itself Free Radio Rajk (after the "National" Communist Minister of Foreign Affairs executed in 1949) expressed solidarity with national demands in a broadcast on November 1:

Comrades, if the Communist Party wishes to continue in the leading and guiding role . . . it must proclaim and demand . . . all that the Hungarian people rightly ask. It is up to us, the Communist Party . . . to ask . . . withdrawal of the Russian Army. . . .

As the revolution progressed even the government of Mr. Nagy, once again Premier from October 24 forward, shared this view. An interview with Gyorgy Lukacs, a Communist and Minister of People's Culture in the government of October 27, expresses a sense of resignation. According to the correspondent of the Polish weekly *Nowa Kultura,* Mr. Lukacs felt:

[The second wing of the Communist Party] is revolutionary, wishing to break completely with Stalinist traditions . . . to create a new Marxist party. . . . The new Party will not be able to expect rapid success—Communism in Hungary has been wholly disgraced. . . .

Evidently, between October 23 and November 9 there were few significant political differences which divided the Hungarian people, and these are difficult to evaluate. There were 14 "free" stations in operation at one time or another in the course of the revolt, and of these only six used the demand form as such—the remainder confined themselves to general political commentary, re-

portage, military movements, and so forth.* Nor was "demand activity" evenly distributed among the six:

	NO. OF INSTANCES	PER CENT OF TOTAL
Budapest (Free Kossuth)	108	48
Free Miskolc	73	32
Free Gyor	27	12
Szombathely	9	4
Free Rajk	2	1
Unidentified	6	3
Total	225	

Yet, it would probably be inaccurate to conclude that demands as such were foreign to the majority of the nation, or that the concept was limited to a few locales.** Radio Budapest, for example, broadcast the demands of widely dispersed organizations and, as the voice of the capital, saw itself as speaking for the country at large.

Again there are some interesting divergencies in the *share* of each class of demands in the total demand activity of the stations—in other words, in the emphasis:

CATEGORY	PERCENTAGE OF ALL DEMANDS BROADCAST BY SOURCE		
	I. Budapest	*II. Miskolc*	*III. Gyor*
National Independence	28	34	55
Political Reform	30	33	30
Economic Reform	34	27	15
End of Censorship	5	3	—
Free Religion	3	3	—

* The 14 "free" stations were Budapest (Radio Free Kossuth, after October 30), Debrecen, Dunapentele, Eger, Gyor, Kaposvar, Miskolc, Nyiregyhaza, Pecs, Szombathely, whose locations are all known; and Csokonay, Rakoczi, Roka, and Rajk, whose locations were not discovered.

** Thus of a total of 78 demands for national sovereignty, 30 were voiced by Radio Budapest in the capital, 25 by Miskolc in northeastern Hungary, 15 by Gyor in the northwest, five by Szombathely on the Austrian frontier, two by Radio Rajk, the mobile transmitter, and one by an unidentified source.

The two outlying stations (Miskolc and Gyor) show a strong emphasis on the issue of national sovereignty; indeed Gyor seems preoccupied with the fundamental issues of the revolution, independence and political freedom, to the exclusion of much else. Conceivably Gyor, which was isolated in the northwest and farther from the threat of Soviet power, felt freer to voice this demand; but the demand, as such, appeared in the capital, in Miskolc, in Gyor, in Szombathely, and over one unidentified station as well as the mobile transmitter Radio Free Rajk. Apart from drawing the conclusion that national sovereignty was the *basic* demand (a conclusion supported by the fact that of eight demands broadcast over Szombathely, five were for independence, and that both of the two demands broadcast by Radio Free Rajk were for independence as well) no generalizations are possible.

Demands Varying

Four distinct phases of the revolution can be distinguished. In the first, from October 23 through October 24, the revolt had the character of a disorganized outbreak. Fighting was sporadic and the government, though now headed by Mr. Nagy, treated it as a temporary disturbance. In this period, apart from the Petoefi Club and the Writers' Union, few demands were put forward. These dealt with limited reform of the existing system.

In the second phase, which extended from October 25 through October 29, the revolution gained strength, the armed forces deserted to the people, and the government of Mr. Nagy was forced into a series of concessions. The revolutionaries seized the radio stations in Gyor, Pecs, Szombathely, and elsewhere and voiced the majority of the demands of the nation. It was in this period that the people burst the bounds of the existing system and, in the words of a Polish Communist who observed these events, pressed for "a curious synthesis: a basis realization of people's democracy (land in

the hands of the peasant, socialization of factories and banks) and of a pluralism of parties, freedom of the press, and all the other liberties inherent in a liberal democracy." Similarly, as clashes between Hungarian revolutionaries and Soviet troops grew more bitter, a parallel theme developed—the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Hungary, the abolition of the Warsaw Pact, and, as a logical corollary, the declaration of Hungary's "neutrality" between East and West.

In the third phase, October 31 through November 4 —the period of Hungary's brief freedom—the nature of the demands changed: the Social Democrats, the Smallholders, the "Petoefi Peasants" resumed political activity as free parties and the *form* of demands, as such, fell more or less in disuse. As the government was gradually broadened, and Mr. Nagy in effect joined the revolution, the following type of political address became usual. On October 31 Bela Kovacs, former General Secretary of the Smallholders' Party and a Minister of State in the new government, declared:

> The [Smallholders'] party has full liberty to reassemble, but the question is whether, in its constitution, the party will proclaim its old ideas again. No one should dream of going back to the world of aristocrats, bankers and capitalists. That world is definitely gone! A true member of the Smallholders' Party cannot think along the lines of 1939 or 1945. The last ten years were bitter, but they also provided a useful lesson.
>
> . . . We must make use of the lesson . . . draw up a new party program. . . . I cannot and do not wish to define the new program. . . . I must first discuss it with the Party leaders in Budapest. . . . But one thing is certain: It must be based on the creation of a new Hungary. . . .
>
> When the Hungarian freedom fighters battled against the Russian tanks, they fought for the country's independence. This does not mean that we regard the Russian people as our enemies, but one cannot follow a unilateral policy. . . . It is necessary to establish relations, based on equal rights, with all nations, and one cannot tie the country's fate to one or another military bloc. The Hungarian people want a neutral Hungary.

Mr. Kovacs' views were a typical expression of the political thought of those days, and, on the face of it, moderate enough. In the brief period of political activity allowed the nation, the demands for neutralization of Hungary came to the fore. Mr. Nagy formally proclaimed neutrality on November 1, in an address broadcast over Radio Budapest:

> The Hungarian people, on the basis of independence and equality and in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter, wish to live in true friendship with their neighbors, the Soviet Union, and all the peoples of the world.
>
> The Hungarian people desire the consolidations and further development of the achievement of their national revolution without joining any power-blocs. . . . We appeal to our neighbors, and to countries far and near, to respect the unalterable decision of our people . . . [for a] free, independent, democratic, and neutral Hungary.

However moderate the official position might be, the Soviet Union saw in such a program a threat to its interests. On November 4 it returned to the attack, and the final phase of the revolution began. The free radios resumed their activity, but, as they fell to the Soviet armies, were silenced. In this period the broadcasts dealt chiefly with appeals to the UN, proclamations of strikes and resistance, and military movements.

The last rebel broadcast in Hungary was heard on November 11, over Free Radio Rajk, the mobile transmitter of the Communist revolutionaries. It was no longer a demand on the Hungarian government, but an appeal to international law: "We request . . . the free nations of the world to assert what moral influence they can. . . . If UN observers were sent to Hungary it would be disagreeable, not [only] to Janos Kadar, but to his Soviet masters."

The end of radio broadcasts did not spell the end of resistance. For more than a month Hungary was paralyzed by a general strike. In this period the position of the revolutionaries grew steadily weaker, and their demands, so far as they are known, more modest. Until

the end, however, the demand for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops remained fixed.

1. We wish to emphasize that the revolutionary working class considers the factories and the land the property of the working people.

2. The Workers' Parliament recognizes the Kadar government as a negotiating party, provided that the government, to assure its own legality, will reorganize itself to conform with the will of the people.

3. The people have put their faith in the workers' councils to make certain that the will of the people continues to be carried out. We demand that the authority of the workers' councils be expanded and reaffirmed by the government in the economic, cultural and social fields.

4. In the interest of preserving order and re-establishing peace, we demand that a date be set for free elections in which only those parties may participate that recognize and have always recognized the Socialist order, based on the principle that means of production belong to society.

5. We demand the immediate freeing of the members of the Imre Nagy government which was elected by the revolution, as well as the release of the freedom fighters.

6. We demand that a cease-fire be ordered immediately as well as the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest, since Hungarian authorities can assure order through the labor force. And we demand that as soon as workers have resumed work, the Hungarian government open negotiations for the gradual and orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the country, and keep the public informed on the progress of these negotiations.

7. The police force must be organized from the honest workers of the plants and from the Army units loyal to the people.

8. It is requested that the above points be made public by the government on the radio and through the press.

Conclusion: We shall immediately begin with reconstruction, work toward supplying the people with food, and re-establish transport facilities, but other tasks will

be undertaken only after recognition of our demands and after they are carried out.

—Workers' Councils of the 11th District Budapest, November 12, 1956.

These demands were circulated in the form of crudely printed handbills by such organizations as the Workers' Councils of Csepel or Sztalinvaros. But with the final suppression of the revolution, and the reorganization of the secret police in December, the cycle of political activity which had begun with the Petoefi debates in the spring of 1956 came to its end.

THE BIBO PLAN

It is very difficult to ascertain how long Minister of State István Bibo stayed in his office in the Budapest Parliament Building after the massive Russian military intervention on November 4, 1956. According to confidential information, he began the drafting of this statement there and continued it at home. Neither the tanks fighting in the streets nor the defeat of the armed resistance deterred him from the responsibility he has assumed as a Minister of Imre Nagy's government. The following draft which goes into considerable detail concerning a solution of the Hungarian crisis—and even deals with the pace of Soviet troop withdrawals—was appropriately made public on November 9, 1956. Minister of State István Bibo's draft was then endorsed on November 14 by the most important representative organ of the Revolution, the Central Workers' Council of Greater Budapest. Consequently, the draft below has a legality which is assured by two facts: 1. that it was submitted by the last Minister of State to remain at his post; and 2. that it was endorsed by the most important organ of popular representation during and after the Revolution.

The second Soviet occupation of Hungary has caused a difficult, and for those who brought it about, nearly impossible situation. The reasons are as follows:

1. Soviet troops occupied Hungary under the pretext of restoring order. The fact is, however, that due to the country's resistance and revolutionary fighting

spirit, the consolidation of the country is impossible so long as Soviet troops remain in the country. At various points, unorganized resistance may continue to flare up for weeks, in fact, even for months.

2. The Soviet-installed government maintains that after restoring order they will conclude an agreement to withdraw Soviet troops. Being fully aware, however, of the political strength of the people of the nation, we may surely assume that the present government with its pro-Soviet foreign policy, and the Soviet methods with which it tried to enforce its Socialist achievement, would collapse.

3. Essential conditions under which the Soviet troops would withdraw, after having attained their aims by the methods they used, do not exist and, in fact, cannot exist. Simultaneously, the international situation imperatively requires Soviet troop withdrawal.

4. The maintenance of Socialism in Hungary by a one-party system is no longer possible, particularly because the Hungarian Workers' Party [MDP] called the Soviet troops in the first place, and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party's [Kádár's government] alleged second invitation to the Soviet Union destroyed the authority of any government relying on Soviet support. Therefore, Hungary cannot be governed without a serious, authoritative multi-party system, the more so since the only Communist who still enjoys authority with the Hungarian people, Imre Nagy, has also advocated a multi-party system.

5. The Soviet Union and the government put into office by it are afraid, and quite rightly too, that withdrawal of Soviet troops and general elections will bring about a situation which ultimately would lead to an orthodox capitalist restoration, to dismissal of all former Communists from civil service and key positions, to a serious and decisive reactionary takeover and that finally it would make Hungary a Western wedge driven into the East-European Socialist bloc. That all this would have been true under the Nagy regime is not evident. The above-mentioned symptoms did appear, however, but the government as organized at that time

would have enjoyed sufficient authority and strength to amend those mistakes within a few days. It is, therefore, cynical and irresponsible to maintain that the only answer to those phenomena was Soviet occupation, which actually came about because of Soviet presumption of a change in the international situation. One thing is certain, however, that the state of mind of the Communists, frightened by the domestic situation, encouraged and prompted the Soviet Union to come to a decision. In a different foreign political situation, on the other hand, when the most rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops is necessary, we can well imagine that a well-formulated and internationally-guaranteed agreement that a capitalist, anti-Communist and reactionary restoration would not take place might influence Soviet decisions.

6. We must not forget that the aversion of an orthodox capitalist, reactionary, anti-Communist restoration is the concern not only of the Soviet Union and the Communists, but also of the youth, workers and soldiers who carried out the Revolution and shed their blood for its victory. The majority of them were not Communists but the great majority consider themselves Socialists. It would be ethically impermissible, as well as impossible from the point of view of evolving a free Hungarian domestic policy, for the restoration to be made the beneficiary, by the votes of the older generation, of that freedom won by the blood of the revolutionaries.

7. We must further consider that a restoration which would make Hungary a wedge in the Communist bloc would, on the one hand, constantly foment further aggressive plans, and on the other, discourage freedom-loving Communists in the other People's Democracies when the time for liberalization of their own regimes came and whereas, a solution that links socialist achievements with a guarantee of freedom would give an encouraging example worth following.

The following draft proposals are aimed to solve the problem by equitable compromise without making concessions of principle:

I. *The governmental starting point* is the last legal

Hungarian government as constituted on November 3 under the Premiership of Imre Nagy. This government's legality derives from the Hungarian Revolution of October 23, 1956 and not from the Rákosi Constitution of 1949.

II. *Alternative A: Foreign Political Solution* would be for Hungary to break out of the military clauses of the Warsaw Agreement, while still observing the consultative agreement referring to European peace and security, provided that Yugoslavia joins the agreement under the same stipulations.

Alternative B: Foreign Political Solution would also be for Hungary to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and to conclude a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union.

III. *Guarantee for the Positions of Communists.*

A.—Amnesty for all crimes and for all acts which can be established to have stemmed from political conviction. The abolition of the death penalty.

B.—A reorganization of state and industrial apparatuses shall take place by means of qualitative selection, with institutional guarantees that such reorganization will not be directed against Communists, nor generally against people not holding diplomas, or against those holding short-cut diplomas [See 5e].

IV. Military evacuation shall be carried out parallel to political consolidation, in 7 to 10 stages, within one to two months, as, for instance:

a.—First stage of withdrawal: Soviet troops withdraw from Budapest and five to six Southern counties. Simultaneously, the free Hungarian government takes office, regulates the position of the Revolutionary Committees and the Workers' Councils and begins reorganization of the administration.

b.—Second stage: Soviet troops evacuate five to six Western counties and Pest County. Simultaneously, Hungarian troops shall temporarily seal the Western border and for the time being prevent entrance of immigrants. On concluding the second stage of evacuation, the Constitutional Revolutionary Assembly might convene in Budapest as stipulated under paragraph 5.

c.—Third stage: Soviet troops evacuate the remaining Eastern counties with the exception of Borsod and Szabolcs. Simultaneously, as stipulated under paragraph 5, the Revolutionary Assembly in Budapest shall constitutionally establish the necessary acts.

d.—Final stage: Soviet troops shall evacuate the remaining two counties at which time the foreign political agreements, as stipulated under paragraph 2, shall be concluded.

V. *Constitutional Solution:* Prior to the general elections, a revolutionary constitution-giving assembly, composed of the Revolutionary Councils and Committees, shall convene which will define the basic constitutional and social principles of the new Hungarian democracy by force of a constitutional law. Further, it will eventually elect a head of state and will legislate an electoral law. The constitutional law will contain the following stipulations:

a.—Hungary's constitutional form is a Republic as under Act 1, 1946.

b.—Hungary's form of government is based on an independent, responsible government, representatives of the people, on basic freedoms and parliamentary democracy.

c.—Hungary's social shape is based on the principle of prohibition of exploitation [socialism] which means:

1. to maintain the 1945 land reform with a maximum of twenty to forty acres;

2. to maintain nationalization of mines, banks and heavy industry;

3. to establish communal ownership of existing factories through workers' management, workers' shares or profit-sharing;

4. the possibility of free individual or cooperative enterprise, with guarantees against exploitation;

5. freedom of private ownership within the guarantees against exploitation;

6. general social security.

d.—Making amends for those economic and moral injustices which have been committed shall by no means be made by restoration of the *status quo*. All compensations shall be made according to the principle prohibiting exploitation, not in terms of property seized, or economic power lost, but only to the extent that it affects a ruined home, destroyed status and the results of one's own personal work.

e.—The reorganization of Hungarian administration shall be based on a low-numbered, qualitative and selected expert management and elected secular leaders, or local self-governing bodies managed by committees. The functions of the latters will be carried out by the revolutionary organs until election of permanent organs. The status of people holding administrative jobs, or jobs with the armed forces and the police, who do not hold diplomas, or hold short-cut diplomas only, shall be institutionally established, but also on a selective principle, eventually by setting up a proportion of these to the whole.

f.—Among the basic freedoms, full freedom of religion shall be emphasized particularly. The state shall in no way interfere with the life of the Churches. The status of the Churches shall be regulated according to the principle of complete separation of Church and State. The state shall respect the Churches' social work, including educational activities, and shall, under agreement, subsidize them.

g.—The above proposals have the force of a state law, meaning that they can be changed only by a two-thirds or three-quarters majority of the National Assembly. Further, a constitutional court shall see that no political party be permitted to be active without observing these rules.

VI. The need for United Nations troops or police will arise only if withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops is not carried out according to the agreement, or should serious incidents occur elsewhere. They are by no means necessary in connection with the elections to be held after a few months of calming-down, subsequent

to the withdrawal of Soviet forces. At present, Hungary after the Revolution is at a pitch of moral and public spirit as it has not been for a thousand years. The withdrawal of Soviet troops and measures issued by a government enjoying political and moral authority are ample for the maintenance of public order.

RECONQUEST OF HUNGARY

The massive Soviet military intervention launched in the early hours of November 4, 1956 to crush the Hungarian Revolution was not a hastily improvised operation. For weeks the Soviet Union had been preparing Operational Expeditionary Forces of "volunteers" for intervention in the Suez crisis, should it decide on such action. This special Army was conveniently at hand to send into Hungary.

The Soviet High Command selected the "volunteers" from the Kiev and Odessa military districts' Army corps. They included mechanized and tank units, light and heavy artillery, paratroopers and specially-trained desert warfare units, totaling five Army corps, and were concentrated in the Odessa region, close to the Rumanian border, with some divisions in Transylvania and the Carpathian Ukraine. Their buildup had just been completed when the Polish and Hungarian events made the Kremlin decide that a show of military strength was necessary.

Soviet divisions marched toward Poland from East Germany and the Kiev military district. The Budapest events of October 23rd convinced the Kremlin that military intervention was the only action which would maintain Soviet domination in Hungary and prevent similar risings in other East-Central European countries. On the same day, Khrushchev telephoned Polish Premier Gomulka, informing him that the Soviet Union accepted the resolutions of the Polish Communist Party's Eighth Plenum and that Soviet armed forces would return to their bases.

In Hungary, however, the Kremlin began to bargain with the government. It is now clear that this was simply a ruse to gain precious time. Of course, Khrushchev has insisted (and maintained as recently as April, 1958, in Budapest) that the decision to intervene in Hungary and crush the revolution was made only after a very difficult struggle. This may be true, but no matter how concerned the Kremlin was, the decision was simplified by the fact that a striking force was ready at hand: the Operational Expeditionary Forces.

Already stationed in Hungary at the outbreak of the Revolution were the 2nd and 17th Soviet Mechanized Divisions and additional Army and Air Force units, about 20,000 men and 500 tanks strong, and in addition, two training divisions of smaller striking force; their newly-inducted men having been stationed in Hungary only a few weeks.

These forces were alerted on October 23rd. The 2nd Division was moved into Budapest to put down the growing revolt, and the 17th Division was moved to Western Hungary. The Soviet 32nd and 34th Mechanized Divisions stationed in Rumania were also alerted on October 23rd, and the 92nd Infantry Division and the Sub-Carpathian and Ukrainian garrisons were alerted on the 24th. These combat-ready divisions then crossed the Hungarian border.

The Operational Expeditionary Forces, also alerted on October 24th, gradually moved into Sub-Carpathia and Transylvania. While Soviet emissaries Suslov and Mikoyan negotiated in Budapest, agreeing to withdraw Soviet armed forces from Hungary, and on November 3rd a Soviet-Hungarian delegation agreed on the technical details of such withdrawal, the Soviet Army was moving in two directions. Those units which had been forced to retreat, as well as the training divisions and some dangerously exposed supply bases, were gradually withdrawn, but at the same time the Soviet Divisions which had been grouped in the Eastern border region of Hungary were hurriedly moved into the country.

The first official reports on these strange Soviet troop movements were issued on November 1st by the Hun-

garian Revolutionary Government, which sent a protest to the United Nations on "the re-entry of Soviet troops into Hungary." By November 2nd, Soviet divisions from Transylvania had moved toward the Szolnok, Szeged, Kiskunhalas area. The Soviet High Command was installed at Szolnok and all "loyal" Hungarian Communists, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Imre Horvath and the renegade Janos Kadar, were directed to rally there.

Divisions moving in from Sub-Carpathia descended into the Tisza valley; a strong column followed the Csap-Miskolc railway line and approached Budapest. Smaller units from the Western Ukraine marched through Slovakia into the Komarno (Komarom) section. On November 3rd, on the pretext of "withdrawal," the Soviet heavy artillery division stationed in Hajmasker was dispatched to Kelenfold.

On November 1st and 2nd all Hungarian airfields and supply bases were occupied by Soviet troops. On November 2nd and 3rd, the Soviet Army began to establish two operational bases: one on the main highway from Miskolc to Budapest, near the Matra-Bükk mountains; and one between Budapest and Szeged, along the main communication lines around Csongrad, Szentes and Kiskunhalas.

During the night of November 4th, strong mechanized units surrounded Budapest. Two heavy artillery groups were created from a pool of mixed artillery units. One was stationed at Kelenfold and the other on the Nagyrakos (Kobanya) military parade ground. Each of these groups numbered several hundred guns. Both opened a heavy barrage in the early dawn of November 4th.

The Soviet High Command planned to subdue Budapest first, since it was the Revolution's nerve center. To ensure quick victory, the artillery barrage was designed to be devastating. The High Command did not attempt to determine where resistance pockets were located or where Freedom Fighters had taken cover: every building, street-corner and open square was kept under continual barrage. The main effort, however, was di-

rected against the Killian Barracks and the area surrounding it. This area sustained tremendous damage; four thousand buildings, containing a total of sixteen thousand apartments, were destroyed. Budapest had never undergone such devastation except at the end of World War II.

The main Soviet attacking forces numbered about 80-100,000 soldiers and 2,500 tanks. Seven Soviet divisions were identified in addition to the mechanized divisions stationed in Hungary before the Revolution (the 2nd and the 17th) and the two divisions rushed into battle from Rumanian territory (the 32nd and the 34th). Thus, the total Soviet forces attacking the Hungarian people numbered well over 100,000, more than enough for an all-out war against Hungary.

Of the main force of 100,000 men and 2,500 tanks, as many as 70,000 men and 2,000 tanks fought in Budapest. Soviet units occupied provincial garrisons, demobilizing those Hungarian Army units which had managed to stay together, and interning the troops. The Battle of Budapest raged for ten days. In Pecs, Transdanubia, fighting continued until mid-November, and the centers of resistance in Northern Hungary, Miskolc and Sarospatak, tied down two Soviet divisions. With Czechoslovak cooperation, one Soviet division crossed into Transdanubia from Komarno (Komarom), and gradually sealed off the Austro-Hungarian border.

After the fall of Budapest, its Freedom Fighter units gradually withdrew and dug themselves into the hills of Buda, with headquarters in Nagykovacsi under my command (Gen. Béla Kiraly). From there we were forced back into the Vertes mountains and later, giving way to ever-increasing pressure, we retreated to the Bakony mountains. In mid-November, with Russian encirclement threatening, I gave orders that the Hungarian High Command and the units immediately charged with its defence, withdraw from the country in small units. This operation was completed on November 20th.

From the very beginning the Freedom Fighters were battling a superior force. The only arms they had were

those taken from Russian soldiers or given them by Hungarian soldiers, and home-made arms such as the primitive anti-tank weapon, the Molotov cocktail, hand-grenades, etc. When the National Guard was being formed, 22,500 Freedom Fighters registered in Budapest. This organization, the newly-created Revolutionary Armed Force, had just begun to be grouped into military formations, and at the time of the second Soviet aggression was organized only into small resistance groups. The only full military unit of the National Guard was a National Guard Brigade of university students. The regular Hungarian Army Command had not been completely cleared of Soviet hirelings by November 4th, and these latter managed to prevent the Hungarian Army from developing organized resistance. In spite of this, however, the Soviet aggressors succeeded in reconquering Hungary only after bloody, desperately-fought battles, involving immeasurable terror and devastation. A tragic proof of the moral decadence of the Soviet Army is that Moscow celebrated the ruthless suppression of the Hungarian Revolution as a military victory.

The Soviet Army learned much from its Hungarian lesson. Perhaps it also learned that in the face of a national struggle for liberty, even the most modern arms are not effective, no matter how large their number, and that the real test of strength would be the time when not a single nation, but all the oppressed countries together, staged an armed uprising for their rights and their freedom. Two hundred Soviet divisions might then not be enough to suppress the nations' struggle for liberty.

Another great lesson for the Kremlin is that a dictatorship must always be a dictatorship. Hungary has now returned to the drastic Stalinist system. The State Security Police and its Border Guard subdivision have been reorganized; the Army was placed under Soviet control from its smallest units up to the High Command; and the "politruk" system (political officers assigned to the Armed Forces as supervisors and indoctrinators) was re-installed in its full former strength.

To assure continued and "legalized" Soviet military occupation of Hungary, the Soviet Union signed a special agreement with Hungary which stipulates that Soviet Army units may be stationed in Hungary even in circumstances not covered by the provisions of the Warsaw Pact.

Thus Hungary has become a Soviet Military Protectorate.

WORLD REACTION TO SOVIET INTERVENTION

The Soviet intervention in Budapest called forth worldwide protests and demonstrations of sympathy for the Hungarians.

VIENNA: About five hundred delegates of an Austrian Socialist youth congress—carrying red banners draped with black crepe staged a silent march past the Soviet Embassy.

COPENHAGEN: About a thousand Danish students demonstrated outside the Russian Embassy.

PARIS: Police dispersed about a thousand students, carrying the Hungarian flag at the head of their procession, who marched towards the Soviet Embassy.

BONN: Flags on Government and other buildings flew at half-mast. The West German Trade Union Federation called on its six million members to stand silent for three minutes today.

BERNE: A wave of popular indignation swept Switzerland. Associations of all kinds met to pass protest resolutions. Students followed up protest meetings by distributing buttonholes in the Hungarian national colors. Thousands of people signed a petition demanding a break in Switzerland's diplomatic relations with Russia.

THE HAGUE: Angry crowds attacked the Soviet commercial building in Amsterdam during the night, bombarding it with stones. More than 60,000 Catholics marched "in silent prayer" through the streets. Rotterdam dock workers refused to unload two Russian ships.

ROME: Big forces of police surrounded Communist party headquarters to protect it from thousands of student demonstrators. Signor Togliatti, the Communist party leader, was meeting his lieutenants in the building to decide whether to issue a formal statement on Russia's action.

The Vatican City newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano* said that "no pretext justifies the Russian intervention in its enormity."

OSLO: Norwegian MPs stood as the Speaker opened the day's sitting with a short speech of sympathy for Hungary. The Government handed the Soviet Ambassador a note urging his Government to allow a Norwegian Red Cross mission into Hungary.

NEW YORK: *The Daily Worker,* organ of the American Communist party, sharply criticized the Soviet Union's use of force. Socialism, it said, could not be imposed on a country by these means.

JAKARTA: Two Government party leaders in Indonesia, Mr. Mohammed Natsir and Mr. I. J. Ikasimo, condemned Russia's action as aggression.

(*Reuters,* November 4-5, 1956)

BRUSSELS: Thousands of university students demonstrated outside the Soviet Embassy here today against Russian action in Hungary. Forty demonstrators and about twenty policemen were injured, some seriously.

The Brussels headquarters of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the world's largest non-Communist labor movement, called on its eleven affiliates in eighty-three countries to stage a five-minute strike Thursday in protest against the suppression of freedom in Hungary and the military events in the Middle East.

(New York *Times,* November 7, 1956)

MOSCOW: Meetings of *Komsomol* (the Communist Youth League) have broken up in disorder when questions about Hungary were raised....

(William J. Jordan,
New York *Times,*
November 25, 1956)

ROME: *Unita,* the [Communist] party's official organ has been flooded for days now by thousands of letters... protesting against Signor Togliatti's attitude to the Polish and Hun-

garian uprisings. Today, 120 intellectuals, the Communist Party's *elite,* addressed a manifesto to *Unita* which the newspaper refused to publish. . . . Even within the editorial staff of *Unita* there is a clash of opinion, Signor Lajolo, editor-in-chief of the Milan edition, was suspended because he published an outspoken criticism of Hungary's Communist Government. . . .

(*The Times* [London], October 31, 1956)

Copenhagen: At a meeting yesterday, the executive committee of the Danish Communist Party joined protests of several party locals and Communist-directed trade unions against the Soviet military intervention. . . .

(*Berlingske Tidende* [Copenhagen], October 31, 1956)

Tokyo: It is no exaggeration to conclude . . . that the Soviet Union will not merely not tolerate the existence of any regime which attempts to escape her control, but is also prepared to destroy it by armed force. The problem is different in nature from the British and French military operations against Egypt, and far more important.

Even if the new government in Hungary has "requested" this aid, it is still indisputable that the Soviet Union is trying to overthrow a legitimate regime by arms. This action is worse than intervention in internal affairs and makes a mockery of the "independent relations between nations" and "equality" constantly being preached by the Soviet Union. How will the Soviet Union explain her "five peace principles" to the world now?

(*Asahi Shimbun* [Tokyo], November 5, 1956)

Vatican: "The blood of the Hungarian people cries to the Lord," Pope Pius XII said today in an encyclical letter to the Roman Catholic episcopacy. For the third time in ten days he asked all Christians to join him in prayer.

Addressing directly those who "bear responsibility for these grievous events" in Hungary, he asked them to remember that "the just freedom of peoples can never be drowned in blood." The Pontiff also told them that God, "as a just judge, often punishes the sins of private persons only after their death, but sometimes, as history teaches us, strikes governors and even nations during their lifetime for their injustices."

The encyclical is understood to have been written personally by Pope Pius. It was one of the shortest encyclicals, running to less than 500 words. It was printed tonight in the Vatican newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano.*

The Pope said his soul had filled with "most painful bitterness" when he learned that "the cities and towns of Hungary are again running with the blood of citizens who from the bottom of their souls desire just freedom." He said his duty commanded him to protest, "deploring these painful facts which cause bitter sadness and indignation not only in the Catholic world but also among all free peoples." The pontiff recalled the words addressed by God to Cain: "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to me from the earth" (*Genesis* IV, 10).

"May the most merciful God touch the hearts of those responsible so that at last injustice may cease, every violence may be calmed and all nations, pacified among themselves, may again find the just order in an atmosphere of serene tranquility."

(Arnaldo Cortesi,
New York *Times,*
November 6, 1956)

ROME: The Soviet Government has become entangled in the web of contradictions resulting from a policy that, while preaching de-Stalinization, is still using Stalinist methods. They cannot take away with one hand what they give or offer with the other....

Today—and no propaganda whatever can alter this fact—the Soviet Union has not defended the cause of Socialism either in Hungary or anywhere else. It has defended solely the political system and methods of government of the People's Democracies, born with the cold war and conceived by Stalin....

(*Avanti* [Left-wing Socialist daily, Rome],
November 6, 1956)

REYKJAVIK: The misfortune which has befallen the Soviets in Hungary is for me, Icelandic socialist, a thing of great sadness....

I am a member of the World Peace Council.... There is nothing more contrary to the World Movement for Peace than armed action on the part of foreign armies against smaller countries.... If I were to accept the events of the last few days in Hungary, I should feel that I was never

again entitled to protest against the activities of foreign armies in other countries. . . .

(Halldor Laxness [Nobel Prize]
Thjodviljinn [Reykjavik],
November 7, 1956)

DELHI: We Socialists have persistently urged that foreign troops should not be allowed to be stationed in a country without the consent of the government concerned, as they would inevitably give rise to tension in the particular area. But for a big power to station its troops without the consent of a small country and, what is still worse, to suppress people and to impose on the helpless government its own puppets and stooges, is the most despicable form of colonialism. Yet this is exactly what has been happening in Hungary, who has now appealed to the United Nations for help.

(Uba Swe, Prime Minister of Burma,
at 2nd Congress of the Asian
Socialist Conference, Janata [Bombay],
November 11, 1956)

ROME: Signor Nenni, leader of the Socialist party, has made it known that he intends to give the sixteen million lire (L9,600) of his Stalin prize to the families of fallen Hungarian patriots. The gesture is a protest against the massacre of the Hungarian insurgents.

PARIS: Two Parisians have died of injuries received during the demonstration and riots of Wednesday and Thursday. Both of them were apparently Communists.

Meanwhile anti-Communist demonstrations continue in many parts of France. At Bastia (Corsica) the local Communist leaders were besieged for some hours until released by the police. In Toulon the Communist newspaper office had to have protection, and in Marseilles the office of a Communist cell was sacked by students. In Bordeaux demonstrators marched past the Communist headquarters carrying the Hungarian flag; they tore down the street sign of the Place Stalingrad and renamed it Place Budapest.

There is no indication at present of any change in the structure, outlook, or leadership of the French Communist party, but all the efforts of its leaders to break down its isolation have been nullified. One observer comments that the party is now as isolated as it was after the signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in 1939.

(*Manchester Guardian*,
November 12, 1956)

LONDON: Not since the Spanish [Civil] War has England seen so popular a revulsion of feeling as over the Hungarian tragedy. I suppose the Russians will think that the workers who have demonstrated and the students who volunteered to go and fight... are Fascist dupes. They may be more impressed by the rapid disintegration of the [English] Communist Party....

(Kingsley Martin,
New Statesman & Nation,
November 17, 1956)

STOCKHOLM: Eight Nobel Prize winners, in a sharply-worded telegram to Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin, protested against the Russian quelling of the Hungarian anti-Communist rebellion. Among those protesting was the Spanish-born poet Juan Jimenez, this year's literature Prize winner.

The telegram, sponsored by the Swedish Committee for Cultural Freedom, said:

"In the name of humanity we condemn and protest against the Soviet Russian oppression of the freedom efforts of the Hungarian people. The events in Hungary form a flagrant crime against human rights. The Soviet Union should immediately withdraw its troops from Hungarian territory and entrust the re-establishing of free, settled relations to the United Nations.

"John F. Enders, Nobel Prize for Medicine, 1954; Juan Ramon Jimenez, Nobel Prize for Literature, 1956; Hans Adolf Krebs, Nobel Prize for Medicine, 1953; Fritz Lipmann, Nobel Prize for Medicine, 1953; Linus Pauling, Nobel Prize for Chemistry, 1954; Frederick C. Robbins, Nobel Prize for Medicine, 1954; Thomas H. Weller, Nobel Prize for Medicine, 1954; Fritz Zernike, Nobel Prize for Physics, 1953."

(*United Press,*
December 1, 1956)

PARIS: The undersigned who never harbored unfriendly feelings to the USSR and socialism, today consider themselves justified in protesting to the Soviet Government against the use of guns and tanks to suppress the uprising of the Hungarian people and their striving for independence, even taking into account the fact that some reactionary elements, which made appeals on the rebel radio, were involved.

We consider and always will consider that socialism, like freedom, cannot be carried on the point of a bayonet. We fear that a government, imposed by force, will soon be com-

pelled, in order to stand its ground, to resort to force itself and to the injustices against its own people which ensue from this....

We are equally opposed to the hypocrites.... We deny the right of protest against Soviet intervention in Hungary to those who kept silent, or even expressed approval, when the US drowned in blood the freedom won by Guatemala....

The first and principal demand which we address to the Soviet Government . . . is the demand for truth. Where truth triumphs, crime becomes impossible; where truth is suppressed, there can be neither justice, nor peace, nor freedom.

Jean-Paul Sartre — Vercors
Roger Vaillant — Claude Roy
Simone de Beauvoir — Claude Morgan
(Among others)....

(*France-Observateur* [Paris], November 15, 1956)

FOOLISHNESS . . .

During his visit at the Brussels World Fair, stopping in front of a large view of Budapest in the Hungarian pavilion, the Soviet chief of state, *Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov* stated:

> What a beautiful city, what a beautiful country. But such foolish things have happened there. Some people have called it counter-revolution, some called it revolution. I think it was just foolishness... Here in the West they raised a big fuss because Imre Nagy was given too harsh a sentence. Perhaps it would have been possible not to give Imre Nagy such a harsh sentence because he was just a fool. Nagy never helped us, never raised his finger to help us. He was not a real Communist.
>
> (*New York Times,* New York City, Aug. 14, 1958)

Freedom is stronger than any ideology

"...what happened in Hungary (Oct. 23—Nov. 4, 1956) demonstrated that the desire for national freedom is stronger even than any ideology and cannot ultimately be suppressed. What happened in Hungary was not essentially a conflict between communism and anti-communism. It represented nationalism striving for freedom from foreign control."

(Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru:
The Tragic Paradox of Our Age,
The New York Times Magazine, Sept. 7, 1958)

DOUBLE STANDARD OF MORALS?

I arrived at the Headquarters of the United Nations more than two months ago as the only legal representative of the Imre Nagy Government. I requested on several occasions a hearing by the pertinent organs of the United Nations so that I might justify the appeal made by Mr. [Imre] Nagy to the United Nations and so that I might ask for action to be taken on this appeal. We have waited with great patience for this occasion and during this time of waiting the oppression of our small country continues. By armed force a group has been put into power which has no legal right to consider itself Hungary's Government....

This period of waiting meant, for Hungarian people, a great deal of suffering, the deportation of the country's youth, the flight en masse *of thousands to escape deportation. the terrible sentences—often the death sentence—passed against those who remained at home....*

All this damage, all this suffering would have been avoided, in our opinion, if the United Nations had heeded in time the appeal of the Imre Nagy Government and had taken appropriate action. Such action was all the more necessary because the Hungarian question does not concern Hungary alone. It raises in the United Nations the question whether a great Power which is a Member of the United Nations and has accepted the obligations of the Charter has the right to use arms to force a small country, which is also a Member of the United Nations, to accept a political and economic order it does not wish to accept.

... The United Nations was formed as a bulwark against dictatorships. If it cannot be maintained as such—if the United Nations cannot ensure that small countries will have the same rights as have the big countries—the United Nations has no raison d'être, *and the consequences cannot be other than the* bellum omnium contra omnes. *This, in the epoch of atomic and hydrogen bombs, would mean the extermination of the world. If the task assigned to it cannot be carried out by the United Nations, it will be succeeded by the horrors referred to as the four horsemen of the Apocalypse...*

(Miss Anna KÉTHLY, before the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, on Jan. 28, 1957)

PART FOUR

Hungary and the United Nations

TIMETABLE OF A FAILURE

NOVEMBER 1

At 10:26 a.m. on Thursday, November 1, 1956, a teleprinter on the twentieth floor of the United Nations building in New York City suddenly began clacking out a call that has no parallel in UN history.

An unidentified station asked: UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK . . . ARE YOU THERE?

The UN operator replied: YES WE ARE STILL HERE.

The unknown station identified itself: DIPLOMAG BUDAPEST CALLING.

The UN operator, not recognizing the codeword Diplomag, consulted a codebook and found that it meant the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Such a call has never reached the United Nations before or since. Normally a member nation sends its messages to its own UN delegation, which relays them to the Secretary General. At this hour, however, the Nagy government of Hungary had no delegation it could trust. Thus, on this day and on this day only, the UN building was directly connected to Budapest, by a Telex circuit that went from Budapest to Vienna by landline, and thence to New York by wireless. Whatever the nameless operator typed on teleprinter No. BP 679 in Budapest was instantaneously reproduced on teleprinter No. MNY 0544 at the UN.

The call from Budapest was so unusual that UN operators gathered around the machine, watching curiously to see what it would print. Nine different times Budapest asked the UN to identify itself, and nine times the UN patiently complied. Budapest, reassured, spoke of a message it would send soon. New York waited; the machine whirred; the contact with Budapest remained unbroken, but no message came. Only scraps of technical talk were transmitted.

At 10:42 Budapest typed: FOR SECRETARIAT UN: IF YOU ARE BUSY I CALL A FEW MINUTES LATER. OUR MESSAGE WILL BE READY. OKAY? PLEASE ANSWER.

The UN, which had said nothing at all about being busy, replied: WE ARE NOT BUSY. CAN WAIT IF YOU WANT. In retrospect, the first four words have prophetic overtones.

Budapest broke the connection at 11:14 a.m. No real message had been sent out. UN operators gossiped about the odd exchange, but no one thought to notify the Secretary General's office that the Hungarian Foreign Office was on the point of sending a message which, in the circumstances, must be of considerable importance. The connection had lasted 48 minutes.

In Budapest, during these 48 minutes, Premier Imre Nagy was holding the most grave and momentous cabinet meeting of his career. Unquestionably, he had ordered that the teleprinter link to the United Nations be established and kept open during it, ready for any emergency. During the last 10 minutes of the 48 minutes, he had cast the die, irrevocably. This cabinet meeting was the climax of a morning of furious activity, both anxious and ominous.

At about 6 a.m. (noon in Budapest) Nagy had protested to Andropov, the Soviet ambassador, against new Russian troops coming into Hungary. Andropov was conciliatory; he said they had come only to relieve and replace departing Russian soldiers exhausted by fighting, and to protect Russian civilians in Hungary. Nagy replied bluntly that this explanation did not satisfy him. He said that if the Soviet troop influx was not halted instantly, he would appeal to the United Nations. Andropov promised that no more troops would enter.

At 8 a.m. (2 p.m. in Budapest) Nagy telephoned Andropov again and said, indignantly, that the troop influx had not stopped, and that, on the contrary, new Russian soldiers had been pouring in steadily for the last three hours. Because of this, he said, Hungary was going to withdraw immediately from the Warsaw Pact. Andropov continued to be conciliatory, but warned Nagy against doing anything rash.

At 10 a.m. (4 p.m. in Budapest) Nagy summoned his special and historic cabinet meeting. He informed his ministers of his decision to leave the Warsaw Pact. They backed him with a unanimous vote, and then drew up a proclamation of Hungarian neutrality, and approved the text of his appeal to the United Nations. They then suggested that the Soviet ambassador himself be summoned to their presence, and hear with his own ears what they had decided.

At 11 a.m.—while the teleprinter connection to New York was established but idle—Andropov arrived to face the Hungarian cabinet. Nagy read out, solemnly, with a full sense of its great meaning, the decisions he and the cabinet had taken. Andropov remained impassive but still conciliatory. He assured Nagy several times that the Russian troops would be quickly evacuated to Russia, all of them, and begged Nagy to withdraw his proposed appeal to the United Nations. Nagy said that he would send it anyway to New York (the line was open and ready) but that he would withdraw it when—and only when—the Soviet troops actually left Hungary. In all this, no minister seemed more enthusiastic or determined than Janos Kadar, a close and trusted collaborator of Nagy. Deeply moved, with tears in his eyes, Kadar faced the Soviet ambassador and said: "I know my political future may be obscure now, but as a Hungarian, I would come down into the streets, if necessary, and use my bare hands to fight against your tanks." Thus far, the great decisions had been made, but they were still not public. Nagy had informed all chiefs of diplomatic missions in Budapest about his forthcoming steps, but this was still secret, in official channels. At 12:15 p.m. he took the final, irreversible step. Radio Budapest went on the air and told the whole world what had been decided. Now Nagy's bridges to Russia were burned; he had set out into the unknown. And

he gave the word to proceed with sending the Hungarian appeal to the United Nations.

At almost the very second this broadcast ended, the UN teleprinter sprang to life again—at 12:21 p.m. BUDAPEST CALLING. ARE YOU READY PLEASE?

Twice again the UN identified itself. Then the formal Nagy appeal for UN help came through briskly, in excellent English, without a halt, and almost without a typographical error. It was addressed to Dag Hammerskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, and said:

RELIABLE REPORTS HAVE REACHED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC THAT FURTHER SOVIET UNITS ARE ENTERING INTO HUNGARY. [THE PRIME MINISTER] SUMMONED M. ANDROPOV, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, AND EXPRESSED HIS STRONGEST PROTEST AGAINST THE ENTRY OF FURTHER SOVIET TROOPS INTO HUNGARY. HE DEMANDED THE INSTANT AND IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE SOVIET FORCES.

HE INFORMED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY REPUDIATES THE WARSAW TREATY, AND, AT THE SAME TIME, DECLARES HUNGARY'S NEUTRALITY, TURNS TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND REQUESTS THE HELP OF THE GREAT POWERS IN DEFENDING THE COUNTRY'S NEUTRALITY....

THEREFORE I REQUEST YOUR EXCELLENCY PROMPTLY TO PUT ON THE AGENDA OF THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY'S NEUTRALITY AND THE DEFENCE OF THIS NEUTRALITY BY THE FOUR GREAT POWERS....

It was signed: "Imre Nagy, President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, designated Minister of Foreign Affairs."

At the end, Budapest asked: DO YOU RECEIVED [SIC] PLEASE?

New York replied: RECEIVED WELL THANKS VERY MUCH,

and then typed out the formal acknowledgment and the exact hour: 12:27 (p.m.) EASTERN STANDARD TIME UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK.

12:27 p.m. on Thursday, November 1, 1956.

At that moment Hungary's appeal for help came legally and officially into the hands of the United Nations. And at that moment a time-clock began to tick, unheard by almost everyone. It would tick for 58 more hours, and then it would strike—with the violent Russian counterattacks that swept away the Nagy government and drowned the revolution in blood.

No one in the United Nations that Thursday afternoon could know (nor could Nagy himself in Budapest know) that there would be only 58 hours. This is purest hindsight. Yet the hours did exist, and to some UN delegates, looking back now with uneasy hearts, they seem an all-too-brief period of grace during which, had the UN acted with furious energy and resolution, something might yet have been done to save Hungary. Probably this is over-optimism; but it is worth exhuming the 58 hours to learn, by autopsy, how they slipped through the fingers of the UN, unused. This is the timetable of a failure, but it is also a lesson for future crisis.

The 12:27 message from Nagy utterly changed the United Nations' legal position towards Hungary.

Only five days earlier, Hungary had taken a completely opposite stand in the UN. It is not yet clear whether on this day—October 28—Nagy was still controlled, against his will, by Communist police guards, or whether in his own mind he had not yet come to desire UN intervention. On October 28, he was still surrounded by guards of the hated AVH security police; on October 29 he appeared for the first time without them, unquestionably a free agent at last.

At any rate, on October 28, Dr. Peter Kos, actually a Soviet citizen named Leo Konductorov, acting as Hungary's permanent delegate to the UN, and speaking in the name of the Nagy government, formally told the Security Council that events in Hungary were purely internal affairs, and no legal concern of the UN. This

stand (which Nagy might have rescinded the following day, but did not) was later to be reaffirmed by the puppet Kadar government, and thus used to stop any UN action, even the entry of UN observers. But in the five days since October 28 events in Hungary had changed fantastically, and Nagy had changed with them. Now he completely reversed his stand. Now the legal government of Hungary was not only permitting UN intervention; it was literally begging for it. During those 58 hours it would have welcomed any number of UN observers, probably even UN troops, had any been available. During most of the 58 hours—but never before and never since—Hungary lay wide open to the West, its borders with Austria free and inviting.

Only about four hours after the Nagy appeal arrived, the General Assembly was to meet in momentous and extraordinary session about Suez. The third World War seemed possible, even probable, and in the corridors of the UN, there were foreboding and almost unbearable tension.

The UN teleprinter office recognized the Nagy message as something out of the ordinary and sent it by special messenger to the Secretary General's office. It arrived about 12:35 p.m. and created little or no excitement. Mr. Hammerskjold's office too had all its energies aimed at Suez. Further, it was the lunch hour. Not only did the Secretary General's office make no announcement of the message; it was soon to deny that it had ever come in at all.

News agencies, having monitored the Nagy broadcast in Europe, noted that he said he was appealing to the United Nations; now they checked to see if, in fact, any such appeal had arrived in New York. It had, but through confusion or oversight, the Secretary General's office said it had not. The reports from Europe were so authentic, however, that the UN press chief finally went in person to the Secretary General's office and, with some digging, found the message. He summoned a flash conference of UN correspondents and read out the text—at 2 p.m.

At this moment in Hungary, Radio Budapest began playing Mozart's "Requiem" for the martyrs of the revolution. It was night, the eve of All Souls' Day, and throughout the darkened city hundreds of thousands of candles burned in the windows, mourning the Hungarian dead. The city was uneasy. Already the elation aroused by Nagy's broadcast was being blunted by ominous rumors. They were justified. In the darkness, Russian tanks moved up to surround the city's three airdromes. In Eastern Hungary, Russian armor suddenly began moving westward, from Debrecen towards Szolnok.

At 2:30 p.m. in New York the Nagy appeal was circulated in mimeographed form to all UN delegates, but it bore no marks of urgency and was mingled in their boxes with innumerable other mimeographed notices. Most delegates did not actually see it until late that afternoon, and many not until late that night.

Not everyone in the UN building that day was hypnotized by Suez to the exclusion of Hungary. As the afternoon drew on, there arose an odd and entirely informal group, which one of its members has called the *Cassandra Club*. It included a few members of the UN secretariat who, for one reason or another, had a special interest in Eastern Europe. It included some Hungarian-Americans and some leading Hungarian exiles. It included also a minority of UN delegates, especially those from Catholic countries.

Particularly active was Dr. Emilio Nuñez-Portuondo of Cuba, who for five years had been tireless in talking about Soviet oppression in Eastern Europe. As soon as he learned of the Nagy appeal, he immediately began a championship of Hungary which was to bring him more than 11,000 congratulatory letters and telegrams. He began buttonholing large numbers of other delegates, trying passionately to convince them that the call from Hungary was urgent and desperate, and that the UN should act at once, this very night.

He did not succeed. Time after time he and other members of the Cassandra Club were told, in effect: "There are only troop movements in Hungary, but there is actual shooting in Egypt. Let us settle Suez first;

then we will take up Hungary." This was especially true of the powerful Afro-Asian-Arab bloc, which has the balance of power in Assembly voting. The AAA was in full cry after the British and French, and suspected anything else as being a diversion.

> At 4 p.m., while Nuñez-Portuondo pleaded in New York, Janos Kadar was speaking over Radio Budapest in praise of "our glorious uprising." But immediately after the broadcast he went, by a circuitous route, to the Russian embassy, and there had long talks. It was unquestionably at this time that he decided to desert Nagy—"seized by fear," as Nagy was to say later. But Kadar kept his decision secret; Nagy suspected nothing of it, and kept Kadar as a trusted ally until the very last.
>
> In the darkness, 160 Russian tanks had moved up to surround all three of Budapest's airdromes in a ring of steel. More Soviet armor moved steadily east, south, and west of the city, cutting off one road after another.

In New York, Nuñez-Portuondo and his supporters were getting nowhere, and the General Assembly was to meet—on Suez—in less than an hour's time. They were bogging deeper and deeper into long legalistic arguments about parliamentary procedure. Some delegates argued that since this afternoon's Assembly had been called to discuss Suez, it could not legally discuss anything else. Nuñez-Portuondo denied this. He pointed out that this would be the first extraordinary session ever held under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure adopted in the days of Korea, and that no precedents of any kind existed. "We are going to make our own precedents today," he said. "Let us make good ones." He insisted that once the Assembly was in session, it was master of its own agenda and could, by two-thirds vote, take up any matter it liked.

Others argued that since the Security Council was still "seized of" the matter of Hungary, the Assembly could not yet legally discuss it. Nuñez-Portuondo (whose Cuba happens to be one of the eleven Council members) pointed out that the Council could meet quickly—tonight—introduce a resolution, receive the expected Soviet veto, then vote the matter over to the Assembly.

A third objection carried great weight with many delegates, and with the Secretariat itself—ironically, an objection which need never have arisen had it not been for a blunder of the Secretariat. This was the argument about whether Nagy meant, when he said "forthcoming Assembly," the regular session which would not sit until November 12 or this afternoon's special session. The objectors speculated that since today's special session had not been called until last night, Nagy, far away in Hungary, probably did not even know it was being held.

In this they were wrong, but Nuñez-Portuondo and his adherents could not prove it. All they could do was to argue that, with new Russian troops pouring into Hungary, Nagy certainly did not mean a delay of eleven more days. They also argued (correctly) that every radio set in Hungary that could get foreign broadcasts would be tuned in to see what the West, especially the UN, was doing, and that Nagy probably knew of the special session as soon as the general American public did.

The argument could have been settled by the Secretariat's asking Nagy which he meant, but this was not done. Communications with Hungary were free and open all this afternoon and much of the evening. The Secretary General, however, did not even get around to acknowledging the Nagy message until 1:05 a.m. the next morning—twelve hours later—and by this time the lines were cut, and his acknowledgement had to be sent to Geneva, for possible relay on to Budapest somehow.

But the debate about Nagy's intent could have been settled instantly if the Secretariat had not overlooked the meaning of a document which had been in its offices for several hours. At 12:45 p.m. this same afternoon, only 18 minutes after the formal Nagy appeal had come in, the same teleprinter had come alive with the third and last direct contact with Budapest. It brought a one-sentence message, again addressed to Mr. Hammerskjold, again signed by Nagy himself:

"I have the honour to inform you that Mr. Janos Szabo, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission, will

represent the Hungarian People's Republic at the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to be convened November 1, 1956, at New York."

This was crystal clear, and would have decided the matter forever. But the significance of this message was entirely overlooked by the Secretariat; it was considered purely an administrative matter and was not circulated to the delegates. More than 24 hours later the Under Secretary General still did not know of it and assured the Security Council that no such message had been received. He was quickly corrected.

At 5 p.m. the General Assembly began its extraordinary session to discuss the crimes of Suez.

At the same hour in Budapest, the Russian embassy admitted that Soviet tanks were surrounding the three airdromes, but explained that it was merely to protect the evacuation of Russian personnel. The embassy made no mention that the surrounding roads were cut. By now only one major road was still open, to Vienna.

In the General Assembly the debate on Suez was long and bitter. The very word "Hungary" was mentioned only once at this session, in a casual remark by a British delegate: "I cannot help contrasting [our actions at Suez] with the armed actions of the Soviet Union aimed at perpetuating its domination of Hungary."

John Foster Dulles spoke about 7 p.m. and said: "I doubt that any representative ever spoke from this rostrum with as heavy a heart as I have brought here tonight." This, however, had nothing to do with Hungary, which he did not mention. It was because, he said, America felt compelled to vote, on Suez, against its friends Britain, France, and Israel. When Dulles finished—at 7:40 p.m.—the Assembly adjourned this session. A second session would meet later.

While Dulles was speaking in New York, a large Soviet armored force rolled westward into Kisvarda. Another strong force of tanks appeared in the Gyoengyoes area, 50 miles northeast of Budapest, and began entrenching itself.

To a man like Vitetti of Italy, it seemed unthinkable that this night should pass without at least a gesture of help. He soon discovered, as Nuñez-Portuondo had discovered, that any real move to act tonight would lead to endless parliamentary arguments on the floor. Therefore, about 10 p.m., he settled for the only tactics that seemed possible. He would wait until after the vote on Suez and then would rise, on a point of order, to mention the urgency of Hungary. This device, mild at best, had American approval. It very specifically did not have American backing in the sense that America would press for action tonight. It was, and was in advance known to be, an empty gesture, a device to get the name of Hungary on the record, a proof that it had not been overlooked.

NOVEMBER 2

At 9:50 p.m. the Assembly opened its second session of the evening, and the great debate on Suez swept on. Cassandra Club members haunted the news agency teleprinters on the third and fourth floors, collected every scrap of news about Hungary. One Cassandra concentrated on the Reuters tickets, believing that they somehow had faster, more detailed reports. As midnight neared, he asked anxiously if the circuits would be kept open, and was assured they would be. At 1:25 a.m. came a dispatch he had expected and feared, a long account, in alarming detail, of Russian troop movements in Hungary. It quoted a dismayed Hungarian as asking: "Are we going to be another Korea?"

He got copies of this dispatch, sent one to the Secretary General's office and others to various delegations —especially the American one. John Foster Dulles himself read it, while the debate on Suez droned on. It was not until about 2:30 a.m. that the name of Hungary was spoken on the floor. Lall, of India, made a passing reference to "some difficulties in Hungary."

There were indeed some difficulties in Hungary. At almost the moment Lall was speaking, two armored trains rolled slowly out of Russia and into Hungary, at the border point of Zahony. Hungarians could see, across

the frontier, great masses of Russian troops, waiting. The armored trains occupied the Zahony station and moved steadily on, deeper into Hungary, taking over the main line to Nyiregyhaza. Farther along the line lay Budapest.

In New York Vitetti of Italy fretted with impatience. He could not speak until the Suez vote came; it was growing very late; he knew in his heart that it was already too late now to act this night on Hungary, even if the Assembly wished. The Suez vote did not come until about 3:30 a.m. The American resolution against Britain, France, and Israel passed triumphantly, 64 to 5, with 6 abstentions.

Vitetti rose to his feet. "I have asked to speak on a point of order." He referred to the Nagy appeal, which, he said, "has just been circulated to us." He underlined the urgency of events in Hungary and said: "I hope that the United Nations—and if necessary this special emergency session—will take immediately whatever action is possible, with regard to the request of the Hungarian people." Then he sat down. It was no motion, merely a point of order. Belaunde of Peru said that he agreed with it then he too sat down. That was all. The speeches went on—about Suez.

At about 4 a.m. John Foster Dulles rose to speak again, again on Suez, but in closing he mentioned Hungary. He looked drawn and haggard. It was very late and, although not even he suspected it, he would be under a surgeon's knife on the morrow.

"I want to express my endorsement," he said, "of the intervention made by the representative of Italy with reference to the Hungarian situation. . . . I hope that this matter, which is on the agenda of the Security Council, will be kept urgently before it, and we shall not be preoccupied with the Middle East to the exclusion of assisting the State of Hungary to regain its independence." A few minutes later—at 4:20 a.m.—the Assembly adjourned.

Exhausted by sleeplessness and the tensions of Suez, delegates went home to sleep. During the new day

about to dawn neither the Assembly nor the Council planned any meetings. It was to be a day of rest.

There was little rest in Hungary. Government loudspeaker trucks roved Budapest proclaiming: "Do not be alarmed! The Russian troop movements are only to protect evacuating Russian personnel!" They reassured no one. The Russian intent seemed too clear and ominous now.

The alarm, and the Russian intent, seemed at last crystal clear in New York, too, as the sun reached Manhattan. The *New York Times* had banner streamers: SOVIET TANKS AGAIN RING BUDAPEST: NAGY DEFIANT, APPEALS TO UN. Western delegates, still sleepy, were telephoning each other, long-faced, discussing the blackening news from Hungary. By late morning, America, Britain, and France agreed that there must be a special Council session today after all. They drafted a two-sentence letter which, in effect, summoned the Council to meet, and called a special messenger to deliver it, by hand, to the new Council President, Entezam of Iran.

While the special messenger hurried across Manhattan, Radio Budapest carried an appeal for Western help from the Jewish community of the city. It was followed by one from the chief Lutheran Bishop: "I ask you in the name of Jesus Christ to help us."

And, about this same hour, an American diplomatic convoy was only a few miles from the Austrian frontier and safety. Then Russian tommy-gunners astride the road stopped them. To American protests, the Russian commanding officer said curtly: "There is no use arguing. You must return to Budapest." Reluctantly, the convoy turned back.

In New York, the special messenger was not able to deliver the American-British-French letter to the Security Council President until 1 p.m.

Twenty-four of the fifty-eight hours were gone now.

Entezam of Iran read the letter. "In view of the critical situation in Hungary, we have the honour on behalf of our governments to request you to call an urgent meeting of the Security Council this afternoon."

President Entezam decided that it would be impossible to collect eleven delegates before 5 p.m., and sent out a call for that hour.

Word that the Security Council would sit in extraordinary session spread quickly through New York, and to the world. It caused mounting excitement and hope, not least of all in Hungary. Now at last, it seemed, the UN would rise like an avenging angel and do something.

> At 1:20 p.m. Radio Budapest came on the air with disturbing news. Most ominous of all was a second Nagy protest to the Russians about the increasing stream of Soviet troops entering Hungary. Nagy pressed, with mounting urgency, for their immediate evacuation. He sent a second appeal to the United Nations.

This second Nagy appeal came more slowly. The direct Telex circuit to Budapest no longer existed and, anyway, Nagy now had a UN delegation that he could trust—or so he believed. But the message was not urgently handled, and again it did not reach most delegates until late that night.

This second appeal, again direct from Nagy to Hammerskjold, recalled that in yesterday's appeal he had reported new Soviet troops entering Hungary. "[Today] further and exact information . . . reached the government . . . that large Soviet military units crossed the border, marching towards Budapest." He described some of the troop movements and said: "On the basis of the abovementioned facts, the Hungarian government deemed it necessary to inform the USSR and all the other diplomatic missions in Budapest about these steps directed against our People's Republic." Nagy said he had made concrete proposals to the Russians about withdrawing their troops, had suggested a place for negotiations on the subject, and named the Hungarian negotiators. "I request Your Excellency to call upon the Great Powers to recognize the neutrality of Hungary, and ask the Security Council to instruct the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to start the negotiations immediately."

Tension increased in the UN building as the afternoon drew on towards 5 p.m., when the Council would meet. No one, of course, expected the Council to take any real action, because of the sure Soviet veto. But it could clear the track for real action, by voting on a resolution, having it vetoed, then voting the "end-run" strategy to transfer the matter into the Assembly. Delegates and informed correspondents were certain that it was what Henry Cabot Lodge of America would do: he would be carrying the ball since Britain and France were still in Coventry over Suez.

Lodge's way was clear. He needed only seven Council votes for the end-run play, and he was absolutely sure of at least eight: the United States, Britain, France, Australia, Belgium, China, Cuba, and Peru.

Promptly at 5 p.m. in New York the Council met in extraordinary session, and immediately fell into an hour-long legalistic argument about the rights of Janos Szabo of Hungary, who had been invited to attend as a guest. This argument, begun by China and the United States, grew quite involved. Did Szabo really represent Hungary? If so, should he be allowed to speak? And, if so, should he speak before or after the regular Council members spoke?

Mr. Hammerskjold was not himself present, being busy with Suez, but was represented by his Under Secretary General, Protitch.

The Council asked Protitch whether the Secretariat thought that Szabo was entitled to represent Hungary. He replied that it had only Szabo's word for it, and added: "We have not yet officially received in the Secretariat any particular information on any credentials from the Hungarian government itself." One of his aides leaned over to whisper to Protitch, and the Under Secretary seemed taken aback. He rose to make a correction: "I have just been informed by the Legal Office that a cable has been received from the Hungarian Government appointing Dr. Janos Szabo at the emergency session of the General Assembly yesterday." It was obviously the first time that the Under Secretary General had heard of this cable, which had arrived nearly 30 hours before.

As the debate on Szabo continued, even Henry Cabot Lodge, who had helped to start it, grew bored. He asked dryly: "Is it in order now to begin talking about the situation in Hungary?" "No," said President Entezam, "it is too early."

> In Hungary it seemed very late. At almost the moment Entezam spoke, Soviet bombers, flying from Russia, touched down on the Hungarian airfields of Kecskemet and Szeged. In the darkness, ever more Russian troops came in, and not only from Russia itself. They came also from Rumania, and Hungarian watchers could see Rumanian roads jammed for several kilometers with troops waiting their turn. Russian railways were so chocked that some troops were routed via Czechoslovakia, and began pouring into Hungary over the Danube bridge at Komaron. In nearly the whole of eastern Hungary, all railway lines were now commandeered by the Russian Army.
>
> About this hour, too, the American diplomatic convoy, turned back by the Russians, reached Budapest again. By this time, also, the new American minister, Wailes, had finally reached his post and was trying furiously to find out what the situation was.

In New York the arguments about Szabo at last subsided (he could speak only after any Council member who wished had spoken) and Henry Cabot Lodge rose to his feet. He began a long and spirited speech which, on the surface, seemed exactly what the Hungarians were waiting for. He made a graceful reference to Louis Kossuth, the great Hungarian freedom fighter of 1849, who had been defeated by Russian and Austrian arms, and had come to America in 1851, seeking help for his country. (Kossuth had been received in America with universal, almost hysterical adoration and was commended to Congress in a special message by President Fillmore. But he left America seven months later, having received not an ounce of real help for Hungary.) As Lodge continued, the Cassandra Club, the press galleries, and many delegates looked puzzled. It was an excellent speech, but where was the resolution he was supposed to introduce, to bring matters to a head, and pass them to the Assembly?

It neared adjournment time, and the question arose about when the Council should meet again—always a good test of the degree of urgency with which various delegates view the situation. President Entezam seemed in no hurry at all; he suggested that next Monday, November 5—three days away—would be soon enough. Immediately delegates from many countries protested that affairs in Hungary were too urgent to lie over so long. Cuba suggested that it was dangerous to delay later than 3 p.m. tomorrow, November 3. Nobody objected, and Nuñez-Portuondo's suggestion was adopted. The session adjourned at 8:50 p.m.

NOVEMBER 3

In Hungary, the students of Sopron University looked up, stricken, from the commandeered radios that formed their impromptu listening post. "Nothing!" one student whispered, as if unable to believe his ears. "Nothing! Not even a resolution!"

All over Hungary the Soviet Army was on the move this night, their noises partly cushioned by thick snow. A great mass of tanks and machine-gun units moved through Szolnok, steadily westward. Two hundred more tanks had been motionless for several days between Szolnok and Abony; now they too were in motion, westward. Russian infantry moved into Nagyrede almost silently, under cover of darkness. A steel ring of tanks moved up to surround the uranium center of Pecs.

The miners made plans to flood the precious uranium mines, so that the Russians could not use them. Within a few hours, they executed their plans to perfection.

About 4 a.m. (10 a.m. in Hungary) a report swept Budapest like wildfire, that a plane with 16 United Nations observers had just landed outside the city. It brought a surge of hope and caused even blacker disappointment when it proved to be utterly false.

About 6 a.m. (noon in Hungary) Nagy announced a new "streamlined" government, saying that 20 of his former ministers had "been relieved of their posts at their own request." In fact, some of them had been such old-line Communists that the insurgents no longer accepted them and, in a few cases, even prevented the so-called ministers from entering their own offices. Others among them,

fearful of the gathering storm, were glad to leave the Nagy government while there was still time. The new 12-person government included only three Communists, and one of them was still Janos Kadar.

Also at 6 a.m. Hungarian and Soviet generals held their first meeting to work out plans for the total evacuation of all Russian troops from Hungary. Nagy himself attended part of this meeting. It seemed to be making smooth progress; the atmosphere was correct, almost cordial; the Soviet generals were accommodating. The complete Russian evacuation was taken for granted by both sides, and the only difference was the date on which it was to be completed. The Hungarians asked for December 30, the Russians held out for January 15 "for technical reasons." The Hungarians agreed that departing Russian soldiers would be treated with full ceremonial, including military music by Hungarian bands for the last units to leave. The Hungarians also agreed to rebuild and maintain Soviet war memorials damaged in the revolution—although the destroyed Stalin statue in Budapest was tacitly omitted.

When this session ended, the negotiators agreed to hold a second meeting that night at 4 p.m. (10 p.m. Budapest time) to iron out further details. The Russians, headed by General Malinin, suggested that since the first meeting had been at the Hungarian Parliament building, the second should be at Soviet military headquarters, at Tokol, on the outskirts of Budapest. He pointed out that from there he had a direct telephone line to Moscow, a useful matter for the negotiations. The hopeful Hungarian negotiators, led by Major General Pal Maleter, a hero of the revolution and now Minister of Defence, agreed.

By 7 a.m. strong Russian forces occupied the road junction at Gyor, and now even the road to Sopron was cut. The Russians told Hungarians in Gyor that they had been traveled steadily for 600 kilometers. Now all the borders with the West were held by Russian troops, except the small bulge of Sopron, and the neck of this bulge was in Russian hands, which sealed it off from the rest of Hungary.

In Washington at 7 a.m., John Foster Dulles awoke with very sharp abdominal pains. He was taken at once to Walter Reed Hospital, and would be operated

on at 1:35 p.m. for a cancerous condition. Thus, at this critical hour, the Department of State lost its chief, and the direction of affairs fell to Under Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr. Supreme control remained, of course, in the hands of President Eisenhower, who in less than 75 hours would go before the voters, seeking re-election.

Nothing of moment happened in New York this last morning of Hungarian freedom. In the United Nations attention was centered on what was expected to be the climactic Assembly session on Suez, to begin this evening. It was expected to vote into existence a special force of UN troops to be rushed to Egypt.

At 3 p.m., thanks to the insistence of Cuba yesterday, the Security Council met again about Hungary. At last the United States introduced its long-awaited resolution.

Fifty of the fifty-eight hours were gone now.

Hardly had the Council come to order when Brilej of Yugoslavia moved for adjournment! He argued that since Hungary and Russia seemed to be negotiating now, the Council should not interfere, but should wait to see how the negotiations worked out . . . "We believe," Lodge said hopefully, "that adjournment for a day or two would give a real opportunity to the Hungarian government to carry out its announced desire to arrange for an orderly and immediate evacuation of all Soviet troops." No other Western delegate shared Lodge's optimism about Russian good faith. Said Walker of Australia: "Unfortunately, the world has had some experience of the course that 'negotiations' sometimes take in a country where the Soviet Union has been able to establish military supremacy."

Sir Pierson Dixon of Britain said: "It would be quite wrong, misleading, and unfair to the Hungarian people to take the comfortable view, as the representative of Yugoslavia seems to do, that we can now safely leave the Hungarian question to settle itself." He urged the immediate passage of the United States resolution and concluded: "I do not frankly see how the Council can do less."

De Guiringaud of France joined in, with all-too-ac-

curate prophecy: "We have not only the right but the duty to find out whether [these Russian troop movements] are not rather a re-grouping of Soviet forces so that they will be able to intervene with such suddenness as to make possible the establishment of a régime to the liking of the Soviet Union."

As de Guiringaud spoke, events in Hungary were confirming his fears. For the last hour, Hungarian outposts on all the major roads near Budapest had been telephoning in alarm to the Ministry of Defence. They reported that hundreds of Soviet tanks were moving slowly and steadily towards Budapest, and asked permission to fire on them. "No," answered the ministry, to dozens of such requests. "Do not fire-" Nagy had given the strictest orders that no Hungarian would fire the first shot. He still had a forlorn and fading hope —there seemed no other—that the Tokol negotiations might produce a miracle. Thus the tanks moved on, nearing the outskirts of the capital, watched by anguished and helpless Hungarians.

In New York... Janos Szabo of Hungary sat impassive, having said almost nothing. But at last, about 4 p.m., several delegates asked Szabo to tell the Council officially whether or not there really were serious negotiations going on in Hungary. Yes, Szabo replied, there were. "I should like to inform the Council with satisfaction about the following promising information received from Hungary today: The leaders of the Hungarian and Soviet armies met at noon today (Budapest time) and both parties expressed their view on the technical questions of withdrawing the Soviet troops. They agreed that they would study the proposals of each other, and they would meet again at 10 o'clock tonight, Budapest time."

It was now that hour—10 p.m. in Budapest. General Maleter and his Hungarian negotiators arrived promptly at the Russian HQ in Tokol. Apparently some negotiations were carried on, and the Hungarians had a direct telephone line back to Nagy's office in Budapest proper. Soon the Russian leader, General Malinin, suggested that they should all have something to eat

and drink, and he led the way to the banquet. Shortly after this, the telephone link to Budapest was abruptly cut. This alarmed Nagy and the military commander at Budapest, General Bela Kiraly. The latter ordered patrols to move out towards Tokol to see what was wrong. The patrols never returned.

In the UN, having heard Szabo's report about the negotiations, delegates were eager to hear a more authoritative source: Arkady Sobolev of Russia. Usually Sobolev is voluble in obstruction, but during this session he said hardly a word. Delegates asked, prodded, even taunted him to say something about these famous negotiations. "I think we really must hear him," said Dixon of Britain. Walker of Australia observed: "It seems that the absence of any comment from him would be rather ominous." At last, about 6 p.m., Sobolev was goaded into making his only statement of the evening, and one of the shortest he has ever made. In English translation it takes only 51 words, and its crux was: "I can confirm that such negotiations are in progress."

At almost the same moment Sobolev spoke in New York a short man in uniform without rank markings suddenly entered the room at Soviet headquarters, interrupting the banquet for the Hungarian negotiators. The host, General Malinin, seemed indignant at the interruption. The visitor whispered something in his ear. Malinin shrugged his shoulders, then ordered his own negotiators to leave the room. The mysterious visitor had identified himself as General Ivan Serov, the notorious chief of Soviet security. He and his men immediately seized all the Hungarians.

In New York there was still no vote on the American resolution, and de Guiringaud of France wondered "why, in this case, the draft resolution is not being put to a vote?" Other nations asked the same question. President Entezam announced that this session must end quite soon, because the Assembly was to meet at 8 p.m. about Suez. This raised immediate protest from the delegations of China, Australia, France, and Britain—but America did not join them. The other nations

argued that the Council could go on meeting on Hungary, even while the Assembly discussed Suez. They offered to split their delegations, and thus hold simultaneous meetings. They got no support from the United States, and the proposals were dropped.

Again came the question: when to meet again. President Entezam still said that next Monday, November 5, 10:30 a.m. would be soon enough. Again there were many protests that this was too late—and again no protest from the United States. Australia suggested that things in Hungary were desperate, and wanted to meet not later than tomorrow, Sunday, November 4, at 5 p.m. Sighing, Entezam put this to a vote. Only he and Lodge voted against it—and thus for further delay. But Peru, Russia, and Yugoslavia had abstained; thus the Australian proposal did not get the necessary seven votes, and failed. Entezam's idea of next Monday was then adopted, Australia abstaining till the last. And Walker of Australia, joined by the Guiringaud of France, rose immediately to say that if anything came up before Monday, they reserved the right to have the Council meet sooner. Certainly, agreed Entezam. All too soon, they were to remember this.

The Council adjourned at 6:55 p.m. Again it had achieved nothing. Again the long-expected "end-run" into the Assembly had not materialized. As the delegates left the hall, they had had their last chance to act.

Less than four hours were left now.

The Council delegates ate a hasty dinner and then hurried to the session of the General Assembly, which began at 8 p.m.—on Suez.

> At this hour, great masses of Soviet armor were already inside Budapest. One strong column advanced from the south, along the Danube, and had already invested the important Soroksari Avenue. This cut off Csepel Island, the heart of Hungarian industry, packed with intrepid workmen who had done so much of the freedom fighting, from the inner capital. Another great column moved into the city from the north, along Vaci Avenue. Still, not a shot had been fired yet.

NOVEMBER 4

In New York, the Assembly rang with some of the bitterest speeches ever heard on the East River. Speaker after speaker denounced "this bloody, brutal, premeditated armed attack" . . . "the furious frenzy of a monster unchained" . . . "This hideous crime of aggression. . . ." All this invective, however, had nothing to do with Hungary. It was aimed solely at Britain, France, and Israel, for their actions in Suez. And it was while this great debate swept on that

The clock struck in Hungary.

At 10:25 p.m. (4:25 a.m. in Budapest, November 4) the first Russian shot was fired in the great counterattack. Soviet guns opened up against Hungarian barracks on Budaorsi Avenue. Immediately, cannon fire broke out all over the city, and the Hungarians began to fight back, fiercely.

New York learned nothing of this for another hour and 25 minutes. Meanwhile, the storm about Suez raged. Arkady Sobolev of Russia seemed especially indignant about Anglo-French actions in Egypt. Gone was his reticence of a few hours before, in the Security Council. In a long speech, he accused the British and French of "barbarity" and of "sowing death among the peaceful inhabitants, among women and children," and of "wilfully ignoring the United Nations."

At 11:05 p.m. (5:05 a.m. in Hungary) a strange voice came from a strange radio transmitter in Hungary. It was the voice of Ferenc Munnich, an old-line Communist recently dismissed from the Nagy cabinet. It announced the formation of the puppet Kadar government, known as the "Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government." Munnich asserted that Kadar, he, and two others had parted ways with the Nagy government on November 1. The new régime asked for Russian armed help in fighting "Fascism and reaction and its murderous bands."

Even this telling announcement attracted little attention in the West, for it was not widely heard. It was broadcast from Szolnok, a Hungarian city about 65

miles southeast of Budapest, already in Russian hands. It came on a wavelength of 1187 kilocycles, a wavelength normally used by the Balaton-Szabadi transmitter far away in the west of Hungary. It was a second Hungarian broadcast, 5 minutes later, that really broke the news to the world.

At 11:20 p.m. (5:20 a.m. in Hungary, November 4) Radio Budapest came on the air in great excitement. "Attention! Attention! Premier Imre Nagy will address the Hungarian people!" A moment later came the prime minister's shaken voice. **"This is Premier Imre Nagy speaking. Today at daybreak, Soviet troops attacked our capital with the obvious intent of overthrowing the legal democratic Hungarian government. Our troops are in combat; the government is at its post. I notify the people of our country and the entire world of this fact."** This was repeated every five minutes, in German, French, and English, interspersed with the Hungarian national anthem.

The horrifying news came quickly to New York. At 11:49 p.m. the Reuters teleprinters in the UN building tapped out a bulletin from its Vienna office. The news spread swiftly; delegates went about with thoughtful, stricken faces. In the Assembly the debate droned on, about Suez. About 12:30 a.m. (it was now November 4, in New York, too) an agonized group of Hungarians in exile, headed by Monsignor Bela Varga, insisted on seeing Lodge. They were told that he was busy; they persisted and, in their desperation, a minor scuffle followed, with a junior American official. UN guards came up to remove the Hungarians.

In the Western camp there were consternation, heartache, and guilt. The worst fears of the Cassandra Club had been justified, but it was no time for I-told-you-so's. Walker of Australia went to Lodge and said: "What are we going to do about this?" He suggested a Council meeting the following afternoon—about 15 hours later. But Walker had had enough delay. He said, in effect: "We have already waited too long. We are probably too late now, but we cannot wait any longer." He proposed, and Lodge finally agreed, that the Coun-

cil should have a special session this same night—or, technically, morning.

About 1 a.m. Walker interrupted the Assembly debate on Suez and, on a point of order, brought the first official news of the Russian attack. He read aloud the Reuters bullein, in grim tones, and then said: "...in view of this news, I am now asking the President of the Security Council to invite the members of the Council to meet with him within half an hour in his office for a consultation regarding the next steps—and the immediate steps, I trust—to be taken by the Security Council."

About 20 minutes later, Lodge also rose on a point of order, to repeat substantially what Walker had already said, except that he quoted an American news agency, the Associated Press, and added the news that the American Legation in Budapest was under fire, its staff sheltering in the basement.

Lodge was shaking with indignation, perhaps the special indignation of optimism betrayed. "And I sat here," he said, white-faced, "and heard the representative of the Soviet Union talking about stopping bloodshed in Egypt. Heaven knows I want to stop bloodshed in Egypt, but I think there is a cynicism about the Soviet Union representative talking about it at the very moment when they were shedding blood in Budapest. This will horrify everybody who knows about it.

"When I saw the first press dispatches, I immediately asked for a meeting of the Security Council, and I was very glad to learn that it will be called soon. I simply wish to say in this great General Assembly of the United Nations how much our hearts go out to the people of Hungary, and with how much warmth and feeling we think of them, and wish for them a happy issue out of their trials, and a future of independence."

To continue the chronology further is hardly worth while. The Assembly adjourned at 3 a.m. and the special Council session opened five minutes later. It was short, bitter, and now completely useless. With indignation spurring him now to true urgency, Lodge rammed through in only two hours the "end-run" tactics

he had been expected to use two days before. Only Russia opposed it, and it was voted over to the Assembly, 10-1. The Assembly met Sunday afternoon at last —its first session on Hungary—and within four hours rushed through an American resolution condemning Russia, asking her to withdraw her troops at once. It passed by 50 votes to 8, with 15 nations abstaining.

But it was far too late now. The fifty-eight hours had run out; the clock had struck; the deed was done.

SUMMARY OF UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS

With special emphasis on the fourteen resolutions, the following United Nations actions on Hungary are in chronological order.

October 28, 1956

The Security Council summoned at the request of France, UK and USA, subsequently supported by many other countries, to consider the "Situation in Hungary." Item placed on agenda by 9 to 1 (USSR); Yugoslavia abstained.

November 1

The Secretary General issued cable from the Government of Hungary requesting help in "defending the country's neutrality" and asking the Secretary General to include this item on the agenda "of the forthcoming General Assembly." The cable declared Hungary had denounced the Warsaw Treaty. (A/3251)

November 2

The Security Council summoned at joint request of France, UK, USA "in view of the critical situation in Hungary." Item put on agenda by vote of 10 to 1 (USSR).

The Secretary General circulated a new communication from the Hungarian Premier (S/3726), asking the Security Council to "instruct the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to start negotiations immediately."

November 4 (3 a.m. to 5:25 a.m.)

In the Security Council a US resolution (S/3770/Rev.1) was adopted but vetoed by the Soviet Union (voting: 9 to

1 with Yugoslavia abstaining). The operative clauses of this resolution were as follows:

"1. Calls upon the Government of the USSR to desist forthwith from any form of intervention, particularly armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary;

2. Calls upon the USSR to cease the introduction of additional armed forces into Hungary and to withdraw all of its forces without delay from Hungarian territory.

3. Affirms the right of the Hungarian people to a government responsive to its national aspirations and dedicated to its independence and well-being;

4. Requests the Secretary General in consultation with the heads of appropriate specialized agencies to explore on an urgent basis the need of the Hungarian people for food, medicine and other similar supplies and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible;

5. Requests all Members of the United Nations and invites national and international humanitarian organizations to co-operate in making available such supplies as may be required by the Hungarian people."

A second US proposal was adopted by 10 to 1 (USSR) (S/3733).

The Security Council "*decides* to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in General Assembly Resolution 77(V) in order to make appropriate recommendations concerning "The Situation in Hungary."

FIRST RESOLUTION

General Assembly (Second Emergency Special Session) agenda item on "The Situation in Hungary" adopted by 53 to 8, with 7 abstentions. A US resolution, as amended by France, adopted in roll-call by 50 to 8, with 15 abstentions. Hungary, Laos and Lebanon did not vote. *(Resolution 1004 (ES-II):*

"1. *Calls upon* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to desist forthwith from all armed attack on the people of Hungary and from any form of intervention, in particular armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary;

2. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to cease the introduction of additional armed forces into Hungary and to withdraw all of its forces without delay from Hungarian territory.

3. *Affirms* the right of the Hungarian people to a government responsive to its national aspirations and dedicated to its independence and well-being;

4. *Requests* the Secretary General to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary, to observe the situation directly through representatives named by him, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at the earliest moment, and as soon as possible to suggest methods to bring an end to the foreign intervention in Hungary in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

November 5

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) cabled Governments Members of the United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund Executive Committee, and other Governments, that Austria had addressed an urgent appeal to UNHCR, since 15,000 refugees from Hungary already required "humane care and maintenance." Cable asked Governments to consider giving temporary asylum "to greatest possible number of genuine refugees," in addition to financial aid. UNHCR also made available to the Austrian Government $25,000 from UNREF.

November 6

UNHCR cabled the Federal Government of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia. In its reply, the Yugoslav Government said that it had given assistance to "approximately 300 Hungarian refugees—including housing, food, clothing and medical aid." The Yugoslav Government said that "in its attitude toward the solution of the problem of the Hungarian refugees," it would be "strictly guided by the principles of the United Nations as well as by the personal decision of the refugees."

November 8

In the General Assembly (Second Emergency Special Session), the Secretary General drew attention to an *aide-memoire* sent by him to the Hungarian Foreign Minister (A/3315) asking if Hungarian Government would permit observers to enter, travel freely and report on their findings. He expressed his "firm expectation" in the *aide-memoire* that the Assembly's request would be accepted.

The General Assembly approved the report of the Credentials Committee (A/3321). The Report agreed "not to take any decision" regarding the credentials of the representative of Hungary "at this time pending further clarification."

SECOND RESOLUTION

November 9

In the Second Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, a resolution sponsored by Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru adopted, after modification, by roll-call of 48 to 11, with 16 abstentions (*Resolution 100: (ES-II)*:

"1. *Calls again upon* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to withdraw its forces from Hungary without any further delay;

2. *Considers* that free elections should be held in Hungary under United Nations auspices, as soon as law and order have been restored, to enable the people of Hungary to determine for themselves the form of government they wish to establish in their country;

3. *Reaffirms* its request to the Secretary General to continue to investigate, through representatives named by him, the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary and to report at the earliest possible moment to the General Assembly;

4. *Requests* the Secretary General to report in the shortest possible time to the General Assembly on compliance herewith."

THIRD RESOLUTION

The General Assembly, (Second Emergency Special Session), adopted a US resolution in roll-call by 53 to 9, with 13 abstentions. (*Resolution 1006 (ES-II):*

"1. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to cease immediately actions against the Hungarian population which are in violation of the accepted standards and principles of international law, justice and morality;

2. *Calls upon* the Hungarian authorities to facilitate, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not to interfere with, the receipt and distribution of food and medical supplies to the Hungarian people and to co-operate fully with the United Nations and its specialized agencies, as well as with other international organizations such as the International Red Cross, to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Hungary;

3. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian authorities to co-operate fully with the Secretary General and his duly appointed representatives in the carrying out of the tasks referred to above."

FOURTH RESOLUTION

The General Assembly (Second Emergency Special Session) adopted an Austrian resolution, after amendment, in roll-call of 67 to none, with 8 abstentions (Resolution 1007 (ES-II) saying that it

"1. *Resolves* to undertake on a large scale immediate aid for the affected territories by furnishing medical supplies, foodstuffs and clothes;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to participate to the greatest extent possible in this relief action;

3. *Requests* the Secretary General to undertake immediately the necessary measures;

4. *Urgently appeals* to all countries concerned to give full assistance to the Secretary General in the implementation of this task."

FIFTH RESOLUTION

The General Assembly (Second Emergency Special Session) adopted a US resolution in roll-call by 53 to 9, with 13 abstentions (Resolution 1006(ES-II) in which it

"1. *Requests* the Secretary General to call upon the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to consult with other appropiate international agencies and interested Governments with a view to making speedy and effective arrangements for emergency assistance to refugees from Hungary;

2. *Urges* Member States to make special contributions for this purpose."

SIXTH RESOLUTION

November 10

The General Assembly (Second Emergency Special Session) adopted a US resolution by 53 to 9, with 8 abstentions *(Resolution 1008(ES-II))* stating that it:

"*Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its eleventh regular session, as a matter of priority, the question on the agenda of its second emergency special session."

The Secretary General issued the text of an *aide-memoire* to the USSR, asking it "to lend its assistance in the fulfilment of my mandate" (A/3336). The Secretary General was convinced that the Soviet Government "is aware of the sense of urgency with which the General Assembly envisages this problem."

The Secretary General announced the dispatch of a second *aide-memoire* to Hungary (A/3335), pointing out that no reply

had come to his first *aide-memoire* (A/3315). The Hungarian Government acknowledged receipt of the second *aide-memoire,* stating that it was studying its content.

The Secretary General addressed a *note verbale* (A/3337) to the Hungarian Government requesting details of needs for medical supplies, food and clothing, as called for in resolutions 1066 and 1007(ES-II). The Secretary General charged Philippe de Seynes, Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, with responsibility for resolutions dealing with relief needs of Hungarian people.

The Secretary General asked James M. Read, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees to make "speedy and effective arrangements" and to co-ordinate emergency assistance for refugees from Hungary. (A/3371)

November 12

The Secretary General announced that he had established an Investigation Group and an Observer Group for Hungary. Participation had been accepted in the Investigation Group by Dr. Alberto Lleras of Colombia and in the Observer Group by Judge Oscar Christian Gundersen of Norway. The Secretary General hoped the observers would get permission to enter Hungary.

The Secretary General issued text of a cable from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary (A/3341) in reply to the Secretary General's *note verbale* and two *aides-memoires.* Reply said that Hungarian and USSR Governments were "exclusively competent" to arrange withdrawal of Soviet troops, that dispatch of UN observers was "not warranted" and that elections were "entirely within the competence of Hungarian authorities."

The Hungarian Government would gratefully accept relief supplies and "is prepared to co-operate most fully with the agencies of the United Nations" in the receipt and distribution of food and medicine for the Hungarian people. The Hungarian Government was also co-operating with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and would inform the Secretary General of its needs.

November 13

The Steering Committee decided by 11 to 2, with one abstention, to recommend inclusion of "Situation in Hungary" as additional item for the eleventh regular session. (A/3343)

The General Assembly decided by a roll-call of 62 to 9, with 8 abstentions, to include the item on Hungary on the agenda and decided by 51 votes to none, with 19 abstentions,

that the item be dealt with in plenary "as a matter of priority."

The Secretary General postponed departure for Cairo and offered to go personally to Budapest.

The Secretary General cabled the Hungarian Government asking for reconsideration of the decision (A/3341) that the presence of UN observers in Hungary was "not warranted." (A/3336)

The Secretary General announced that the Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary had cabled information on relief needs and had said that he would welcome "talks on the best means of providing the assistance." (A/3345)

Philippe de Seynes, acting for the Secretary General, handed $500,000 to Leopold Figl, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria. The sum was half of a check for one million dollars presented to the Secretary General by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations for assistance to Hungarian refugees.

November 14

The Secretary General announced the reply to the *aide-memoire* of November 10 (A/3336) from the USSR, stating that dispatch of observers to Hungary "is a matter lying exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic." (A/3337)

November 15

The Secretary General sent cables to the Governments of Member States of the United Nations and to the Specialized Agencies calling their attention to resolutions 1004 and 1007(ES-II) saying: "In view of the extreme urgency of the situation and the immediate need for medical supplies, foodstuffs and clothes, I have the honor to request a preliminary indication regarding the assistance you are prepared to offer under these resolutions."

The Hungarian Government offered to meet the Secretary General in Rome and to negotiate about aid offered by the United Nations, "as well as to exchange views about the position taken by the Hungarian Government regarding the resolutions of the United Nations." (A/3358)

November 16

The Secretary General replied to the Hungarian cable (A/3358) proposing discussions in New York "as early as possible" with the Hungarian Foreign Minister the matters

mentioned in the Hungarian communication of November 15 (A/3362) "under the circumstances."

The Secretary General announced that Judge Oscar Gundersen (Norway), Mr. Arthur Lall (India) and Dr. Alberto Lleras (Colombia) would form a group to prepare a report after investigating "the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary" (A/3359). It was explained that the Observer Group would not be dropped.

November 19

The Secretary General issued a *note verbale* of the Hungarian Government denying mass arrests and deportations to the USSR. (A/3367)

November 20

The Secretary General issued the text of a cable from the Hungarian Government explaining police action in Hungary and claiming that "not a single arrested person has been deported." (A/3373)

The Secretary General introduced a report by the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees (A/3371) stating that from 28 October to 18 November some 34,000 refugees entered Austria and, although some 6,000 had already been taken to other countries, the flow continued at an average rate of 2,000 a day. The response by other governments offering temporary asylum to refugees and thus alleviating the burden upon Austria had been remarkable.

SEVENTH RESOLUTION

November 21

In the General Assembly a Cuban resolution, amended by El Salvador, and adopted by roll-call of 55 to 10, with 14 abstentions, (A/RES/407) stated that it:

"1. *Considers* that the information received adds urgency to the necessity of prompt compliance with resolutions 1004 (ES-II) and 1055 (ES-II) calling for the prompt withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and for the dispatch of observers to Hungary by the Secretary General;

2. *Urges* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian authorities to take immediate steps to cease the deportation of Hungarian citizens and to return promptly to their homes those who have been deported from Hungarian territory;

3. *Requests* the Secretary General to keep the General Assembly informed as to compliance with this as well the above-

mentioned resolutions, so that the Assembly may be in a position to consider such further action as it may deem necessary."

The Secretary General issued an addendum to his interim report, pointing out that information had been received by the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees that there had been a sharp increase in the influx of refugees, bringing the total number in Austria on 21 November to some 51,000.

EIGHTH RESOLUTION

In the General Assembly a resolution submitted by Argentina, Belgium, Denmark and the United States was adopted by 69 to 2, with 8 abstentions after four Hungarian amendments had been rejected, (A/RES/409) saying that it:

"1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the action taken by the Secretary General to determine and help to meet the need of the Hungarian refugees, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist these refugees and to bring about co-ordinated action on their behalf by Governments, inter-governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations;

2. *Requests* the Secretary General and the High Commissioner for Refugees to continue their efforts;

3. *Urges* Governments and non-governmental organizations to make contributions to the Secretary General, to the High Commissioner for Refugees or to other appropriate agencies for the care and resettlement of Hungarian refugees, and to co-ordinate their aid programmes in consultations with the Office of the High Commissioner;

4. *Requests* the Secretary General and the High Commissioner for Refugees to make an immediate appeal to both Governments and non-governmental organizations to meet the minimum present needs as estimated in the report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to the Secretary General and authorizes them to make subsequent appeals on the basis of plans and estimates made by the High Commissioner with the concurrence of his Executive Committee."

NINTH RESOLUTION

In the General Assembly a resolution submitted by Ceylon, India and Indonesia, as amended, was adopted by 57 to 8, with 14 abstentions (A/RES/408) stipulating that it

"1. *Urges* Hungary to accede to the request made by the Secretary General without prejudice to its sovereignty;

2. Requests the Secretary General to report to the General Assembly without delay."

November 24

The Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees reported on a telegram received by his office from the Austrian Government, calling for urgent assistance. UNHCR referred to earlier report (A/3771 and Corr.1) based on expectation of 20,000 refugees likely to remain in Austria for six months. This had forecast expenditure for the Austrian Government of $6.5 million, plus $2,500,000 for emergency supplies already furnished in the opening stages by the Red Cross and other international agencies. "Now, however, it is evident that with approximately 60,000 refugees arriving in Austria, and thousands more coming every day, these figures are no longer tenable." (A/C.3/L.507)

November 26

The Governing Body of the International Labor Organization voted by 36 to 2, with 2 abstentions, five conclusions of its Committee on Freedom of Association concerning the situation in Hungary:

The conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association called for complete freedom of association to be established in Hungary, together with the civil liberties provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the independence of the trade union movement.

The Governing Body of the International Labor Organization adopted by 36 to 1, with 3 abstentions, a recommendation stating the desire of the International Labor Organization to participate in any arrangements made to ascertain the facts of the present situation in respect of freedom of association in Hungary. Mr. David Morse, Director General of the ILO, was asked by the Governing Body to participate personally in such an enquiry if appropriate. (A/3390)

In the Third Committee of the General Assembly a draft resolution proposed by Czechoslovakia (A/C.3/L.508), as amended, was rejected by 43 to 10, with 15 abstentions. The Czechoslovak draft resolution called upon the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees "to inform displaced persons and refugees of the laws and measures adopted in the various countries to facilitate their return, in particular such measures as amnesty . . ."

TENTH RESOLUTION

A revised draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510/Rev.1) proposed by Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States was adopted in a roll-call by 49 to none, with 19 abstentions. The General Assembly:

"1. *Expresses its appreciation* of the efforts of the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees to implement the program for permanent solutions of the existing refugee problem and to deal with the emergency situation created by the problem of Hungarian refugees;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Government of Austria for the part it has played in receiving and assisting the refugees who have entered its territory;

3. *Requests* the High Commissioner to continue his efforts to effect solutions in accordance with the statute of his Office and the UNREF program under due safeguards in accordance with his responsibility under the said statute to provide international protection for refugees within his mandate;

4. *Requests* the High Commissioner, in consultation with the Secretary General and with the Governments concerned, to develop a comprehensive assessment of the needs, both material and financial, of the Hungarian refugees, to be submitted to the UNREF Executive Committee for its approval at the earliest possible date."

The Secretary General and the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees sent a joint cable to all Member States of the United Nations and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland, the Vatican and Vietnam. The cable drew attention to the generous efforts being made by many governments in implementation of General Assembly resolution 1006(ES-II) concerning assistance to refugees from Hungary and asked for immediate attention to subsequent resolution A/RES/409.

The cable stated that a situation of the utmost urgency had developed and pointed out that the greater influx of refugees made it necessary to provide fresh estimates. It was now considered that an estimated 60,000 Hungarian refugees would require care for the next six months. To meet their minimum needs, ten million dollars would be required over and above expenditures already incurred and funds already

in hand. The cable asked for urgent and precise indications of the nature and extent of assistance which governments were prepared in this emergency to make available, whether in cash or in the form of temporary asylum or resettlement offers.

Mr. Philippe de Seynes, Under-Secretary in charge of Relief to the Hungarian People and Mr. James M. Read, Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees sent a letter to non-governmental organizations active in aiding refugees, drawing their attention to A/RES/409 and mentioning the urgent appeal for contributions from governments sent out the same day. "We acknowledge with deep gratitude the service to refugees which many voluntary agencies have rendered for a long period of years. While recognizing the great need for the continuation of their long standing programs for refugees, we express the confident hope that these agencies will urgently increase their aid programs so as to render maximum additional help to these new refugees." Non-governmental organizations were asked to inform the Secretary General and UNHCR of the nature and extent of any contributions they might be able to make.

November 30

The Secretary General submitted a report (A/3403) to the General Assembly following its various resolutions. The Secretary General reported having asked the Governments of the USSR and Hungary for information required in implementing the resolutions. He hoped for a positive reply to his offer to go personally to Budapest where he intended to cover not only the humanitarian activities to which his offer originally referred, "but also in general the position taken by the Government of Hungary regarding the resolutions of the United Nations," as indicated by the Government itself in a cable to the Secretary General on 15 November (A/3358). The Secretary General said that "it seems appropriate that the contact of the Secretary General with the Hungarian Government be considered as based on his position under the Charter, with the wider scope that such a standpoint might give to his approach." The Secretary General stressed that the situation was complicated by a lack of information. "It seemed to him that when a satisfactory basis for progress did not prove attainable through an exchange of communications, the initial step had to be the establishment of a direct personal contact." The Secretary General assumed that "full account will be taken of the fact that he is still waiting for a reply from the Hungarian Government."

The group consisting of Judge O. Gundersen, Mr. A. Lall and Mr. A. Lleras had been examining "some material presently available to the Secretariat," but that the group was not yet presenting a report, since it felt that its work should be supplemented by and coordinated with the results of direct observation in Hungary. The Secretary General reaffirmed his view that the investigation should be "based on available and confirmed material."

An annex to the report of the SG gave the text of a letter from the Chairman of the USSR delegation dated 29 November 1956, which restated the attitude of his delegation to "the so-called question of 'The Situation in Hungary'." The letter stated that "allegations of the deportation of Hungarian citizens to the USSR are based on slanderous rumors circulated by certain groups for the purpose of misleading public opinion."

The Secretary General circulated replies received so far to his appeal of 15 November to governments for contributions in support of relief for Hungary. He pointed out that a number of replies described aid being furnished by governments through channels such as the Red Cross. Some of these replies referred exclusively to relief being provided to the Hungarian people, others to aid being given to refugees and still others to action being taken on both aspects of the problem. (A/3405)

December 4

The Hungarian representative announced his readiness to discuss arrangements for the Secretary General's visit to Budapest. The meeting of the General Assembly was recessed for an hour to discuss a definite date to be fixed.

The Secretary General informed the Assembly of his intention to proceed to Budapest on 16 December and to stay there from 16 to 18 December, 1956. He proposed to send Mr. Philippe de Seynes, Under-Secretary in charge of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, to Budapest one week in advance of his visit as part of his own staff. He stated that the Delegate of Hungary would convey the suggested dates to his Government.

ELEVENTH RESOLUTION

A resolution sponsored by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand and United States, adopted by roll-call of 54 to 10, with 14 abstentions. (A/RES/413)

"1. *Reiterates* its call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian authorities to comply with the above resolutions and to permit United Nations observers to enter the territory of Hungary, to travel freely therein and to report their findings to the Secretary General;

2. *Requests* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Hungarian authorities to communicate to the Secretary General, not later than 7 December 1956, their consent to receive United Nations observers;

3. *Recommends* that in the meantime the Secretary General arrange for the immediate dispatch to Hungary, and other countries as appropriate, of observers named by him pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 1004(ES-II);

4. *Requests* the Governments of all Member States to cooperate with the representatives named by the Secretary-General by extending such assistance and providing such facilities as may be necessary for the effective discharge of their responsibilities."

The United Nations signed an Agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross by which the latter would act as the agency for the distribution of supplies furnished by the UN for relief to the population of Hungary, in particular by furnishing medical supplies, food and clothing. The Committee will supply all organizational supervisory and technical personnel, services and equipment and the United Nations will defray such administrative and operational costs attributable to the performance of the relief program as are agreed between the Committee and the United Nations. The United Nations and the Committee will act in close collaboration in regard to the planning and implementation of the program and the Committee will cooperate fully with any representative of the Secretary General sent to Hungary in connection with it

December 7

The Secretary General announced (A/3435) that he had received no official reaction to his proposal to visit Budapest on 16 December. "If the visit cannot be made at the time proposed, it may be questioned whether it would be to the purpose."

The Secretary General announced that he had addressed letters to the Permanent Representatives of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, USSR and Yugoslavia asking whether ob-

servers named by him would be permitted to enter the countries in question. (A/3435)

December 8

The Secretary General issued a letter from the Permanent Representative of Austria stating that the Austrian Government would permit observers named by him to enter Austria. (A/3435/Add.1)

The Secretary General issued the text of a letter received from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia refusing permission for observers to be sent there. This would, said the letter, "establish a most dangerous precedent. In this particular case, the dispatch of observers to the countries neighboring Hungary would be liable to extend the area of tension and thus aggravate the situation still further." (A/3435/Add.2)

December 9

The Secretary General issued the text of a letter from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia stating that "the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic could not give its consent to the entry of observers, mentioned in your letter, into the territory of Czechoslovakia." (A/3435/Add.3)

December 10

The Secretary General published the letter from the Permanent Representative of Romania saying that the Government of the Romanian People's Republic "considers that the sending of UN observers to the countries adjoining Hungary is not in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter." (A/3435/Add.4)

The Secretary General issued the text of a letter from the Chairman of the Delegation of USSR stating that the Soviet Delegation had already declared that the resolution "constituted a further attempt at gross interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary through the United Nations and conflicted with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with the generally accepted rules of international law."

December 11

The Hungarian Delegation refused to participate in the discussions of the General Assembly "so long as the discussion of the Hungarian question does not proceed in the spirit of the United Nations Charter."

Executive Board of UNICEF approved initial allocation of $700,000 to meet relief needs of Hungarian children and

mothers in Austria and Hungary. This allocation was made with the understanding that $200,000 might be used to meet urgent requirements not met from other sources; a plan of operations for the use of the remaining $500,000 will be submitted to the Executive Board for approval.

This decision followed a four-day visit to Budapest by Mr. Maurice Pate, Executive Director of UNICEF who described the needs of the Hungarian people as "desperate" and said that they would require outside help for a long time to come.

December 12

The Secretary General issued a *note-verbale* of the Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations in which the Hungarian Government stated that 16 December was "not appropriate" for the Hungarian Government as a date for his visit to Budapest. "On the other hand, the Hungarian Government will, at a later date, set forth a proposal through its representatives in New York for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the visit of the Secretary General of the United Nations." (A/3435/Add.6)

The Secretary General submitted an interim report on "Humanitarian Activities to Assist the Hungarian People" (A/3443). The Secretary General referred to the previous estimate of "not less than a further $10,000,000" as being required to meet the minimum needs of an estimated 60,000 refugees in Austria. Although the number of refugees there was now somewhat higher than 60,000, "it would appear that that figure still represents a reasonable estimate for planning purposes." The generous offers of Governments to provide asylum did not dispense with the need for cash contributions to care for the refugees remaining in Austria.

The Secretary General again urged Governments to make contributions to the UN funds which he had established for aid to the people of Hungary. "The Secretary General also wishes to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the desirability of maintaining the greatest flexibility in the allocation of funds as between the refugee program and the program of relief within Hungary respectively. By contributing through the United Nations, Governments will ensure that their contributions for and to the Hungarian people will be allocated in such a way as to reflect sensitively the changing needs of the two programs."

The Secretary General said that he would welcome any suggestions that Governments might care to make for the coordination of national fund-raising efforts from private sources.

On 15 November, the Government of Yugoslavia had informed the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that approximately 300 Hungarian refugees had entered Yugoslavia. On 6 December, the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia informed the Secretary General that an agreement had been reached between the Governments of Yugoslavia and Hungary for the repatriation on 7 and 9 December of the 141 refugees "who had freely expressed their wish to return." The remainder of the refugees, of whom there were over 600 on 6 December, would be allowed to emigrate to other countries or to remain in Yugoslavia, as they preferred. The Secretary General and the High Commissioner would remain in contact with the Yugoslav Government in respect to assistance to these refugees.

TWELFTH RESOLUTION

A draft resolution submitted jointly by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and the United States of America, adopted in a roll-call by 55 to 8, with 13 abstentions (A/RES/424):

"1. *Declares* that, by using its armed force against the Hungarian people, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is violating the political independence of Hungary;

2. *Condemns* the violation of the Charter by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in depriving Hungary of its liberty and independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental rights;

3. *Reiterates* its call upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to desist forthwith from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make immediate arrangements for the withdrawal, under United Nations observation, of its armed forces from Hungary and to permit the re-establishment of the political independence of Hungary;

5. *Requests* the Secretary General to take any initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem, in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly."

A draft resolution submitted by Austria (A/3441) was not put to the vote, as the Austrian delegate explained that its

basic idea had been added in operative paragraph 5 of the 20-power resolution.

A draft resolution submitted by Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia (A/3437) contained the following clauses:

"1. *Deplores* that no steps have been taken in pursuance of the above-mentioned Soviet declaration and to meet the overwhelming demand of the Hungarian people in respect of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and that, in consequence, there has been a further deterioration of the situation and continued non-co-operation by the Hungarian people;

2. *Declares* that the intervention of armed forces in Hungary has not only resulted in violence and bloodshed, but has aggravated the situation and prevented the approach to a solution, and that it should cease forthwith, and that immediate arrangements should be made for the withdrawal of foreign forces so that peaceful conditions can be promoted in Hungary;

3. *Declares* that recent events in Hungary have conclusively shown that force and violence provide no answer to the demands of a people;

4. *Expresses* its firm conviction that the interests and freedom of the Hungarian people, of the United Nations and of the world co-operation would be best furthered by the cessation of the existing foreign intervention and by the assurance that there will be no external intervention or pressures, armed or otherwise, from any quarter;

5. *Requests* the Secretary General to initiate efforts both with the Hungarian and Soviet Governments through their representatives at New York, and to consider without delay the question of visiting Moscow in addition to the efforts he is making in regard to Budapest, to assist in promoting a speedy solution with the co-operation of all concerned."

This draft resolution was not put to the vote at the request of the delegate of India, who said: "a contrary decision has been taken in the way of a decision on the issue itself."

December 26

The Secretary General announced that the group of three which had been looking into conditions in Hungary had been disbanded, but not dissolved, as of 15 December. He noted that permission had been refused to the group to visit any country except Austria.

January 5, 1957

In his report (A/3485) the Secretary General informed the General Assembly that "there was no possibility for the rep-

resentatives of the United Nations to make direct observations in Hungary, nor has the cooperation necessary for the investigations been forthcoming from Governments directly concerned. The only source of new and direct information under these circumstances, possibly available might be hearings with refugees from Hungary, conducted, in the first place in neighboring countries. Therefore, the establishment of a Special Committee was proposed and such a Committee should obviously serve as an organ of the General Assembly for a continued observation of developments in relation to Hungary in all those respects which may be of relevance to the Assembly."

THIRTEENTH RESOLUTION

January 10

The United Nations' General Assembly adopted a draft resolution (A/3487.Rev.1.) by 59 to 8 with 10 abstentions which was sponsored by Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. (Resolution 1132 (XI)). The main dispositions of the resolution are the following:

"Desiring to ensure that the General Assembly and all the Members of the United Nations shall be in possession of the fullest and best available information regarding the situation created by the intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its use of armed force and other means, in the internal affairs of Hungary, as well as regarding developments relating to the recommendations of the General Assembly on this subject,

1. Establishes for the above-mentioned purposes, a special Committee composed of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, to investigate, and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate, in order to report its findings to the General Assembly at its present session, and thereafter from time to time to prepare additional reports for the information of Members of the United Nations and of the General Assembly if it is in session;

2. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Hungary to cooperate in every way with the Committee and,

in particular, to permit the Committee and its staff to enter the territory of Hungary and to travel freely therein;

3. Requests all Member States to assist the Committee in any way appropriate in its task, making available to it relevant information, including testimony and evidence, which members may passes, and assisting it in securing such information;

4. Invites the Secretary General to render the Committee all appropriate assistance and facilities;

5. Calls upon all Member States promptly to give effect to the present and previous resolutions of the General Assembly on the Hungarian problem;

6. Reaffirms its request that the Secretary General continue to take the initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly."

January 11

The Kádár-Delegation to the United Nations declared, in its *note-verbale* (A/3493) that "The Hungarian Government . . . states that no committee of any kind has the right to conduct investigations into the Hungarian question by collecting testimony from unauthorized and biased persons and to establish observation in Hungary in order to obtain information . . . "

January 17

In a note sent by the Hungarian Delegation to the United Nations and distributed as Document A/3504 the Kádár regime levelled accusations against certain countries for the alleged "mistreatment of returnees."

The Secretary General distributed his own and the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the humanitarian assistance given to the Hungarian people both inside and outside Hungary. (A/3503 and A/3503/Add.1)

January 28

The Special Committee heard the first witness in connection with the hearings on the problem of Hungary. Miss Anna Kéthly's statement was released under Document GA/1471.

January 29

Maj. Gen. Béla Király and Mayor Josef Kővágo were heard in open meetings, too.

February 13

The General Assembly heard the report of the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly distributed as

document A/3564 Report A/SPC/10 on the complaint of the USSR on the intervention of the United States of America in the domestic affairs of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and its subversive activity against those states.

The Credentials Committee of the United Nations General Assembly made its report on the submitted credentials of the Member Delegations informing that the acceptance of the credentials submitted by the Kádár régime's delegation was denied and action on it was suspended. (A/3536).

February 20

The Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary published under Document A/3546 as interim Report on its investigations giving the first findings and listing the procedures and rules used by the Committee in connection with the hearing of refugees.

March 8

The General Assembly adopted a draft resolution (A/3570) by a vote of 65 to 0 with 6 abstentions, sponsored by Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Iran, Japan, Norway and the United States according to which the Eleventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly was suspended with the provision that it may be reconvened would an emergency necessitate it in connection with Hungary.

June 20

After long preparation and repeated delays the Special Committee of the General Assembly on the Problem of Hungary published its Report under Document A/3592 Suppl. 18.

August 19

The Secretary General sent cables to the Governments of the Member States recalling the 11th Session for September 10, 1957, at 10:30 A.M. to discuss the Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary.

FOURTEENTH RESOLUTION

September 10-13

The reconvened General Assembly discussed the draft resolution A/3658 and A/3658.Add.1. submitted on September 10, 1957, by Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands,

New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. This was adopted on September 13, 1957, by 60 to 10 and 10 abstentions as Resolution 1133(XI).

"The General Assembly,

Recalling its Resolution 1132(XII) of 10 January 1957, establishing a Special Committee, consisting of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, to investigate, and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate,

Having now received the unanimous report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary,

Regretting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary have failed to cooperate in any way with the Special Committee,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Special Committee for its work;

2. Endorses the report of the Special Committee;

3. Notes the conclusion of the Special Committee that the events which took place in Hungary in October and November of 1956 constituted a spontaneous national uprising;

4. Finds that the conclusions reached by the Special Committee on the basis of its examination of all available evidence confirm that:

a. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the United Nations Charter, has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights;

b. The present Hungarian régime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

c. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has carried out mass deportations of Hungarian citizens to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

d. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has violated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary;

5. Condemns these acts and the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly;

6. Reiterates its concerns with the continuing plight of the Hungarian people;

7. Considers that further efforts must be made to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in regard to Hungary

in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly;

8. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary in view of evidence contained in the report to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people; to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms; and to ensure the return to Hungary of those Hungarian citizens who have been deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

9. Requests the President of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, as the Special Representative of the General Assembly on the Hungarian problem, to take such steps as he deems appropriate, in view of the findings of the Special Committee, to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in accordance with resolutions 1004 (ES-II), 1005 (ES-II), 1127 (XI) and 1132 (XI) of the General Assembly, to consult as appropriate with the Special Committee during the course of his endeavors and to report and make recommendations as he may deem advisable to the General Assembly."

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE: CONCLUSIONS

The terms of reference of the Special Committee covered a broad field, namely the report to the General Assembly of the United Nations after full and objective investigation, its finding on all aspects of the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary by armed force and by other means and the effects of such intervention on the political development of Hungary. The Committee's investigation, as has been explained, involved the study of copious documentation from various sources and in several languages, as well as the questioning of more than a hundred witnesses, whose testimony fills two thousand pages in the verbatim record. The Committee regrets that the attitude of the Hun-

garian Government has prevented it from basing its investigation on direct observation in Hungary, as required by the General Assembly resolution.

The Committee's findings relate to many aspects of the events in Hungary and are concerned with numerous points of detail that have a bearing on the origin and nature of those events. The report itself embodies the conclusions of the Committee, and these conclusions of the Committee cannot be readily dissociated from the evidence which is there assembled. A summary of the Committee's findings on individual aspects of the situation in Hungary has been appended to certain of the chapters. It would, however, seem appropriate at this stage to summarize a number of conclusions drawn by the Committee from its study of the evidence as a whole. To the best of the Committee's belief, these conclusions represent the essential facts about the Hungarian uprising which are necessary to an understanding of its nature and outcome. They are as follows:

(i) What took place in Hungary in October and November 1956 was a spontaneous national uprising, due to long-standing grievances which had caused resentment among the people. One of these grievances was the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the USSR; the system of government was in part maintained by the weapon of terror, wielded by the AVH or political police, whose influence was exercised at least until the end of 1955, through a complex network of agents and informers permeating the whole of Hungarian society. In other respects also, Soviet pressure was resented. From the stifling of free speech to the adoption of a Soviet-style uniform for the Hungarian army, an alien influence existed in all walks of life. Hungarians felt no personal animosity towards the individual Soviet soldiers on Hungarian soil, but these armed forces were symbols of something which annoyed a proud people and fed the desire to be free;

(ii) The thesis that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary and that it drew its strength from such circles and from Western "Imperialists" failed to survive the Committee's examination. From start to

finish, the uprising was led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, many of whom were Communists or former Communists. The majority of political demands put forward during the revolution included a stipulation that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure and that such social achievements as the land reform should be safeguarded. At no time was any proposal made for the return to power, or to the Government, of any figure associated with pre-war days. "Fascists" and "saboteurs," heavily armed, could not have succeeded in landing on Hungarian airfields which were under Soviet supervision, or in crossing the Austrian frontier, where a closed zone was shown by the Austrian authorities to the military attachés of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the USSR;

(iii) The uprising was not planned in advance. It was the universal testimony of witnesses examined by the Committee that events took participants by surprise. No single explanation can determine exactly why the outbreak occurred just when it did. Communist spokesmen, including Mr. Kadar and the members of his present Government, have recognized the bitter grievances of the Hungarian people before 23 October. They have spoken of a "broad, popular movement" caused by the "bitterness and indignation" of the masses. Two factors would seem to have brought this resentment to a head. The first of these was the news received on 19 October of a successful move by Poland for greater independence from the USSR. This news was largely instrumental in bringing the Hungarian students together in the meetings of 22 October. The second factor was the acute disappointment felt by the people when Erno Gero, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, in his speech on the evening of 23 October failed to meet any of the popular demands and adopted what was considered a truculent tone towards his hearers;

(iv) Although no evidence exists of advance planning, and although the whole course of the uprising bears the hallmark of continuous improvisation, it would appear

that the Soviet authorities had taken steps as early as 20 October to make armed intervention in Hungary possible. Evidence exists of troop movements, or projected troop movements, from that date on. It would appear that plans for action had therefore been laid some time before the students met to discuss their demands. The Committee is not in a position to say whether the Soviet authorities anticipated that the grievances of the Hungarian people, stimulated by events in Poland, could no longer be contained. Signs of opposition were evident before the 23rd; the Hungarian Government had reason to foresee that trouble was brewing. While the evidence shows that Soviet troops from outside Hungary were used in the first intervention, no clause of the Warsaw Treaty provides for intervention by armed forces of the Soviet Union to dictate political developments within any signatory's frontiers;

(v) The demonstrations on 23 October were at first entirely peaceable. None of the demonstrators appears to have carried arms, and no evidence has been discovered that any of those who voiced the political demands or joined the demonstrators had any intention to resort to force. While disappointment at Mr. Gero's speech may have angered the crowds, it would hardly of itself have sufficed to turn the demonstration into an armed uprising. That this happened was due to the action of the AVH in opening fire on the people outside the radio building. Within a few hours, Soviet tanks were in action against the Hungarians. This appearance of Russian soldiers in their midst not as friendly allies, but as enemies in combat, had the effect of still further uniting the people;

(vi) Obscurity surrounds the invitation alleged to have been issued by the Hungarian Government to the Soviet authorities to assist in quelling the uprising by force. Mr. Nagy has denied, with every appearance of truth, that he issued this invitation or was even aware of it. Since Soviet tanks appeared on the streets of Budapest at about 2 a.m. on 24 October, it would have been impossible for him to have addressed any official message to the Soviet authorities, since he held no govern-

ment post at the time when the tanks must have received their orders. An invitation may have been made privately by Mr. Gero, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or Mr. Hegedus, the Prime Minister. The Committee, however, has had no opportunity of seeing a text of such an invitation, or of considering the exact circumstances in which it may have been issued. Until further information comes to light, it would be wise to suspend judgment as to whether such an invitation was issued at all.

Similar considerations apply to the invitation which is alleged to have been addressed to the Soviet authorities before the second intervention on 4 November. Mr. Kadar had remained a member of Mr. Nagy's Government when the latter was reconstituted on 3 November and the Committee is unaware of his having given any recorded indication of his disapproval of Mr. Nagy's policies. Mr. Kadar's movements at this time are not fully known, and he cannot be considered to have substantiated his own claim to have called, in the name of the Government, for Soviet help. In any event, there is abundant evidence that Soviet preparations for a further intervention, including the movement of troops and armour from abroad, had been under way since the last days of October. Mr. Kadar and his Ministers were absent from Budapest during the first few days after he formed his Government, and administrative instructions to the people of Hungary were issued by the commanders of the Soviet troops;

(vii) When Mr. Nagy became Prime Minister, he was not at first able to exercise the full powers of that office. Only when the grip of the AVH was loosened by the victory of the insurgents was he able to take an independent stand. By this time, the real power in Hungary lay with the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils, which had sprung up spontaneously in different parts of the country and had replaced the collapsing structure of the Communist Party. Mr. Nagy, though himself a Communist of long standing who had lived for many years in the USSR, invited non-Communists into his new Government, and listened to the

demands of various Revolutionary and Workers' Councils. It would appear that Mr. Nagy himself, like the country at large, was somewhat taken aback by the pace of developments. However, seeing that his countrymen were united in their desire for other forms of government and the departure of Soviet troops, he threw in his lot with the insurgents. By this action, he obliterated the impression which he had created while still under the domination of the AVH, and he became a symbolic figure in the uprising, although he had not instigated it, and was never its actual leader;

(viii) The few days of freedom enjoyed by the Hungarian people provided abundant evidence of the popular nature of the uprising. A free press and radio came to life all over Hungary, and the disbanding of the AVH was the signal for general rejoicing, which revealed the degree of unity achieved by the people, once the burden of fear had been lifted from them;

(ix) There were a number of lynchings and beatings by the crowds. These were, in almost all cases, confined to members of the AVH or those who were believed to have co-operated with them;

(x) Steps were taken by the Workers' Councils during this period to give the workers real control of nationalized industrial undertakings and to abolish unpopular institutions, such as the production norms. These were widely resented as being unfair to workers and also a reflection of popularly suspected secret trade agreements with the USSR, which were said to make heavy demands on the Hungarian economy for the benefit of the Soviet Union. During the days of freedom, while negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities for the withdrawal of Russian troops, attempts were made to clear up the streets of Budapest and life was beginning to return to normal. The insurgents had agreed to amalgamate, while maintaining their identity, in a National Guard, which would have been responsible, with the Army and Police, for maintaining order;

(xi) In contrast to the demands for the re-establishment of political rights put forward during the uprising, is the fact that basic human rights of the Hungarian

people were violated by the Hungarian Governments prior to 23 October, especially up to the autumn of 1955, and that such violations have been resumed since 4 November. The Committee is convinced that the numerous accounts of inhuman treatment and torture by the AVH are to be accepted as true. On the evidence, it is also convinced that numbers of Hungarians, including some women, were deported to the Soviet Union and that some may not have been returned to their homes. These deportations were designed to break the back of the revolution. Action taken by the Hungarian people in their spontaneous uprising succeeded in ridding them for a few days of the apparatus of police terror. This democratic achievement of a united people was indeed, threatened by a form of "counter-revolution" and it was to this that it succumbed. However, the "counter-revolution" consisted in the setting up by Soviet armed forces of Mr. Kadar and his colleagues in opposition to a Government which enjoyed the overwhelming support of the people of Hungary;

(xii) Following the second Soviet intervention on 4 November, there has been no evidence of popular support for Mr. Kadar's Government. Mr. Kadar has successively abandoned most of the points from the revolutionary programme which he had at first promised to the Hungarian people. On the central question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, he has moved from complete acceptance of the nation's wishes to a refusal to discuss the subject in present circumstances. Against the workers, he has proceeded step by step to destroy their power and that of the Workers' Councils. Capital punishment is applicable to strike activities. The processes of justice have been distorted by the institution of special police and special courts and by the ignoring of the rights of the accused. The Social Democratic Party has again been forceably liquidated. General elections have been postponed for two years. Writers and intellectuals are subjected to repressive measures. The Hungarian workers have shown no sign of support for Mr. Kadar's Government or for the prospect

of continuous Soviet occupation. Only a small fraction of the 190,000 Hungarians, mostly young people, who fled the country have accepted his invitation to return. The peasants have reason to be grateful to Mr. Nagy for his attitude towards collectivization of agriculture and forced deliveries of farm produce;

(xiii) In the light of the extent of foreign intervention, consideration of the Hungarian question by the United Nations was legally proper and, moreover, it was requested by a legal Government of Hungary. In the matter of human rights, Hungary has accepted specific international obligations in the Treaty of Peace. Accordingly, the Committee does not regard objections based on paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter as having validity in the present case. A massive armed intervention by one Power on the territory of another, with the avowed intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the country must, by the Soviet's own definition of aggression, be a matter of international concern.

(*United Nations, New York City, June 12, 1957*)

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY

Chairman: Mr. Alsing ANDERSEN of Denmark. He has been a member of the Danish delegation to the United Nations since 1948. He has held various ministerial posts in the Danish Government since 1935. Member of Parliament.

Members: H. E. Mr. K. C. O. SHANN (Rapporteur) of Australia. He has served as Australian Ambassador to the Philippines, Acting Head of his country's Mission to the United Nations, and in other government posts.

H. E. Mr. R. S. S. GUNEWARDENE of Ceylon. He is (1957) Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In 1952 and 1953 Mr. Gunewardene was Ceylon's Minister to Italy.

H. E. M. Mongi SLIM of Tunisia. In April 1956 he was appointed Minister of State without Portfolio, in September Ambassador to Washington, and in November became Tunisia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

H. E. Professor Enrique Rodriguez FABREGAT of Uruguay. He is the Head of the Uruguayan delegation to the General Assembly since 1947. He has represented his country on the Economic and Social and the Human Rights Commission.

WE WANT TO BE FREE!

We Hungarians feel that mankind looks to the United Nations for the answer to the burning question: do the governments, whether they represent small or large nations, have to submit to maxims based on moral principles, or may the jungle law of the stronger be permitted to reign uncurbed. The answer to this problem hinges on the case of the numerically small but spiritually great nation to which I belong . . .

It is difficult for me to tell the truth because I have to paint a realistic picture of an epic struggle written in blood: of a struggle in which the participants rose high above the measure of mortals; in which 14-year-old children rose to the heights achieved by antique heroes and 70-year-old grandmothers acted like Roman matrons. And yet my task is to relate this in a manner which will create a sense of reality.

There are memories of glorious days, followed by gloom. At first, there was the exalted joy of rapturous crowds in the smoke-filled streets; later there was the sombre calm of men determined to die, in the rubble-littered streets of the wounded city.

The Hungarian revolution proves that the fate of nations is molded by the emotions of the people. Even the creation of this great institution, the United Nations, is due to the ardent desire of millions to be able to rely on an international forum to mediate between nations and to seek just solutions on the basis of moral principles . . .

I wish to emphasize that the Hungarian revolution was not premeditated and not organized by anyone. Hungarian youth as one man strained against the Communist shackles, breaking them with the force of a volcanic eruption. In the heat of this sacred fire the Communist indoctrination melted within minutes and its glow opened the eyes of everyone. The truth was suddenly revealed and the repulsive and farcical form of Communist lies and doctrines became apparent. These young people rose as one man and in single resounding outcry rejected the Leninist-Stalinist teachings.

The very same evening hundreds of thousands of Hungarians expressed the one wish with all their hearts:

"We want to be free!"

(Mayor Josef KŐVÁGÓ, before the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, on Jan. 29, 1957)

PART FIVE

The Nagy Case

OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

BUDAPEST, Hungary, June 17. (Reuters)—Following is an unofficial translation of the text of a communiqué issued by M. T. I., Hungarian news agency, on the trial and execution of Imre Nagy and other leaders of the 1956 revolt:

Legal authorities have completed the proceedings in the case of the leading group of those persons who with active participation of the imperialists unleashed a counter-revolutionary armed revolt with the aim of overthrowing the legal order of the Hungarian People's Republic on Oct. 23, 1956.

The Chief Public Prosecutor of the Hungarian People's Republic charged in his indictment Imre Nagy and his fellow accused, Ferenc Donat, Miklos Gimes, Zoltan Tildy, Pal Maleter, Sandor Kopacsi, Jozsef Szilagyi, Ferenc Janosi and Miklos Vasarhelyi with the crime of having formed an organization aimed at overthrowing the Hungarian people's democratic state order, and in addition Imre Nagy with treason and Sandor Kopacsi and Pal Maleter with the crime of military revolt.

The Prosecutor's office ended the penal proceedings against Geza Losonczy, defendant, because he died of illness in the meantime.

The People's Courts' Council of the Supreme Court stated on the ground of the testimony of the accused, of the testimony of twenty-nine witnesses and of having investigated the wide range of documentary evidence, that Imre Nagy and his most intimate accomplices, Geza Losonczy, Ferenc Donat, Miklos Gimes and Jozsef Szilagyi, established in December, 1955, a secret anti-state organization with the aim

of seizing power by force and overthrowing the Hungarian People's Republic.

It was established during the trial of this case that Imre Nagy and his accomplices had played a leading role in the preparation and unleashing of the counter-revolutionary uprising of October, 1956. Zoltan Tildy and Pal Maleter became acquainted with the inimical aims of Imre Nagy and his companions in October, 1956, agreed with them and actively joined the counter-revolutionary revolt.

The members of the conspirators' group, at the head of the internal forces of reaction and in association with the foreign imperialists, made a putsch attempt designed to overthrow the Hungarian People's Republic.

The court established that Imre Nagy founded a small illegal group of his most intimate supporters as early as the end of 1955 with the object of seizing power by force. The illegal group conducted its hostile activity by unlawful means and also exploited lawful possibilities.

In the interests of attaining their objectives aimed at the overthrow of the people's power, the members of this group mobilized and included in their activity the enemies of all categories and ranks of the people's democratic state order.

At the same time, by hiding their real objectives and by voicing demagogic and false "socialist" slogans, they temporarily misled, and used for their objectives aimed against the state, unsuspecting people as well.

The group of conspirators, in the first place the leader of the group, Imre Nagy himself, worked out in detail the political platform of the movement against the people's democracy, intermediate tasks, methods and future objectives. These secret documents, written largely by Imre Nagy himself, were submitted by the Public Prosecutor to the court.

Imre Nagy in his document ("Morals and Ethics") worked out by him in December, 1955, called the people's democratic state order a "degenerated Bonapartist power" and incited to its overthrow by force.

In another document written in January, 1956 (entitled "Some Current Questions"), he outlined the task of forming an alliance with the forces opposing the people's democracy and set as an aim, by relinquishing the power of the workers' class, the restoration of the multi-party system.

In his pamphlet entitled "The Five Basic Principles of International Relations," also dated January, 1956, he determined as objectives of the group of adventurers, under the pretext of the "liquidation of bloc policy," the nullification

of the Warsaw Pact, the country's defense alliance, and placing the country in the hands of the imperialists.

On the basis of the evidence and confessions, the court has established that Imre Nagy had these writings duplicated and spread them in secret among his immediate accomplices and in the circle of elements they could rely on.

In the course of the trial, it was proved that the illegal organization created by Imre Nagy and his companions conducted systematic subversion aimed at overthrowing the workers' and peasants' regime and at destroying the legal order of the people's democracy and finally seizing power by force.

They included in their illegal activities Gabor Tanczlos and Balazs Nagy, who later on fled to the West, and through them they turned the Petoefi Circle into a meeting place for hostile elements and the forum for the attacks against the party and the state.

Under the pretext of arranging debates, they themselves organized the demonstrations of the Petoefi Circle against the people's democracy. They prepared beforehand many hostile speeches, among others Tibor Dery's appeal made in the so-called press debate in which he urged youth to counter-revolutionary actions. It was prepared by Geza Losonczy, Sandor Haraszti and Dery together.

Part of their method was to publish in the press inciting articles by Tibor Dery, Gyula Hay, Tamas Aczel and elements similar to them who opposed the people's republic.

In these articles, they enlarged boundlessly on certain mistakes committed in the course of building socialism and slandered the regime in an outspoken manner. The aim of all this was to undermine the regime, discredit the state's prestige and mobilize the hostile elements opposed to the people's democracy so as to use them as a basis to obtain power by force.

In September, 1956, Geza Losonczy publicly declared to Amos Elon, an Israeli newspaper man who was in Budapest: "If it comes to that we will oppose the Government by force." At an illegal meeting arranged by himself Jozsef Szilagyi said on Oct. 20, 1956: "Imre Nagy and his companions are prepared to take over the Government."

The known demonstration of Oct. 23 was initiated by Imre Nagy and his group, availing themselves of the connections they had built up in the Petoefi Circle and in the universities. Jozsef Szilagyi commissioned by Imre Nagy, at a meeting held at the Technical University on the night of Oct. 22, personally incited to demonstrations.

The demonstration of Oct. 23 was directed by the Imre Nagy group through Gabor Tanczos and his companions. At that period, the group of conspirators held secret conferences almost every day and sometimes several times a day.

On the initiative of Imre Nagy, on Oct. 19, 20, and 22, 1956, Geza Losonczy, Ferenc Donat, Miklos Gimes and other members of the conspiracy began to work out the program of the government that was to be set up.

On the morning of Oct. 23, 1956, a secret meeting was held in Geza Losonczy's flat at which Miklos Gimes, Miklos Vasarhelyi, Ferenc Janosi and Sandor Haraszti were present, led by Imre Nagy.

They worked out a government list that they wished to put in power by overthrowing the legal Hungarian Government. On this secret government list, Imre Nagy designated himself as Prime Minister while ministerial posts were distributed among the members of the conspiratorial group.

For the purpose of directly controlling an armed uprising that had taken place under cover and at the same time as the legal demonstration, the members of the conspiracy set up several special illegal centers. One of their centers, the members of which were Sandor Kopacsi, Jozsef Szilagyi, Miklos Gimes, Gyoergy Fazekas and Tamas Aczel, was organized in the main Budapest police station.

Sandor Kopacsi, breaking his pledged oath, abusing his position as Police Chief and misleading his subordinates, executed the tasks drawn up by the illegal center.

In order to arm the insurgent anti-people's democratic forces and disrupt the armed forces loyal to socialism, he gave orders to district police stations not to offer any resistance to the insurgents but on the contrary to hand over their arms and police buildings to them.

In this way, Kopacsi caused more than 20,000 firearms to be distributed among the insurgents from police stock. Close cooperation existed between this group and the subcenter brought into being on Oct. 24, 1956, and of which Geza Losonczy, Ferenc Donat and Ferenc Janosi were members.

This group directed among others the disintegrating activities that were taking place in the ranks of the army and at the same time systematically gave the military plans of the armed forces defending the People's Republic to the insurgents.

Imre Nagy and his accomplices established secret contacts and associations with the representatives of bourgeois restoration well before the October uprising and concluded an alliance with them so as to seize power by force.

In the course of this negotiations, for instance, Geza Losonczy and Sandor Haraszti personally reached agreement with Anna Kethly as early as July, 1956, and later through the intermediary of Istvan Erdei, regarding her participation in a future Imre Nagy government.

At the end of 1955 Imre Nagy decided to re-establish the so-called coalition parties and to form a government with them. When, however, he obtained the post of Prime Minister by force and deception and by relying on the counter-revolutionary forces, he went far beyond that point.

He gave permission for and made possible, contrary to the Constitution, the unrestricted creation of seventy different parties and organizations in the few days of the counter-revolution—among them such notorious bourgeois-fascist parties, prohibited under the peace treaty, as the Magyar Elet Partja (Party of Hungarian Life), Kereszteny Demokrata Part (Christian Democratic party), Magyar Neppart (Hungarian People's party), Nemzeti Tabor (National Camp), Kereszteny Front (Christian Front), Katolikus Neppart (Catholic People's party), Kereszteny Neppart (Christian People's party) and the Nyilaskeresztes Part (Hungarian Nazi party) in Gyoer.

In order to consolidate their power, the Imre Nagy group of conspirators also made an alliance with other extreme reactionary groups. The group also "rehabilitated" the lawfully and justly sentenced Jozsef Mindszenty, the former Prince Primate, and made him take a stand against the People's Republic.

After an agreement had been reached with him through Zoltan Tildy, Mindszenty proclaimed the program of capitalist restoration over the radio on Nov. 3. Imre Nagy and company also came to terms with bourgeois fascists in imperialist pay.

This was proved by the declaration made on Oct. 28, 1956, by Bela Varga, chairman of the so-called Nemzeti Bizottmany (National Committee), in which he said: "The members of the committee are in constant touch with the leaders of the Hungarian uprising."

Following this, Zoltan Tildy came to an agreement by telephone with Ferenc Nagy, who had arrived in Vienna to back the counter-revolution, to the effect that the emigrés would support the government of Imre Nagy.

In the course of his activity as Premier, Imre Nagy broke his oath by excluding from the leadership the country's Constitutional directing organs—the National Assembly, the Pres-

idential Council and the Government—and set up unlawfully a so-called Cabinet as his own government organ.

He also constituted this Cabinet at the time in such a way that the reactionary forces were in the majority, although as an act of deception he also included persons loyal to socialism.

On Nov. 2, however, he reorganized this Cabinet, making room in it for further determined, extremist representatives of bourgeois restoration and for leaders of the counter-revolutionary uprising.

At that time, apart from Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy and Zoltan Tildy, there were among others as members of the Government Anna Kethly, Istvan B. Szabo and Istvan Bibo as well as Pal Maleter, commander of the armed counter-revolutionary rebels in the capacity of Minister of National Defense.

After having disrupted or rather set aside the central authority of the People's Republic, Imre Nagy undertook the destruction of the local authorities. The legal organs of administration, the councils and economic organs of administration, were abolished and their places taken by so-called Revolutionary Committees, the majority of which consisted of bourgeois and Fascists, and Workers' Councils intended to mislead the workers.

The treacherous and subversive activities of Imre Nagy and his accomplices and finally the cease-fire order they had passed by force, paralyzed the armed forces that defended the People's Republic. Simultaneously, they organized, supplied with arms and finally legalized the counter-revolution-army forces in revolt.

War criminals and anti-democratic offenders, convicts released from prison, the enemies of all categories and ranks of the People's Democracy were rallied in the so-called National Guard. When this had been done, the white terror started to rage in Budapest and throughout the country.

According to data uncovered so far, 234 citizens were assassinated. During the same period, 3,000 progressive persons, loyal to the system of the people's democracy, were imprisoned and their execution was planned in the immediate future.

In addition, up to Nov. 4, death lists were compiled of more than 10,000 people and preparations were made for their massacre.

At the same time as they rallied around them the reactionary, counter-revolutionary forces of the country, Imre Nagy and his accomplices established widespread connec-

tions and cooperation with different circles of the imperialists, their organs and representatives.

A member of the group of conspirators, Laszlo Kardos, was in contact with Cape [apparently a mistaken version of the name of the former first secretary of the British Legation in Budapest, Cope], a former official of the British Legation of Budapest through whom Imre Nagy's anti-state political writings were funneled out to the West.

Through Pal Maleter, they were in contact with Cowley, the British military attaché, who took a direct part in the military direction of the uprising.

Through Losonczy, they made contact and established relations with Prince Leowenstein, a delegate sent to our country by the West German imperialists. In accordance with the negotiations, Prince Loewenstein promised the support of the West German big capitalists to the counter-revolutionary rebels in a speech broadcast by Radio Kossuth.

Simultaneously, certain imperialist circles led by the American imperialists had for years adjusted their entire propaganda machinery and intelligence service for the purpose of granting support to the Hungarian representatives of the counter-revolutionary trend called "national communism" to the Imre Nagy group.

The American Intelligence Organization called "University of Strasbourg" worked out the program of the counter-revolutionary uprising in September, 1956, and this program was then spread illegally within the country.

In the days of the counter-revolution, noteworthy quantities of small arms were smuggled into the country among Red Cross gifts. At the same time, the imperialist press and radio started a propaganda campaign in favor of Imre Nagy.

They emphasized that, as regards the Western powers, it was more advantageous if the dismemberment of Hungary from the socialist camp was carried out by a group that "was called Communist."

The notorious Radio Free Europe made propaganda for the counter-revolutionary uprising via its Hungarian broadcast and its well-known balloon operation.

After the outbreak of the counter-revolutionary uprising, Radio Free Europe offered assistance and direction by giving military instructions. These instructions were carried out by the group of conspirators.

To realize their objectives and also to make the road entirely free for an imperialist intervention, Imre Nagy and his treacherous group attempted to repudiate the defense or-

ganization of the country, the Warsaw agreement, illegally and unilaterally.

This attempt was crowned by Imre Nagy's radio appeal of Nov. 4, 1956, in which he appealed for the open and armed intervention of the Western imperialists against the revolutionary worker-peasant government and the Soviet troops whose assistance was requested by it.

After the defeat of the counter-revolutionary armed uprising, some groups of conspirators of the type of Imre Nagy sought refuge where support had previously been granted them. Among those who had taken part in the coup, Bela Kiraly, Anna Kethly, Joseph Kovago and others escaped to the West to avoid being called to account.

Hungarian authorities knew that Jozsef Mindszenty went into hiding in the American Legation. Istvan B. Szabo tried to seek refuge in the British Legation in Budapest. The group of Imre Nagy, which had earlier fought under the black flag of "national communism," escaped to the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest.

It is characteristic of the conspirators' infamy that they continued their counter-revolutionary activities in the same way even when, under the direction of the revolutionary worker-peasant government, the Hungarian People's Republic began to restore legal order, to insure peaceful existence for the people and to repair the serious losses caused by the counter-revolution.

Anna Kethly, Bela Kiraly, Jozsef Kovago and their associates sent their instructions from the West and Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy and others issued instructions from the building of the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest to continue armed resistance, to organize strikes, to paralyze life and reorganize underground subversion.

Thus Nagy and Losonczy got in touch with the "Central Workers' Council of Budapest," with Radio Free Europe, and even caused a new illegal paper to be published under the name "Oktober Huszonharmadika" (Oct. 23), through Miklos Gimes and other accomplices from the building of the Yugoslav Embassy.

All this has been proved by irrefutable evidence in the course of subsequent investigations and at the present trial.

Legal proceedings have also proved that in accordance with their previous revisionist, bourgeois-nationalist political attitude, Imre Nagy and his associates inevitably went to the length of entering into an alliance with the most reactionary, imperialist forces of the bourgeoisie and of betraying the regime of the workers, the people's democratic order, the

working peoples of Hungary and the socialist fatherland.

At the trial, the defendants Ferenc Donat, Miklos Gimes, Zoltan Tildy, Sandor Kopacsi, Ferenc Janosi and Miklos Vasarhelyi showed repentance and pleaded guilty.

Imre Nagy, Jozsef Szilagyi and Pal Maleter denied their guilt but were unmasked as a result of the incriminating evidence given by the witnesses and the accomplices and material proof, and made partial confessions concerning the facts of their crimes.

Weighing the serious nature of the crimes, the aggravating and extenuating circumstances, the People's Courts' Council of the Supreme Court, on the basis of the trial, declared the defendants guilty.

Therefore, Imre Nagy was sentenced to death, Ferenc Donat to twelve years' imprisonment, Miklos Gimes to death, Zoltan Tildy to six years' imprisonment, Pal Maleter to death, Sandor Kopacsi to life imprisonment, Jozsef Szilagyi to death, Ferenc Janosi to eight years' imprisonment, and Miklos Vasarhelyi to five years' imprisonment.

The sentences are final. The death sentences have been executed.

LEGAL OBSERVATIONS

According to a communiqué of the Hungarian Minister of Justice, translation of which was reported by *Reuters* on June 17, 1958, Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, Miklos Gimes, Jozsef Szilagyi, Ferenc Donath, Zoltan Tildy, Sandor Kopacsi, Ferenc Janosi, and Miklos Vasarhelyi were tried, found guilty and sentenced by the People's Courts' Council of the Supreme Court of the Hungarian People's Republic for various offenses.

The information given by the communiqué is rather meager for a complete legal analysis; nevertheless certain legal points may be established. The legal aspects of the case with which this analysis is concerned are the following: 1. The responsibility of the members of the Council of Ministers under Hungarian law; 2. Asylum and safe-conduct obligations; 3. The Court and questions of procedure; and 4. Charges.

1. Responsibility of Members of the Council of Ministers Under Hungarian Law

The 1949 Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic provides:

> Art. 27. (1) The Council of Ministers is responsible for its activities to Parliament and must render regular accounts of its work to that body.
>
> (2) The Chairman of the Council of Ministers (or his Deputy) and its members are individually responsible for their actions and conduct. A special law regulates the implementation of this responsibility.
>
> (3) Any member of the Parliament may put to the Council of Ministers, its Chairman or members, questions relating to any matter within the competence of the persons named and such questions must be answered by them in the House of Parliament.

At the time of the enactment of the 1949 Constitution the law in force regulating the responsibility of the Chairman (henceforth Prime Minister) and the Ministers was Law No. III of 1848. Up to the present day (July 1, 1958) this law has not been repealed, nor has it been superseded by any law enacted after 1949.

According to Law No. III of 1848 Ministers may be made responsible for their acts and orders issued in their official capacity, if such are detrimental to the independence of the country or violate constitutional provisions, existing laws, the freedom of individuals or the sacredness of property; for the embezzlement or illegal use of funds entrusted to them; for failure to enforce the laws and uphold good order and bravery [Sec. 32]. The right of impeachment belongs to the lower house, and the right of adjudication to the upper house of Parliament [Sec. 33].

Imre Nagy and his cabinet, including the post-revolutionary Prime Minister and the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, Janos Kadar, were constitutionally elected by the Presidium of the People's Republic. This was subsequently recognized by the Kadar government as well as by the government of the USSR which conducted negotiations with the

Nagy government. It is another evidence of recognition that Nagy's dismissal was published by the Kadar government officially in the most ordinary manner in the official gazette *(Magyar Közlöny)* on November 12, 1956.

Consequently, Imre Nagy and his co-defendants of cabinet rank, Pal Maleter and Zoltan Tildy, being under the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the Parliament for their acts while in office, could have been held responsible legally only by the Parliament and not by any court.

According to the communiqué issued by the Minister of Justice on June 17, 1958, Nagy and his co-defendants were charged with various acts ranging in time from December 1955 to November 4, 1956. In regard to the applicability of ministerial responsibility under Law No. III of 1848, this time-span is divided into two periods: first, from December 1955 until October 23, 1956, while Nagy and his co-defendants of cabinet rank were not in office, and second, from October 24 until November 4, 1956, while they were in office.

Ministerial responsibility extends ordinarily only to acts committed while in office. However, when a cabinet member is made responsible for a continuing offense, or a set of continuing acts, which was commenced prior to his appointment to office, and was continued, and in some instances even completed, while he was in office, he owes responsibility only to Parliament.

The reason for this may be found in two legal principles: first, under Hungarian criminal law a continuing act, or set of continuing acts, must always be adjudicated as a single act [Royal Curia, No. K. 4128/1928, B. XXI. 71; No. K. 5315/1935, Bj. LXXXVIII. 90; No. K. 424/120, Bj. LXXII. 204.]; and second, special law always prevails over general law.

From these two legal principles it follows that the special law *(i.e.,* on the responsibility of cabinet members) applies to the acts of Imre Nagy and his co-defendants of cabinet rank, no matter when they were commenced, because the acts they were charged with were completed while they were in office.

2. Asylum and Safe Conduct Obligations

After the Soviet mass attack on November 4, 1956, Nagy sought and was granted asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. On November 22 Nagy left the Yugoslav Embassy under the agreement between the Yugoslav Embassy and the Hungarian government containing the "assurance that he would not be molested." When he left the Embassy he was captured by Russian military authorities and, according to some reports, abducted to Romania.

The Yugoslav government, according to a Belgrade report of *The New York Times* on November 24, 1956, protested this breach of agreement concerning the safe conduct of Imre Nagy and his entourage on the part of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic, but apparently without effect. On an unknown date the Hungarian government must have regained custody of Imre Nagy because, according to the communiqué of the Minister of Justice, he was tried, sentenced by a Hungarian court and executed. If Nagy left the Yugoslav Embassy under the promise of safe conduct by the Hungarian government and fell immediately into the power of Russian military authorities, the obligation of the Hungarian government was automatically restored as soon as it regained the custody of Imre Nagy no matter how, or how long, it was interrupted by Soviet military interference. The fact that the Soviet military authorities interfered with the safe conduct promised by the Hungarian government did not abolish, but only suspended, the obligation of the Hungarian government under the agreement.

This problem raises two legal questions: (1) Does the Communist government of Hungary recognize in general the principle of asylum? (2) On what authority did the Russian military authorities arrest and abduct Imre Nagy?

The 1949 Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic does recognize the principle of asylum; Article 58 provides:

(2) Foreign citizens, persecuted for their democratic attitude or their activities in the interest of the liberation of the people, enjoy the right of asylum in the Hungarian People's Republic.

Under a long-standing international custom it appears to be impossible for a country, which under its own laws grants asylum to foreign citizens, to deny such rights to another country concerning its own citizens.

Furthermore, the Hungarian government by granting, after diplomatic negotiations with the Yugoslav government, safe conduct to Nagy and his entourage for leaving their asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy, have at least *de facto* recognized this extension of the asylum right. Therefore, when the Hungarian government put Nagy and his co-defendants, who were granted safe conduct in agreement with the Yugoslav government, to trial for activities covered by the safe conduct agreement, they acted in bad faith in breaking the agreement.

The question as to what authority the Russian military authorities possessed to arrest and abduct Nagy and his associates must be answered in the negative. The Russian military authorities had no such right.

Under the Peace Treaty concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary in Paris in 1947, Soviet military troops had to leave Hungary within ninety days following the ratification of the treaty, except such troops as were necessary to secure communication lines to Austria [Art. 22]. *The New York Times* reported on January 4, 1948 that, according to an official USSR report, all Soviet troops had left Hungary except those retained to secure these lines of communication. In other words, the occupation of Hungary ended on January 4, 1948.

On May 15, 1955 the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria signed a State Treaty under which the Forces of Allied and Associated Powers were to be withdrawn from Austria no later than December 31, 1955. At that time the Soviet troops withdrew from Austria; this meant that they were obligated to withdraw also

from Hungary because the necessity for lines of communication to Austria had ceased.

However, on May 14, 1955 Hungary, together with other so-called satellite countries, signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the USSR in Warsaw which went into force on June 5, 1955. Under this Treaty the signatory powers established a joint command in a separate agreement which provided that:

> The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will be effected by agreement among the states in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defense. *(Supplement to the American Journal of International Law.* Vol. 49. 1955. pp. 194-199.)

This was the agreement under which Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary at the time of the October 23, 1956 revolution.

It is quite obvious that the open purpose of Soviet troops for staying in Hungary was "mutual defense" against attacks from without; therefore, no logical necessity appears for their authorization to interfere in Hungary's domestic affairs. Such authorization cannot be found in a Hungarian statute.

However, the governments of Hungary and the USSR concluded an agreement relating to the status of USSR troops temporarily sojourning within Hungary. The agreement was an outcome of the Warsaw Pact (Preamble) and among other matters provided that:

> Art. 1. The temporary sojourn of Soviet troops within the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic shall in no way infringe the sovereignty of Hungary; the Soviet troops will not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Since Soviet troops were in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Pact before the above agreement was concluded, there is no reason for supposing that their status was different prior to the conclusion of the agreement than it is under it.

Therefore, it may reasonably be inferred that the Soviet military authorities had no right whatsoever to arrest a Hungarian citizen on Hungarian soil.

3. The Court and Questions of Procedure

The court in which Imre Nagy and his co-defendants' cases were tried, was, according to the communiqué of the Minister of Justice, the People's Courts' Council of the Supreme Court. This court was established, as a perpetuation of the martial law and summary procedure introduced after the defeat of the revolution, as a court of original jurisdiction by Edict No. 25 of 1957 on April 6, 1957. According to the new consolidated statute on people's courts [Edict No. 34 of 1957] the People's Courts' Council of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over any crime provided that the prosecutor brings the charges in that court or the President of the Supreme Court assigns the case to the People's Courts' Council [Sec. 2].

Besides the fact that no court had criminal jurisdiction over Imre Nagy and his co-defendants of cabinet rank, this particular court was established subsequent to the commission of the acts charged against the defendants. In an ordinary case this *ex facto* establishment would not disqualify a court but in this particular case doubts may be raised in regard to the court's jurisdiction because its martial and summary character has a very definite substantive bearing on the rule of law as realized in such a court. It is felt that giving jurisdiction to a people's court, a court of political character *par excellence,* over offenses which at the time of the perpetration belonged to the jurisdiction of a court of law, realizes to its fullest extent the illegal effects of retroactivity.

It has been reported by the newspapers but not mentioned in the communiqué of the Minister of Justice that the trial was held in secret. Hungarian law has no provisions permitting secret trials. All cases must be tried under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Law No. III of 1951, as amended by Law No. V of 1954 and Edict No. 8 of 1957] which expressly

provides that trials shall be public. There are only two exceptions to this rule. One is that the court may order a closed session when such appears necessary for the preservation of state, military and official secrets or for moral reasons. This provision appears to be the usual one to be found in every code of criminal procedure.

But a much broader power is given in Sec. 23/A (3), which provides that the Military Division of the Supreme Court must, on the motion of the prosecutor, conduct a closed trial if the interests of the state so require. However, this rule applies to the Military Division alone while the Nagy case was tried by the People's Courts' Council of the Supreme Court.

The fact that the communiqué of the Minister of Justice failed to indicate when, where and under what circumstances the trial took place, and that it remained silent on the presence of defense, indicates that the trial may have been held in secret. If this was the case, the trial was illegal.

4. Charges

The communiqué of the Minister of Justice dated June 17, 1958 released the information that Imre Nagy *et al.* were charged with

> having formed an organization aimed at overthrowing the Hungarian people's democratic state order.

Furthermore, it stated that Imre Nagy was also charged with "treason," and Pal Maleter with "military revolt."

The communiqué failed to make any reference to laws applied in the case. (This appears to be highly unusual on the part of the chief legal officer of a country, and may indicate the extra-legal character of the whole proceedings.)

However, the wording of the communiqué points clearly to Law No. VII of 1946, Sec. 1, as incorporated in Chapter 1, Point 1 of the Official Compilation of Substantive Criminal Statutes in Force *(Hatálayos anyagi büntetöjogi szabályok hivatalos összeállítása),* which reads:

(1) Whoever commits an act, initiates, leads or lends substantial material aid to a movement or organization aimed at the overthrow of the people's democratic state order or the people's republic as defined in the Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic, shall be punished for a crime.

(2) It shall also be a crime to participate actively in, or promote a movement or organization defined in Section 1, Paragraph (1).

Treason is defined in Law No. III of 1930, Sec. 58 (BHO-35) as follows:

(1) Whoever allies or places himself in contact with the government of a foreign power or a foreign organization with the intent to induce same to commit an inimical act against Hungary, as well as seeking to induce a foreign power to wage a war or commit an act of violence against Hungary, commits the crime of treason and shall be punished with imprisonment for from ten to fifteen years.

Military revolt is defined in Law No. XLII of 1948, Sec. 29, as follows:

It is a revolt when soldiers openly set themselves in groups against the military discipline.

All three of these crimes may be punished by death [Law No. VII of 1946, Sec. 10; Law No. III of 1930, Sec. 58 (3); and Law No. LXII of 1948, Sec. 30 (2)].

The communiqué offered a long story about the activities of the defendants which are presumably the "facts of the case" but failed to state in what way these alleged acts of the defendants constituted punishable offenses. It is true that the text of Law No. VII of 1946, Sec. 1 is so indefinite, and therefore broad in scope, that any act may be brought under it at will. However, before attempting to scrutinize these acts in the light of statutory provisions, attention must be directed to the nature of the text of this statute as it appears in the Compilation.

In the text of the Compilation the following words appear: "... the people's democratic state order or the people's democratic republic as defined in the Consti-

tution of the Hungarian People's Republic," whereas the original text of the law reads: "... the democratic state order or the democratic republic as defined in Law No. 1 of 1946."

The legality of this change in the text of the law must be challenged on the following grounds.

On August 1, 1952, the Hungarian Ministry of Justice compiled all statutory provisions relating to substantive criminal law, except for those relating to petty offenses not within the jurisdiction of the courts, effective on the same day, and published them in a volume entitled "Official Compilation of Substantive Criminal Statutes in Force" (*A hatályos anyagi büntetőjogi szabályok hivatalos összeállítása).* Thenceforth the text of the Compilation was declared by the Minister of Justice to be the authoritative text of the statutes included, and was accepted as such by the courts. Nevertheless, the authority of the Compilation is uncertain because it was neither a legislative act nor a governmental decree based on a constitutional provision nor issued under the special authorization of the legislature. Under the Constitution the regulatory power of the Minister of Justice does not extend to changing laws enacted by the Parliament. It seems, therefore, that the Compilation is not a *sui generis* source of law but that its authority is derived from the specific authority of the various statutory provisions embraced. Hence, the text of the Compilation ought to be a verbatim reproduction of the statutory provisions. But this is not the case. One instance in point is the text of the law applied in the case of Imre Nagy *et al.*

In footnote No. 2 to the text of Chapter 1, Point 1 of the Compilation [1958 ed., p. 55] the following is stated:

> In the original text of the law appear the words: 'the democratic state order or the democratic republic as defined in Law No. I of 1946.' According to the report of the Parliament's political, constitutional and legal committees, made from their joint session on August 12, 1949: 'the penal provisions of Law No. VII of 1946 on the protection of the Hungarian republic shall henceforth

apply as provisions for the criminal protection of the Hungarian People's Republic' (Records, No. 26).

No legislative action has ever been taken on this committee report and, consequently, the Minister of Justice had no authority to change the text of the law in order to adapt it to a situation prevailing at the time of the publication of the Compilation. Law No. VII of 1946, enacted for the protection of the state order and of the republic, as defined in Law No. I of 1946 (the Constitution adopted when the Communists were in a negligible minority in the Parliament), remains formally effective. This is true despite the fact that the particular state order and the republic which it was supposed to protect were abolished by the 1949 Constitution. This, however, does not make it permissible to identify the "people's democratic state order" with "democratic state order," especially since the two concepts are diametrically opposed; therefore, such treatment cannot be considered a mere interpretation.

This change made in the text of the law constitutes a rather drastic distortion of legislative intent by limiting the application of the provisions to a definite regime, that is, to the "people's democracy," whereas originally it was obviously intended for the protection of a sovereign and democratic state in the widest possible sense of the words, and not for the protection of Hungary as a Soviet Russian satellite.

Thus it may be concluded that if Law No. VII of 1946 is in force at all, it is in force in its original text, which in turn means that it protects the interests of a sovereign Hungary as a state and not that of a political party subordinated to foreign interests.

The communiqué of the Minister of Justice charged Imre Nagy *et al.* with an act which only the above-quoted three statutory provisions could possibly apply. But it failed to show that the alleged acts formed punishable offenses. The charges against the defendants may be divided into two distinct categories. The first category consists of acts which, if proven, might have constituted criminal offenses. However, the communiqué failed to show evidence that they were committed.

The other category consists of acts which definitely do not come under any provision of criminal law.

The following may fall within the first category:

> [Nagy] established an anti-state organization with the aim of seizing power by force.

The communiqué made the above blunt statement but failed to identify the organization by name, or description, members, particular methods, time and territory of operation, direct influence on, and casual connection with events detrimental to interests protected by criminal law.

The statement that

> ... the court established that Nagy played a leading role in the preparation and unleashing of the counterrevolutionary uprising ...

falls within the same category. The communiqué failed to show why it considered the revolution a "counterrevolution," and if it was a counterrevolution why it constituted a punishable act. At this point it must be mentioned that in Hungary, contrary to the situation in Soviet Russia, no concept of counterrevolutionary crime is known in criminal law.

The communiqué also stated that

> ... members of conspirators' groups ... in association with foreign imperialists, made a *putsch* attempt designed to overthrow the People's Republic.

But it failed to identify the conspirators, the imperialist power, the *putsch* attempt, and to show that if a conspiracy existed at all, why and in what way it was directed at the overthrow of the People's Republic. Whether Nagy conspired or not prior to taking office is wholly irrelevant at this point because he was subsequently duly elected Prime Minister of the People's Republic; and it has not been shown that he made any attempt to abolish or succeeded in abolishing the People's Republic while in office, unless the sovereign acts of Hungary through duly elected representatives merely to alter the relationship between Hungary and the USSR were activities considered aimed at the overthrow of the People's Republic.

The communiqué contains the following startling statement:

> The illegal group conducted its hostile activities by unlawful means and also exploited lawful possibilities.

Nowhere in the communiqué is it stated which activities are qualified as unlawful means and which as lawful possibilities, obviously because the court considered the latter also punishable.

The communiqué mentions a whole series of acts as grounds for the criminal prosecution and conviction of Imre Nagy and his co-defendants, none of which constitutes a criminal offense at all; some are rights guaranteed in the 1949 Constitution. These acts constitute the above-mentioned second category. Nagy was charged with

> . . . having worked out in detail the political platform against the people's democracy.

The most careful research failed to discover, in the Hungarian law books, any prohibition against working out and presenting a platform aimed at changing or abandoning the people's democracy. Such a change is prohibited only if it is accomplished through violence.

The communiqué ascribed to Imre Nagy as criminal activities certain of his literary works, both published and unpublished,

> criticizing the people's democracy.

Not only is such activity not prohibited by law but it is expressly guaranteed in the 1949 Constitution [Art. 55, freedom of speech, press, and assembly].

It was also charged that

> . . . in his [Nagy's] pamphlet, 'The Five Basic Principles of International Relations,' he determined the objectives of the group of adventurers under the pretext [of] liquidation of bloc policy and the nullification of the Warsaw Pact.

There is no statutory prohibition against advancing one's thoughts about international relations.

Imre Nagy was also charged with having

> . . . decided to re-establish the so-called coalition parties and to form a government with them. . . . He gave permission for and made possible, contrary to the Constitution, the unrestricted creation of seventy different parties and organizations.

The Constitution has no provisions prohibiting the formation of political parties or organizations. On the contrary, the Constitution guarantees the right of organization [Art. 56]. The fact is that beside the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party two other political parties, the Smallholders' and the Peasant Party, existed on the eve of the revolution, both of which had been represented in the Parliament as well as in the government. *E.g.,* Istvan Dobi, the Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Republic, was himself a member of the Smallholders' Party.

Imre Nagy was also accused of having reorganized his government and taken in elements which at the time of his trial were not approved by the regime. The most painstaking research failed to locate any statutory provision prohibiting the Prime Minister from reorganizing his government.

These are the highlights of the communiqué relating to the "facts of the case" upon which the conviction was based. It is no wonder that the Minister of Justice omitted in the communiqué all references to statutes and laws. It simply could not refer to any statute because the acts with which Imre Nagy and his co-defendants were charged do not constitute criminal offenses.

The statement of "facts" in the communiqué of the Minister of Justice ends as follows:

> Legal proceedings have also proved that in accordance with their previous revisionist, bourgeois-nationalist political attitude, Imre Nagy and his associates inevitably went to the length of entering into an alliance with the most reactionary, imperialist forces of the bourgeoisie and of betraying the regime of the workers, the people's democratic order, the working people of Hungary, and the socialist fatherland.

This statement also fails to indicate any act which would constitute a criminal offense under the Hungarian Communist criminal law.

WORLD REACTION TO THE EXECUTIONS

The announcement of the executions of Premier Imre Nagy, General Maleter and two of their associates caused world-wide protests of unprecedented magnitude. Statesmen, governments, parliaments, leading individuals and organizations expressed their indignation. From Bombay to Copenhagen, from Tokyo to Montevideo, from Iceland to Istanbul came the news of protest meetings and demonstrations denouncing the Soviet action. Commentators analyzed the execution of the Hungarian leaders for its bearing on the position of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Eastern Europe as a whole, as well as on the global problem of East-West relations. Here are a few statements and editorial comments:

White House

The following remarks concerning the execution of Imre Nagy and General Maleter were made by President Eisenhower at his news conference on June 18, 1958:

"I cannot think of any incident that could have and has more shocked the civilized world. These two men were not guilty of evil doing. They were fighting for their own country, to eliminate or reduce the domination by force of their country on the part of the Soviets. Good faith was violated in their execution, the story of which has just come to our attention in this country.

"It is clear evidence that the intent of the Soviets is to pursue their own policies of terror and intimidation in any way they choose, to bring about complete subservience to their will.

"I think there is no incident that should have more alerted the free world to the lack of confidence that we are compelled to feel in the words and actions of these Communist imperialists."

New Delhi

Prime Minister Nehru's statement at his press conference in New Delhi, on July 3, 1958:

"... Mr. Nehru recalled that the other day he had expressed his 'deep distress' over the Hungarian executions. 'I was greatly worried in addition to that by the consequences that might come; by consequences I mean increase in tension. It is obvious that this has resulted in pas-

sionate feeling, increase in tension, charges and countercharges, so that in effect it has taken us back from that movement which was going towards—you might say—a lessening of tension. I think it has been very unfortunate.... One of the things about this matter is that the question has arisen in my mind how far the *Panchseel* (the Five Principles) is being acted upon by the people who talk about it." (*Indiagram,* Information Service of India, Washington, D.C., July 7, 1958)

"Questioned at the airport on his return from holiday about the Hungarian executions, Mr. Nehru promptly described the news as 'most distressing both in itself and in its possible consequences.' It is indeed difficult to suppose that any but communists would take a different view. In India the executioners' behavior has already been denounced by the PSP (Praja Socialist Party) and the Jana Sangh (Hindu Party), as well as by virtually the entire press and many individuals. Abroad, condemnation has been equally scathing. Notice has been very properly taken of the matter by the UN Special Committee on Hungary; the horror expressed by statesmen and other commentators has been supplemented by more than one outburst of popular indignation. But the really important part of Mr. Nehru's comment is the second. Nothing will now bring Mr. Nagy or General Maleter back to life, or excuse the brutal and treacherous manner in which they were done to death. But will the affair have more results, by poisoning the international atmosphere for the future? The chances are only too evident that it will." (*The Statesman,* New Delhi, July 17, 1958)

London

Britain's Foreign Office commented as follows on the execution of Premier Nagy and General Maleter, on June 24, 1958:

"Mr. Nagy was the legally appointed head of the Government which tried to make Hungary free and independent. General Maleter was a soldier who fought bravely for the same end. They were defeated by foreign intervention.

"Mr. Nagy was arrested despite the fact that he had been given a safe conduct by the Kadar regime imposed on Hungary by the Soviet Army. General Maleter was arrested whilst negotiating at the invitation of the Soviet

military command, for the evacuation of Soviet forces from Hungary.

"Both have been tried and executed in secret without being given any chance to state their case either to their own countrymen or to the rest of the world. They, and those who fought with them, deserve the respect of all mankind."

Belgrade

From the text of the Yugoslav Government's note to the Hungarian Government on June 24, 1958:

"...The Yugoslav Government, and our people, have received the sudden news about the secret trial and execution of Imre Nagy with profound indignation. The assertions of an alleged activity by the persons mentioned after their arrival in the Yugoslav embassy building are untrue, and are fabricated from beginning to end.... Judging by the staged accusations against Yugoslavia, and by the circumstances under which the trial was held, there is justified doubt in the accuracy of the other material evidence as well, certainly in all that is directly or indirectly imputed to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government stresses this finding all the more resolutely, as there have also been similar trials in the past, such as the trial of Rajk, in which Yugoslavia was accused. Allegations were at that time also made that reliable evidence was available on Yugoslavia's guilt and interference, and then later, when much innocent blood was shed, it was established that this evidence, along with the explicit admission of responsible Hungarian men, was invented." *(TANYUG,* wire service, Belgrade, June 24, 1958)

Washington

Statement of the U.S. Department of State on June 17, 1958:

"The execution of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter and other Hungarian patriots, first publicly announced last night by Radio Moscow, can only be regarded by the civilized world as a shocking act of cruelty. The preparation of this act, beginning with the Soviet abduction of Imre Nagy from the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest in violation of assurances of safe conduct pledged by the Soviet puppet, Kadar, was by stealth and secrecy. It fol-

lows, significantly, on Mr. Khrushchev's April visit to Budapest. It has also come at a time when the Soviet Union has been attempting to persuade the world that international discussion of the plight of Hungary and Eastern Europe generally should not take place because it would constitute unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of these countries.

"The Soviet Union, which has pursued a policy of terror toward the peoples of Hungary and of the other dominated countries of Eastern Europe for over 12 years, must bear fundamental responsibility for this latest crime against the Hungarian people and all humanity. The murder of these two Hungarian leaders, who chose to serve the interests of their nation rather than those of Soviet Communism, brings to a tragic culmination the Soviet-Communist betrayal of the Hungarian people. It is the executioners of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter, and not the executed patriots, who have committed treason against the Hungarian nation. By this act the Soviet Union and the Soviet-imposed regime in Hungary have once more violated every principle of decency and must stand in judgment before the conscience of mankind."

PARIS

The French Government issued the following statement on June 18, 1958:

"The execution of Imre Nagy and General Pal Maleter and their companions is an act that nothing could justify.

"The secrecy of the trial, the pretense of juridical justification grossly contrary to the facts recognized by a large majority of the member states of the United Nations, mark a return to the worst Stalinist methods, which had been condemned by the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the people's democracies themselves.

"Imre Nagy and his companions have been executed for having tried to give their country a regime in which the people would have had the right to express itself and for having chosen national independence.

"The French Government considers that the execution of these courageous and independent men is an event of extreme gravity whose consequences will be profound."

NEW YORK

We, the undersigned, who held responsible positions in our country during the Hungarian Revolution are able

to give an account of the events on the basis of personal experience. We consider it our duty, therefore, to point out the material distortions of the official communiqué issued in connection with the execution of Imre Nagy and his associates.

The communiqué mentioned our names as having allegedly sent instructions from the West to Imre Nagy, Géza Losonczy and others who were in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. The Communiqué declares:

> ... Béla Király, Jozsef Kövágo and their associates sent their instructions from the West and Imre Nagy, Géza Losonczy and others issued instructions from the building of the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest to continue armed resistance, to organize strikes, to paralyze life and reorganize underground subversion.

The fact, however, is that Imre Nagy and his associates sought asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest on November 4, 1956, and remained there until November 23, 1956. As Mr. Jozsef Kövágo remained in Hungary until November 30, 1956, and Major General Béla Király stayed until November 17, 1956, we were unable to send instructions to them from the West.

After the second Soviet attack on Hungary on November 4, 1956, strong Soviet military units surrounded the Yugoslav Embassy and kept it under permanent observance and check; thus, we had no opportunity, although being in the city, to contact the legal Prime Minister of Hungary. *(June 19, 1958)*

JOSEPH KŐVÁGO,
Former Mayor of Budapest.

MAJOR GENERAL BÉLA KIRÁLY,
Former Commander
of the Hungarian National Guard.

CALCUTTA

"... The capital from which the announcement came is among the most powerful. What fears had it from (such a) prisoner as Imre Nagy? And yet fear is what makes men kill—and Imre Nagy has been killed. Did he then perchance symbolize something that the mighty Kremlin was afraid of? What could it be? Will the masters of the Kremlin be able to go to sleep in peace? It may be doubted. Men die; ideas do not." *(The Hindustan Times,* Calcutta, India, June 18, 1958)

"... the Hungarian authorities assert that these men (Imre Nagy and his associates) engaged in counter-revolutionary activities while they enjoyed asylum in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. These fabricated assertions, similar to those used in Stalin's time, are made seemingly to justify the execution of Nagy and the other men, as well as the calculated sharpening of the campaign against socialist Yugoslavia. This step, which sharply recalls the Stalinist show-down method, has aroused a considerable reaction throughout the world.... The press, and also many responsible statesmen, consider this action is a great hindrance to the rapprochement of the views of the East and West, and that it considerably damaged the fertile outcome of the talks which through diplomatic channels have being going on between the USSR and the three Western capitals." (Radio Belgrade, in English, June 21, 1958)

"... The execution of Imre Nagy and his comrades is one of the new moves for checking the further development of socialism. It is clear that this act. which agitated the progressive world opinion, is heavily affecting all conscious fighters for socialism." (*Borba,* Belgrade, June 23, 1958)

"... This sinister trial and execution is strongly reminiscent of the trial of Rajk. Just as that trial, the present trial of Nagy at a secret session of the court of which nothing is known, was to supply the alleged proofs about 'Yugoslav cooperation with the imperialists' and about Yugoslavia's allegedly supporting Nagy in the struggle for the 'overthrow of socialism in Hungary.' These absurd slanders against Yugoslavia need not be denied as they are false and the whole world takes them as such. . . . Nagy's execution was needed by some people as an element of aggravation of relations with Yugoslavia, and even more as a terrible warning to those who would resist the present resuscitation of Stalinist policy." (*Politika,* Belgrade, June 23, 1958)

"... The execution of Imre Nagy and comrades is not only an act which deserves general condemnation, but also constitutes an irreparable violation of an agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Hungarian Government, and is the cause of fresh straining of relations in the world. It is obvious that such acts weaken the enormous efforts which all progressive forces in the world

are investing to diminish tension and to strengthen peace." (From the speech of Yugoslavia's delegate at the International Labor Organization conference, Geneva. *TANYUG,* Belgrade, June 26, 1958)

Stockholm

"... Imre Nagy, General Pal Maleter and two other Hungarian resistance men have now paid with their lives for their dreams of freedom and democracy for the suppressed Hungarian people. The epilogue to the Hungarian tragedy of October 1956 was according to form: secret police, secret court proceeding, and death sentences which were kept secret until they had been carried out." (*Aftonbladet,* Stockholm, June 18, 1958)

Tokyo

"We were greatly shocked at the report that Hungary's former Premier Nagy, former Defense Minister Maleter and others had been executed.

"... Examples are numerous in which nationalistic Communists, such as former Foreign Minister Rajk of Hungary and former deputy-Premier Kostov of Bulgaria, were executed by Russia. Therefore, the execution of Nagy and his party is no wonder. However, we consider it different from the past cases that such execution took place in utter disregard of an international pledge.

"Russia has proposed to hold a summit conference for easing international tensions. This is a fine thing. An international conference is meaningless unless the promises made are fulfilled. Apart from this, we give attention to the fact that, while the western side is insisting on taking up the situation in East Europe as a matter for discussion in the proposed summit conference, Russia is vehemently opposing it on the ground of hampering the holding of the conference.... What Russia means is perhaps that peace should be secured on the basis of an approval of the *status quo.* We also admit that it is sometimes necessary to accept realities as they are in order to iron out differences. However, the *status quo* could not be accepted unless equitable. The present situation in East Europe could hardly be approved unless it is at least tolerable, if not satisfactory, to the East European people.... Russia was forced to trample underfoot an international promise and give, thereby, a mortal blow to

her own reputation, in order to maintain the *status quo* in East Europe." (*Mainichi,* Tokyo, June 20, 1958)

"The 'shock' and wave of indignation which spread throughout the world as a result of the announcement of the execution of former Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy and others have become more widespread and have brought about serious repercussions.... Is it not crystal-clear that his actions were aimed at restoring liberty to his country and that it was the Soviet Army that fired at the Hungarians to crush their movement? One may say that something 'more outrageous than crime' has resulted from a fundamentally mistaken idea that values institutions above human beings and maneuvers above truth." (*Asahi Evening News,* Tokyo, June 26, 1958)

Mandalay (Burma)

"All democratic countries denounce Russia for the execution of Nagy. The Hungarian case concerns not only Hungary, but the whole world.... The Soviet Union has already been condemned by the U.N. General Assembly (for suppressing the 1956 Hungarian freedom uprising). Now to execute the Hungarian leaders shows the Soviets brazenly ignore world opinion." (*Myankalanzin,* Mandalay, Burma, June 30, 1958)

Teheran

"The horrible case of the torture of Hungary refuses to die. The United Nations Special Committee has now reported that at least a hundred Nationalists will further strengthen the will of Nationalists all over the world." (*Ettelaat,* Teheran, June 19, 1958)

New Delhi

"... More than the Prime Minister for a brief hour of a small and far-away country died when Imre Nagy was executed. The contempt with which world opinion has been treated in this particular instance may not be missed by even those who viewed the sad events in Hungary in October 1956 with less than the accusatory cocksureness of the Western capitals." (*Hindusian Standard,* New Delhi, June 18, 1958)

"The execution of Nagy has come as a hard blow to the hopes of those nations who are not aligned with any military pact. Almost all the impartial and neutral ob-

servers of world events have condemned Russia for this action and have commented that Russia is a military dictatorship devoid of justice and mercy. . . . A dictatorship which fares to disregard world public opinion in such an off-hand manner and possesses such retaliatory hatred can never honor the truth. It is not Nagy but 'truth' that has been murdered." (*Hindustan,* New Delhi, July 1, 1958)

GENEVA

". . . In the eyes of Moscow, Nagy committed the unforgivable crime: he preferred independence for his country to its servitude under Russian communism. The crime committed in Budapest confirms what only the blind and deaf could ignore—namely that any softening of Soviet communism is but tactics and camouflage. And that no matter which face Moscow pleases to show, Soviet communism strives without mercy and by all means for its one and only unalterable goal: the subjection of the world." (*Tribune de Genève,* Geneva, Switzerland, June 18, 1958)

HELSINKI

". . . This flagrant event cannot leave any Finnish worker cold. It opens up, before us, vistas of the methods which we could expect if the communists came to determine our affairs." (*Suomen Sosialdemokraatti,* Helsinki, June 19, 1958)

DJAKARTA

". . . Let us take this as a lesson and a warning of what is meant, if communists, who are puppets of Moscow and carry out orders from Russia blindly, come to power in any land. . . . the death of Imre Nagy is not insignificant. All freedom lovers will become stronger in their firm will to be alert against the danger of Soviet expansion." (*Pedoman,* Djakarta, Indonesia, June 19, 1958)

ALLAHABAD (INDIA)

". . . We are convinced that it is not the Hungarian government but the Russian government that has murdered Nagy. . . . World public opinion is now fully convinced that Hungary is nothing else except a colony of

Russia and that the Hungarian people are slaves to dictates of their Russian overlords. One thing is sure: that the Russian action has made Nagy a martyr for the cause of freedom. We will not be surprised if another bold effort by Hungarians is made to regain their lost freedom." (*Amrit Patrika,* Allahabad, India, June 29, 1958)

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Acting Rapporteur: Dr. E. Ronald Walker (Australia)

I

1. As defined by resolution 1132 (XI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 January 1957, the functions of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary were to collect "the fullest and best available information regarding the situation created by the intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, through its use of armed force and other means in the internal affairs of Hungary, as well as regarding developments relating to the recommendations of the General Assembly on this subject." The Special Committee was instructed to report its findings to the General Assembly "at its eleventh session, and thereafter from time to time to prepare additional reports for the information of Member States and of the General Assembly if it is in session."

2. In pursuance of its functions, the Committee submitted a first Interim Report on 20 February 1957.[1] A fuller report was submitted on 12 June 1957[2] and endorsed by the General Assembly by resolution 1133

[1] A/3546.

[2] *General Assembly Official Records, Eleventh Session, Supplement* No. 18 (A/3592).

(XI) adopted at the resumed meetings of its eleventh session, on 14 September 1957.

3. In its main Report, the Committee dealt with all aspects of the intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Hungary, by armed force and by other means, and the effects of that intervention on political developments and on the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Hungary. Among the actions by Soviet forces on Hungarian territory which the Report related was the arrest of General Pal Maleter and the abduction of Premier Imre Nagy and his companions. Reference was also made to official Hungarian announcements of many arrests and trials of persons having participated in the uprising and to unofficial reports of secret trials and executions.

4. In view in particular of continued reports from Hungary of completed or contemplated trials of participants in the uprising, the Committee has thought it necessary to keep under review such reliable information as can be obtained concerning developments falling within its terms of reference.

5. On the night of 6 June 1958, the world learnt that Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, and two of their associates had been executed by the Hungarian Government.[3] The Committee met as a matter of urgency and issued on 21 June a communiqué deploring these tragic events.[4] After further consideration of the available information, the Committee decided to prepare a special report to bring to the attention of the United Nations the circumstances of these executions, which have evoked expressions of profound indignation from

[3] An English translation of the relevant communiqué was issued by the Permanent Mission of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations on 18 June 1958. The announcement of the trial and execution was made by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice, broadcast originally by Budapest Radio, Home Service, 16 June, 2300 hrs. GMT, and was carried by the Moscow Radio, Home Service, 17 June, 0830 hrs. GMT. The communiqué was published in the 17 June issue of *Nepszabadsag*, and was carried on the same day in the Sovet newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.

[4] Annex I.

leading figures and many organized groups, as well as numerous individuals, in many countries. The Committee also considered several proposals submitted by its members, which have been recorded in the Committee's records.

6. The Committee informed Prince Wan Waithayakon, the Special Representative of the General Assembly on the Hungarian Problem, of its action and received the following reply:

> "I warmly appreciate excellent communiqué issued by Special Committee which has received wholehearted approval throughout the world. After careful reflection I am of opinion that Special Committee is doing the right thing in collecting more information for report to General Assembly which alone can determine further action."

II

7. The Special Committee recalls that from the beginning of its activities it has spared no pains to obtain the fullest and most authentic information on the questions which the General Assembly charged it to investigate. For this purpose, it has made repeated approaches to the Hungarian authorities, who were obviously in the position to provide facts germane to its inquiry. It has also applied to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of Romania, but none of these Governments has co-operated with it in any respect.

8. The Governments referred to have throughout maintained that the Committee is illegal and its activities contrary to the provisions of the Charter, particularly to paragraph 7 of Article 2. This view was, however, decisively rejected by the General Assembly when, on 10 January 1957, it created the Committee by a vote of 59 to 8, with 10 abstentions, and again rejected on 14 September 1957, when the General Assembly endorsed the Committee's Report by 60 votes to 10, with 10 abstentions. On the former occasion,

the General Assembly called upon the USSR and Hungary, as well as all other Member States, to assist the Committee in its task; on the latter occasion, the General Assembly expressed its regret that "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary have failed to co-operate in any way with the Committee."[5]

9. It should be recalled that, with a view to obtaining such co-operation from these Governments, the following steps have been taken:

(a) On 25 January 1957, in communicating the text of resolution 1132(XI) to the Governments of the USSR and Hungary, the Secretary General drew their attention to the paragraph which the General Assembly called on those Governments to permit the Committee and its staff to enter Hungary and to extend all appropriate co-operation to them. This request was rejected.[6]

(b) On 14 March 1957, the Committee requested the Government of the Romanian People's Republic to enable it to meet Imre Nagy, as the evidence of Mr. Nagy who, as Prime Minister of Hungary, had appealed to the Security Council, would be of outstanding importance. Its request was rejected.[7]

(c) On 19 March 1957, the Secretary General transmitted to the Permanent Mission of Hungary a copy of a letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee, saying that it was the Committee's expectation that the authorities concerned would reconsider their previous position and enable it to conduct the necessary investigation in Hungary. The Hungarian Government maintained its previous position.[8]

(d) On 20 December 1957, the Chairman of the Special Committee wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary asking for information about reports of trials alleged to be proceeding in Hungary against

[5] Resolution 1133 (XI) of 14 September 1957.

[6] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3592), para. 32.

[7] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3592), para. 34.

[8] *Ibid.*, para. 33.

participants in the 1956 uprising, including General Maleter and Colonel Kopacsi. The Permanent Representative of Hungary refused to transmit this letter to his Government.[9]

10. Following an appeal by the Committee to interested Governments on 21 June 1958 to make available to it any information at their disposal regarding the arrest, trial and execution of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter and their companions, the Committee addressed letters to the Foreign Ministers of Hungary, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, asking for specific information regarding these matters. These Governments have refused to accept the Committee's letters.[10] In the face of the Hungarian Government's refusal to make fuller information available, the Committee has concentrated in its present report on Hungarian Government official texts and communiqués, and on reports in officially licensed Hungarian newspapers and broadcasts of statements by Hungarian Ministers, high officials and Party leaders.

III

11. The communiqué issued by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice and published in Budapest and Moscow on the night of 16-17 June 1958[11] announcing that death sentences had been pronounced and carried out against Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, Miklos Gimes, and Jozsef Szilagyi also stated that Sandor Kopacsi had been sentenced to life imprisonment, Ferenc Donath to twelve years' imprisonment, Ferenc Janosi to eight years, Zoltan Tildy to six years, and Miklos Vasarhelyi to five years. Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, Ferenc Donath, Miklos Gimes, Zoltan Tildy, Sandor Kopacsi, Jozsef Szilagyi, Ferenc Janosi and Miklos Vasarhelyi had been charged with the "crime of having formed an organization aimed at overthrowing the Hungarian People's Democratic State or-

[9] Annex 11.

[10] Copies of the letters and of the replies from the Permanent Representatives of these three Governments are in Annex III.

[11] See footnote 3.

der." In addition, Imre Nagy had been accused of "treason," and Sandor Kopacsi and Pal Maleter of "mutiny."[12]

12. The Special Committee, as noted earlier, found that General Maleter was arrested on 3 November 1956 in the Soviet Headquarters at Tököol, on Csepel Island, where, as Minister of Defence in the Nagy Government, he was leading the Hungarian military delegation,[13] which was negotiating with the Soviet Command, in which capacity he was entitled to special protection accorded under the recognized principles of international law. It should be noted that at the meeting of the Security Council on 3 November 1956, the representatives of Hungary declared, and the representative of the USSR confirmed, that these negotiations were taking place.[14]

13. The Committee also examined the circumstances in which Imre Nagy and his party were abducted by Soviet military personnel on 22 November 1956, after they left the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, where they had been granted asylum.[15] They did so under a promise of safe conduct and immunity given by Mr. Kadar, in his capacity as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in a letter addressed to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on 21 November 1956. Mr. Kadar stated:

> "In the interest of terminating the matter, the Hungarian Government, agreeing to the proposals contained on page 3, section 8 of the letter of 18 November 1956

[12] Zoltan Tildy, an ordained Minister in the Reformed Evangelical Church, was Prime Minister of Hungary in 1945 and became the first President of the Republic in 1946. Sandor Kopacsi was head of the Budapest Police between 1952 and 1956. Ferenc Donath, Miklos Gimes and Miklos Vasarhely, were journalists, and Jozsef Szilagy, a writer; all four were close political associates of Imre Nagy. Ferenc Janosi, the son-in-law of Mr. Nagy, was an ordained Minister of the Reformed Evangelical Church, and also held several government posts.

[13] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3592), para. 290.

[14] S/PV. 753, paras. 62 and 132.

[15] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3592), paras. 80-82 and 630-639.

addressed to me by the Yugoslav Government, hereby confirms in writing its verbal declaration that it does not desire to apply sanctions against Imre Nagy and the members of his group for their past activities. We take note that the asylum extended to the group will hereby come to an end and that they themselves will leave the Yugoslav Embassy and proceed freely to their homes."[16]

14. On 23 November 1956, the day following Mr. Nagy's abduction, a Hungarian Government communiqué announced that he and some of his party had gone to Romania, in accordance with a request they had submitted previously.[17]

15. The Yugoslav Government on 24 November 1956 lodged a protest with the Hungarian Government against the violation of the written agreement guaranteeing the safety of Mr. Nagy and his companions. The Note also stated that Mr. Nagy had rejected an offer to go to Romania, which had been made to him while he was still on the Embassy premises.[18]

16. A statement made by the Foreign Minister of Romania at the General Assembly on 3 December 1956 may be recalled in connection with the assurances given to the Yugoslav Government by Mr. Kadar. On that occasion, Mr. Preoteasa stated that, on being approached by the Government of Hungary with reference to Mr. Nagy, the Romanian Government "gave the assurance that the stay of the group in Romania would be marked by all the rules of hospitality and that all necessary steps would be taken to guarantee the personal safety of Mr. Nagy and his friends. Similarly, the Romanian Government gave the assurance that it would observe the international rules relating to political asylum."[19]

17. The Committee recalls the efforts it made in March 1957 to obtain the assistance of the Romanian Government to enable it to meet Imre Nagy.[20] The

[16] TANJUG, 28 November 1956.
[17] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3592), para. 638.
[18] TANJUG, 24 November 1956.
[19] A/PV. 605, para. 202.
[20] See para. 9 (b) above.

Committee notes that the circumstances in which Mr. Nagy subsequently departed from Romania have never been revealed. Indeed, the first official indication of his having been brought back to Hungary was given after the announcement of his execution.

18. It is significant that a number of references to Imre Nagy were made by Mr. Kadar while Mr. Nagy was still in the Yugoslav Embassy and during the first days of his detention in Romania, in which Mr. Kadar gave assurances to the effect that his Government was not intending to prosecute Mr. Nagy for his part in the uprising. On 11 November 1956, Mr. Kadar declared:

> "I, who have myself been a member of Nagy's Government, hereby state that, according to the best of my knowledge, neither Imre Nagy nor his political group has willingly supported the counter-revolution."[21]

On 14 November 1956, Mr. Kadar told a delegation of Hungarian workers that he did not believe that Imre Nagy had deliberately and willingly helped the "counter-revolution." Rather, he had been carried away by events. "Imre Nagy is not under arrest," he added. "He left the Parliament Building of his own free will and neither the Government nor the Soviet troops wish to restrict his freedom of movement. It depends entirely on him whether or not he participates in politics."[22] On 27 November 1956, Mr. Kadar declared:

> "We have promised not to start any punitive proceedings against Imre Nagy, and we shall keep our word."[23]

19. In March 1957, however, speaking in the Kremlin, Mr. Kadar accused Mr. Nagy of not only undermining the Party from within, but of preparing its destruction from without, in alliance with the dark forces of reaction.[24] Attacks on Nagy reached a new intensity in December 1957, when volume IV of the

[21] Budapest Radio, 11 November 1956, 1000 hrs. GMT.
[22] *Nepszabadsag*, 14 November 1956.
[23] *Nepszabadsag*, 27 November 1956.
[24] *Nepszabadsag*, 28 March 1957.

Hungarian White Book stated that he "violated his oath of office, and instead of defending constitutional order, he exploited his post of Prime Minister to uphold the attempt at the violent overthrow of constitutional order."[25] Other denunciations of Imre Nagy that month were made before the Academy of Sciences, by Dezso Nemes, Editor of *Nepszabadsag*,[26] and before the National Assembly, by the Chief Public Prosecutor, Geza Szenasi.[27]

20. On 12 June 1958, in a front-page article, Mr. Kadar spoke contemptuously of "characters like Imre Nagy, who fell into the quagmire of treason."[28] Four days later came the announcement in Budapest and Moscow that Imre Nagy had been sentenced to death and executed.

21. Following this announcement, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest on 24 June 1958, handed a Note of protest to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.[29] "The Yugoslav Government, and our people," declared the Note, "have received the sudden news about the secret trial and the execution of Imre Nagy with profound indignation." The Yugoslav Note of protest recalled the exchange of letters between the Yugoslav and Hungarian Governments on 18 and 21 November 1956. In them, agreement was reached on the question of the asylum of Imre Nagy and the other persons given asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, by which the Hungarian Government guaranteed their personal security and free departure to their homes immediately after leaving the Yugoslav Embassy building and undertook that "it would not apply any sanctions against them for their past activities." The Note of 24 June also revealed that the Yugoslav Government had protested on 24 November 1956 to the Hungarian Gov-

[25] *The Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Events in Hungary*, Volume IV. Published by the Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic [Budapest, 1957], page 90.

[26] *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, January 1958, pages 44-59.

[27] *Nepszabadsag*, 22 December 1957.

[28] *Nepszabadsag*, 12 June 1958.

[29] TANJUG, 24 June 1958.

ernment that this agreement had not been implemented, and that the Hungarian Government, by its reply of 1 December 1956, had rejected the Yugoslav protest. The Hungarian Government asserted in its reply that the fact that the persons concerned had not returned to their homes was "a secondary question of technical importance," and that it was otherwise keeping to the obligations of the agreement. It reaffirmed that it was prepared to guarantee their personal security and declared that "it did not intend to punish them for their past activities." The Yugoslav Note of 24 June 1958 added that:

> "It is obvious that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has on two occasions harshly offended the obligation it gave to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia: by not making possible the free return of Imre Nagy and other persons to their homes, but instead sending them to the Romanian People's Republic for a compulsory stay; and by the fact that, contrary to the given guarantees regarding personal security and impunity because of their past action, it brought some of these persons to a secret trial, and sentenced Nagy and some of his companions to death, which punishment was executed . . ."

IV

22. The execution of Imre Nagy and his companions has special significance because Mr. Nagy, as the Prime Minister of the Government of Hungary (of which Mr. Kadar was also a member) had appealed directly to the United Nations on 1 and 2 November 1956.[30] The fate of Imre Nagy, however, should not be allowed to distract attention from the fact that since the intervention by Soviet armed forces on 4 November 1956, many other sentences have been officially announced concerning persons accused of being connected with the 1956 uprising. It cannot, however, be taken for granted that all sentences have been published. Most of the victims have no famous name to bring their sufferings to the

[30] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3592), para. 326.

notice of the world. A list of sentences announced by the Hungarian Government-licensed press and radio and all apparently referring to persons associated with the 1956 uprising, is submitted in an annex to this report.[31] From this list, it appears that at least thirty persons were sentenced to death between 20 June 1957, the date of publication of the Committee's main Report, and 21 June 1958.[32]

23. In addition to these officially announced sentences, many reports have been received from unofficial sources of trials now under way or contemplated. Among the many names mentioned in such unofficial reports are those of Mrs. Laszlo Rajk, widow of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs executed in 1949 and later rehabilitated before the uprising of October 1956; Gabor Tanczos, former Secretary of the Petöfi Club, Peter Erdös, György Fazekas and Sandor Haraszti, prominent journalists; and Szilard Ujhelyi, a close associate of Mr. Nagy and former Director of the Hungarian Radio. Except for Mrs. Rajk, Peter Erdös and Szilard Ujhelyi, these persons were mentioned in the communiqué issued by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice as being associated with Imre Nagy and other condemned persons, on 16 June 1958. Although no confirmation by the Hungarian authorities is available, the Committee cannot ignore these reports, in view of the earlier circulation of similar unofficial reports regarding pending or current trials of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter.

24. In its main Report, the Committee referred to the regime of "summary jurisdiction" prevailing in Hungary since November 1956.[33] No real alleviations have been introduced by the Decree-Laws of 15 June and 3 November 1957,[34] as to the sentences to be imposed or the summary procedures to be followed. Min-

[31] Annex IV.

[32] This figure is additional to the thirty-one death sentences mentioned in the *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3592), para. 760.

[33] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3592), paras. 753-757.

[34] *Magyar Kozlony*, No. 66, 15 June 1957; No. 117, 3 November 1957.

imum sentences of five or ten years imprisonment are still provided for; the majority of the members of the "People's Courts" still consists of revokable appointees of political organs, whose names are not made public; the accused may still be obliged to select counsel from a list compiled by the Minister of Justice. The Committee's main Report also includes evidence regarding the methods by which so-called confessions have often been obtained from political prisoners accused of disloyalty to the regime.[35] The continued presence of foreign armed forces in Hungary is likely to prevent the expression of the feelings of the people against such procedures by the Hungarian Government. The presence of the Hungarian security police, whose activities were referred to in the main Report of the Committee, there being no evidence that this has changed, is as essential factor restricting the free expression of the people's feelings.

25. The Committee recalls that the Hungarian authorities failed to respond to the efforts made in 1957 by the Special Representative of the General Assembly, Prince Wan Waithayakon, to achieve the objectives of the United Nations, as set out in the relevant General Assembly resolutions.[36] The recent sentences are all the more disturbing because they came after a number of public assurances by Hungarian leaders that a period of stabilization had begun and that proceedings against persons accused of participating in the uprising were virtually over. Thus, on 1 April 1958, the Minister of Justice, Ferenc Nezval, speaking before the Legal and Judicial Committee of the National Assembly, declared that "the trials of provincial counter-revolutionary criminal cases were already concluded. The final liquidation of counter-revolution cases and a conclusion of trials may be expected soon."[37] Despite such assurances, unofficial reports of further trials and executions continue to be received.

[35] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, paras. 771-775.
[36] A/3774.
[37] *Esti Hirlap*, 2 April 1958.

V

26. In its examination of the circumstances surrounding the arrest of General Maleter and the abduction of Mr. Nagy, the Committee has emphasized that, in both cases, the action was taken by Soviet security personnel and not by members of the Hungarian armed forces or security police. The Warsaw Treaty of 14 May 1955 (which the Hungarian Government, under Imre Nagy, decided on 1 November 1956 to repudiate, as announced by their cablegram to the United Nations[38]) and the Hungarian-Soviet Agreement of 27 May 1957,[39] are invoked to justify the presence of Soviet forces in Hungary. Despite this, in September 1957, the General Assembly, in resolution 1133 (XI), found that "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence," and reiterated its earlier resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces. On 24 May 1958, Mr. Kadar announced the withdrawal of 17,000 Soviet troops from Hungary,[40] but gave no information as to the nature of the troops withdrawn or the troops that remained. Neither this announcement nor any other available evidence has enabled the Committee to conclude that there has been a complete withdrawal of Soviet armed forces, as urged by the General Assembly, and it is not contested that Soviet armed forces are still in Hungary.

27. While the arrest of General Maleter and the abduction of Mr. Nagy and his companions were undertaken by Soviet personnel, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government, in announcing the subsequent trials and executions, has accepted full responsibility. These secret trials and executions evidence continued disregard for the resolutions of the General Assembly and for human rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Na-

[38] A/3251.

[39] *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (A/3892), Annex A to Chap. VIII.

[40] *Nepszabadsag*, 28 May 1958.

tions. Moreover, although Mr. Kadar is reported as recently as 1 July 1958 as having denied that the Hungarian Government had broken its word, the record clearly shows that the action of the Hungarian Government in bringing Imre Nagy to trial was contrary to solemn assurances, which Mr. Kadar, on behalf of the Hungarian Government had previously given, including those confirmed by letter to the Yugoslav Government.

28. The executions of Pal Maleter and Imre Nagy and their companions are striking, but unhappily not isolated, examples of the continued policy of repression carried out at the present time in Hungary in conditions described in this report and the previous Report of the Committee.

29. In view of the continued prevalence of unofficial reports for further secret trials and executions, the Committee expresses the hope that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, hearing the voice of public opinion in many countries, will cease carrying out new death sentences and, bringing to an end the present harsh repression, will effectively re-establish the inalienable principles of human rights. In view of these conclusions, and since the Committee cannot submit this report to the General Assembly directly, in view of resolution 1132 (XI), it is transmitting it to the Governments of Member States for such purposes as they may deem appropriate in relation to measures that may be taken by the General Assembly or initiatives that may be undertaken by Governments in this matter.

ONE SENTENCE ON TYRANNY

This is tyranny—
Whether in confession of prisoners
Or the confession of lovers,
In the words that should be soft, half-spoken,
Tyranny is the fly in the wine-glass;
Not in your day and night-dreams only,
Not in the bride-bed only,
But in the yearning, the wanting even,
And in beauty and love even—
Because tyranny has been there before you.
Love, your love, has been ravished.
Tyranny is there when you lie down together.
It is the darkness in your throat.
Tyranny is in your food, your drink,
Tyranny is in your mouth, your nose,
You smell it, taste it, warm or cold,
Indoors or out, by night or day.
Where there is tyranny
And all is vain—
Great art or this true litany.
And when your grave is dug,
When your body is lowered,
It states who you were,
It makes use of your ashes.

(Hungary, 1950)

GYULA ILLYÉS

PART SIX

Supplement

SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN HUNGARY: LEGAL ASPECTS

Under the terms of the Armistice Agreement with Hungary[1] her territory remained occupied by Allied (Soviet) troops.

Article 22 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary[2] provided:

> Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty all Allied forces shall, within a period of 90 days, be withdrawn from Hungary, subject to the right of the Soviet Union to keep on Hungarian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria.

Accordingly, after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty Soviet troops were to remain in Hungary for the purpose of maintaining communication with the Soviet troops of occupation in Austria, as long as Austria was to be subject to such an occupation. The Treaty of Peace came into force on September 15, 1947.

Under the Four Power Agreement and the *Staatsver-*

[1] Armistice Agreement with Hungary signed at Moscow on January 20, 1945. See Manley O. Hudson, International Legislation, Vol. IV, 1950, pp. 276-282. Harvard Univ. Press.

[2] American Journal of International Law Supplement, 1948, pp. 225-251.

trag with Austria of May 15, 1955,[3] Soviet armed forces evacuated Austria. Thus the above clause under which Soviet armed forces remained in Hungary after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Hungary ceased to be operative. It is still an open question why signatories to the Treaty of Peace with Hungary did not invoke this clause and invite the Soviet Union to evacuate Hungary. That the Hungarian government did not protest against stationing of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory, needs no explanation.

After the first, and also after the second intervention by Soviet forces in October and November, 1956, the world was told that these Soviet units were stationed in Hungary, and had intervened, under the Warsaw Treaty.

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed at Warsaw on May 14, 1955,[4] between Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the U.S.S.R. declares in its preamble that it wishes to promote:

> .... respect for the independence and sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Article 1 of the Treaty reads as follows:

> The Contracting Parties undertake in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organizations to refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force, and to solve their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security.

Article 4 provides:

> In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty.... shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed forces ....

[3] *Ibid.*, 1955, pp. 162-194.
[4] *Ibid.*, 1955, pp. 194-199.

There is no direct clause in the Treaty which would justify one of the signatories stationing troops on the territory of the other, although there is a provision for a Joint Command of their armed forces which runs as follows:

> Article 5.—The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labors of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression.

It has been maintained that the right to station troops on Hungarian soil may be deduced from the above Article.[5] Such an opinion, however, is by no means convincing.

Simultaneously with the signing of the Warsaw Treaty a declaration was issued concerning the establishment of a Joint Command. Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned by the signatory states. A Staff of the Joint Armed Forces will be set up under the Commander-in-Chief, and will include permanent representatives of the general staffs of the signatory states. The Staff will have its headquarters in Moscow. The last paragraph of this declaration provides:

> The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the signatory states will be effected, by agreement among the states, in accordance with the requirements of their mutual defence.

Article 5 of the Warsaw Treaty as well as the above declaration refer to an "agreement" which, though, was never published. Thus the real legal source, if any, of the stationing of Soviet troops in the territory of Hungary remains obscure.

[5] See: Quincy Wright, "Intervention, 1956," American Journal of International Law, 1957, p. 275.

It seems characteristic for the prevailing circumstances that the Soviet Union, after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, found it necessary to have a special treaty signed with the Kadar government on May 27, 1957, relative to "the legal status of Soviet forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic."[6]

But this latter Treaty does not contain provisions as to a consent by Hungary to the "temporary stationing" of Soviet forces; it presumes their existence within the borders of Hungary, and only provides regulations concerning their status, their placing, jurisdiction over their members and compensation for damages, etc.

The preamble of this Treaty recalls 'the present international situation .... when West Germany is being remilitarized .... when the United States and other participants in the North Atlantic Alliance are maintaining numerous forces and military bases in close proximity to socialist States ....," and thus continues:

> .... taking note of the fact that in these conditions the temporary stationing of Soviet forces on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic is expedient for the purpose of safeguarding joint defence against the possibility of aggression and that it accords with international agreements ....

Article I of this Treaty reads as follows:

> The temporary presence of Soviet forces on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic in no way affects the sovereignty of the Hungarian State; the Soviet forces do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Similarly ludicrous statements are to be found in Article II of the Treaty:

> 1. The numerical strength of the Soviet forces temporarily on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, and the places of their stationing, are determined on the basis of special agreements between the Govern-

[6] See: U.N., Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, Eleventh Session, Supplement 18, pp. 60-62.

ment of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Government of the USSR.

2. Movements of Soviet forces on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic outside the places of their stationing require in each case the agreement of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic or of the Hungarian organs authorized by the Hungarian Government to act for it.

3. The training and manoeuvres of the Soviet troops on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic outside their stationing areas are carried out either on the basis of the plans agreed on with the proper Hungarian Government bodies, or with the approval in each case of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic or of the proper Hungarian authorities.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and its European satellites, including such treaties and agreements as the Warsaw Treaty of 1955, or the "status of Soviet forces agreement" with Hungary, cannot be considered as a relationship between independent states under international law or international politics. Accordingly, all such conventional provisions as referred to above can only be envisaged in the knowledge that they serve to camouflage the real state of affairs: the complete subordination of satellite (in our case, Hungarian) governments and authorities to the will of Moscow. Therefore, the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary ought never be and can never be considered in the same light as, for instance, the legal status of United States or British armed forces in foreign lands.[7]

The presence of Soviet forces in Hungary, though open to legal examination and scrutiny—the result of which can hardly be considered satisfactory—does not rely on the consent of the Hungarian people. It is at present the outcome of Soviet intervention in the affairs of Hungary, the consequence of an elimination by force of the recognized government of Hungary, and of the establishment by same armed intervention of a slavishly subservient puppet-government.

[7] See: F. A. Vali, "Servitudes of International Law, A Study of Rights in Foreign Territory," London, 1958, p. 217.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE KÁDÁR REGIME

The principal instrument of the Kádár regime—in addition to the Soviet Army—for the suppression of the revolution was the Hungarian Communist system of criminal law. Known before the revolution to be biased in its decisions toward the interests of the ruling regime, to be guilty of illegalities concerning the rights of the accused, and to be inclined to inflicting harsh penalties,[1] *this system of criminal law was amended and thereby worsened in four important ways. These four changes enabled the regime to bring to court and try suspects more easily and to punish those found guilty more severely. The first change aimed at "simplifying" the regular criminal trial procedure. The second change empowered courts-martial to conduct summary trials against persons suspected of having committed counter-revolutionary crimes. The third change established special benches in all higher courts to conduct "accelerated" trials against persons suspected of having committed counterrevolutionary crimes.. And the fourth change established a Special People's Court Bench in the Supreme Court to function as an additional control on the administration of criminal justice.*

Regular Criminal Trial Procedure "Simplified" to Expedite Trials of Persons in the Regular Courts. The November 12, 1956, issue of *Magyar Közlöny* published an edict with the innocent-sounding title of "On the Simplification of Criminal Procedure Concerning Certain Crimes."[2] The effect of this edict was such that government attorneys were able to present the defendant to a court immediately without making formal charges in writing for the following types of crimes: murder, intentional manslaughter, arson, robbery, and looting. The same procedure was also allowed for crimes committed through the illegal use of firearms

[1] See the article of Dr. Alexander K. Bedo "Communist Justice in Hungarian Criminal Courts," in *Highlights,* IV, No. 11 (November 1952), p. 349. West-European Law Project, Congressional Library, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

[2] Edict No. 22 of 1956.

and for the attempt to commit any of the above-mentioned crimes. It is immediately apparent that this "simplified" trial procedure was a summary-type trial procedure.

Summary Trials Ordered Made by Courts-Martial for Counterrevolutionary Crimes. Because the revolution was still active in December 1956, the Kádár regime imposed martial-law type justice on the Hungarian population through an Edict of December 11, 1956, of the Presidium.[3] This edict ordered summary trials by courts-martial for the crimes mentioned immediately above as well as for crimes committed by damaging establishments serving the public interest, for keeping firearms or explosives without a license, for failure to report persons keeping unlicensed firearms or ammunition, and for association or conspiracy aimed at committing these crimes. The Cabinet passed a decree with details on the implementation of the edict.[4] This decree ordered that "general provisions concerning criminal procedure may be applied only insofar as the present decree does not establish a different rule" (Sec. 2).

Each court-martial consisted of 1 military judge and 2 lay judges. Any person suspected of having committed a crime to be tried by a court-martial had to be arrested immediately and presented to the competent government attorney's office. The government attorney then presented the case to the nearest court-martial provided that the accused had been caught in the act of committing the crime or that "the necessary evidence was at the disposal" of the government attorney (Sec. 5).

Courts-martial had no jurisdiction in cases where regular criminal proceedings were already in progress. Moreover, insane persons, persons seriously ill physically, and expectant women were not to be tried by these courts. The length of the proceeding was not to exceed 72 hours beginning with the arrest of the accused. If the sentence was not made within this time limit, the case had to be transferred to the court having regular jurisdiction and venue. Therefore, the courts-

[3] Edict No. 28 of 1956.
[4] Decree No. 6/1956.

martial tried cases rapidly without previously setting a date and without sending out summonses. The government attorney presented both witnesses and other evidence. Although it was not spelled out in the decree, it may reasonably be assumed that the defense counsel was also permitted to present witnesses and other evidence. These courts were not supposed to try any case without the presence of the defense counsels —if not the defense counsels appointed by the defendants, then those counsels appointed by the courts-martial.

Concerning punishments, a court-martial was ordered to apply the death penalty if its judges unanimously found the defendant guilty. In cases where the restoration and the protection of the public order did not require the death penalty, a court-martial could have imposed imprisonment of from 10 to 15 years instead (Sec. 10[2]). Juveniles between the ages of 18 and 20 who were found guilty were supposed to be punished with imprisonment of from 10 years to 15 years, whereas juveniles under 18 years of age were subject to imprisonment of not less than 5 years but not more than 10 years. All sentences had to be made in writing immediately together with short statements of reasons for the sentences. No appeal was permitted against the sentence of a court-martial except the protest of the government attorney "in the interest of legality" or the petition of the accused for a new trial because of new evidence.

If the death penalty was ordered by a court-martial, it had to consider whether to recommend clemency. A recommendation of no clemency was to be made only upon the unanimous vote of all judges. In death-penalty cases where the court recommended no clemency, the defendant had to be hanged within 2 hours. In cases where the court recommended clemency, all related documents, including the petition for clemency of the defendant and of his counsel and the opinion of the government attorney, had to be forwarded to the Presidium through the Ministry of Justice.

Imprisonment ordered by a court-martial had to be-

gin immediately. If the court found that the case did not come under its jurisdiction, or that a sentence was not possible within the statutory time (72 hours), or that sufficient evidence had not been presented, the court had to transfer the case to the regular courts or —if the evidence warranted such a sentence—it was able to pronounce a sentence of acquittal.

Apparently the Kádár regime felt that these provisions were too lenient because two days after the edict ordering the summary trials was passed, this edict was amended by the Presidium.[5] The amendment provided that:

> If the defendant is found guilty of any of the crimes falling under the summary procedure, the court-martial shall impose the death penalty at the same time.

Because the amendment had no special provision concerning juveniles, it may be assumed that juvenile defendants found guilty of counterrevolutionary crimes were also hanged by the Kádár regime.

Two partially overlapping statistical reports give a picture of the activities of the courts-martial, especially of their accelerated tempo in the early part of 1957. A publication of the Central Statistical Office[6] reveals the following data. The courts-martial conducting summary trials between December 11, 1956, and January 7, 1957, completed action on 67 cases: 36 cases by the Court-Martial of Budapest, 19 by the Court-Martial of Kecskemét (in central Hungary), and 6 cases by the Court-Martial of Debrecen (in eastern Hungary). Of the total of 89 defendants involved in 67 cases, 2 were acquitted, the cases of 16 were transferred to the regular courts, and 71 were found guilty and sentenced; of the 71 persons found guilty, 11 were sentenced to death, 1 to imprisonment for life, 19 to imprisonment for 15 years, 14 to imprisonment of from 11 to 14 years, 23 to

[5] Edict No. 32 of 1956.

[6] Központi Statisztikai Hivatal [Central Office of Statistics], *Fontosabb adatok az* 1956 *október-decemberi időzakról* [Important Data Covering the Period of October-December 1956] (Budapest: 1957), p. 51.

imprisonment of 10 years, 1 to imprisonment of up to 7 years, and 2 to imprisonment of 5 years.

Of the defendants who got the death penalty, 4 were executed immediately after pronouncement of sentence; 2 were executed after the Presidium refused clemency; 3 got their sentences commuted to terms of life imprisonment; and 2 had petitions for clemency still pending.

A still more accelerated tempo is revealed in the report of the Minister of Justice to the Judiciary Committee of Parliament.[7] According to this report, between December 16, 1956, and February 25, 1957, the courts-martial held 195 summary trials involving 304 defendants. Forty defendants were sentenced to death, and 15 were executed immediately. The Presidium rejected clemency petitions of 11 others, who were subsequently put to death. Thirty-nine defendants were sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years; 8 got terms of 14 years; 32 got terms of 12 years; 85 got terms of 10 years; and others got terms of less than 10 years. Allegedly 79 per cent of the defendants had been punished previously—though it was not revealed how many of them were punished for political crimes, i.e., because of their anti-Communist attitudes.

Special Benches Created in Higher Courts Also To Try Counterrevolutionary Crimes. The Edict of November 12, 1956, Concerning Simplification of the Criminal Procedure was repealed and superseded by the Edict of January 15, 1957, Concerning the Regulation of an Accelerated Criminal Trial Procedure.[8] The latter edict ordered the creation of a special bench in the criminal division of each higher court to try certain cases according to an "accelerated" criminal trial procedure. These benches were authorized to function as courts of original jurisdiction in cases specified in the edict. This "accelerated" procedure was still another type of summary trial procedure.

Earlier statutes published after the revolution dealt only with the summary trials of cases involving murder,

[7] *Népakarat*, March 14, 1957.
[8] Edict No. 4 of 1957.

intentional manslaughter, arson, robbery, looting, damaging vital public enterprises, the illegal retention or use of firearms and explosives, the failure to report on others possessing firearms and explosives, and association or conspiracy aimed at committing any of these crimes. The Edict of January 15, 1957, gave jurisdiction to the special benches to conduct summary trials for such crimes, but it also enlarged the scope of jurisdiction to include other crimes, such as:

> *Sec. 1.* ... (f) Crimes committed by intentionally damaging utilities supplying water, gas, or electricity or other establishments which have been declared indispensable by Cabinet decree and which supply the population with essential goods [goods and services]; [crimes committed] by [damaging] public transportation enterprises or defense industries; [crimes committed] by the act of illegally intruding into or by the presence on the premises of an establishment, or by any other act, to intentionally disturb its work, [as well as the acts of] anyone instigating or calling upon others to commit such an act (B. H. O., Sec. 73(1)).[9] ...
>
> (g) Crimes committed by intentionally endangering means of transportation (B. H. O., Sec. 372);
>
> (h) Organizing against the People's Republic or against the people's democratic political order (B. H. O., Sec. 1), and associating for this purpose (B. H. O., Sec. 8);
>
> (l) Revolt (B. H. O., Secs. 17-24); and
>
> (j) Treason (B. H. O., Secs. 35 and 37-40).

Another Decree of January 15, 1957, of the Cabinet declared that all government-owned agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprises were indispensable to the public interest.[10] Thus, the above-mentioned criminal acts directed against any of these enterprises were also brought into the jurisdiction of the special benches.

Each special bench conducting summary proceedings consisted of 1 professional judge appointed by the president of the respective court and 2 lay judges "elected" by the Presidium of the People's Republic. The bench organized at the Supreme Court consisted of 2 profes-

[9] The Official Collection of Substantive Criminal Law in Force.
[10] Decree No. 2/1957.

sional judges and 3 lay judges and was supposed to review appeals filed against the sentences of the special benches of the lower courts. Only the Attorney General and the President of the Supreme Court were able to initiate a trial at the Special Bench of the Supreme Court.

Punishment administered by the special benches was generally death, but, similar to the courts-martial, these benches could also have imposed sentences of imprisonment of not less than 5 years. Concerning juvenile defendants, it appeared that the benches could have imposed the death penalty without any restriction.[11]

An Edict of February 1, 1957, of the Presidium changed and amended a number of other provisions of criminal law.[12] Removed from within the jurisdiction of the courts-martial were the crimes of firemen and prison officials. Existing statutory rules were restated that criminal acts committed during the period of service of soldiers, border guards, policemen, members of the civilian defense establishment, and special police fall under the jurisdiction of the courts-martial. The special transportation courts, organized in 1954 and patterned on the Soviet system, to deal with criminal cases connected with transportation were abolished. The edict also permitted the court to appoint not only individual lawyers to serve as defense counsels but also a lawyers' collective as a whole. Thus the decision as to who was to serve as court-appointed defense counsel was left to the discretion of the head of the lawyers' collective. Moreover, the time limit for arrests by the police was extended from 24 hours to 72 hours.

In cases of appeal, the Special Bench of the Supreme Court was prescribed by this edict to proceed on the basis of the statements of fact as ascertained by the trial courts; however, the Special Bench was permitted to add to or change these statements, or send the cases back to the trial courts for further evidence and for pronouncement of new sentences.

A peculiarity of this edict is that the Special Bench

[11] Sec. 5(3).
[12] Edict No. 8 of 1957.

of the Supreme Court was permitted to increase the punishments of the lower courts even if the government attorneys did not appeal against the original sentences. It appeared as an achievement that while hitherto "protests in the interest of legality" submitted by the Attorney General were dealt with by the Supreme Court in closed sessions, subsequently, as a result of this edict, all persons had to be informed as to the time of the hearing, and were allowed to submit an objection and also speak before the Court.

A Decree of March 2, 1957, of the Cabinet reorganized existing courts-martial into five courts-martial, a total which was apparently less than the total number of Army divisions.[13]

Special People's Court Bench Established in the Supreme Court Also to Conduct Summary Trials. Apparently the high Command of the Hungarian Communist Party was still dissatisfied with the administration of criminal justice because, through an Edict of April 6, 1957, of the Presidium, a special People's Court Bench was ordered created in the Supreme Court to function as both an appeals court and a trial court.[14] The People's Court Bench[15] had to consist of 1 professional judge appointed by the President of the Supreme Court and 4 lay judges "elected" by the Presidium. This Bench was empowered to act as trial court in any criminal case put before it by the President of the Supreme Court or by the Attorney General. Similar to the procedure in the special benches, the prosecutor was not required to give a written accusation to the defendant or to the court, but, instead, had to simply present his accusation orally at the trial. This Bench was also able to act as the appellate bench for the regular appeals filed against sentences of the lower courts, had to act

[13] Decree No. 14/1957. Previously in Hungary there was at least 1 court-martial for each division of the Hungarian Army.

[14] Edict No. 25 of 1957.

[15] Similar benches were also established in the district courts by Edict No. 34 of June 15, 1957, of the Presidium. Since this development occurred after the completion of this report, this development was not included.

as the appellate bench for review of the protest of the Attorney General filed "in the interest of legality," and had to act as appellate bench for review of any request for a new trial. In case of a request for a new trial, this Bench was permitted to try the case. Therefore, if the Office of the Government Attorneys objected to the proceedings or the decisions of the lower courts, each such case was supposed to be reviewed and was even permitted to be retried by the People's Court Bench—a bench composed primarily of persons with political rather than legal training.

The four shades of summary procedure described above had one important defect in common: the lack of provision of suitable opportunity for the preparation of defense by the accused. The preparation of defense was made extremely difficult because of the lack of time allowed and the lack of written charges. Thus, two important prerequisites for a fair trial were missing in the summary trials conducted in the Hungarian People's Republic. Moreover, the development of various shades of summary procedures revealed the struggle of the Kádár regime to find professional as well as lay judges willing to impose the sentences demanded by the regime, as was indicated by the publication of notices of dismissals of military and civilian judges from the Supreme Court.[16]

Internment[17] and Police Surveillance Also Used to Eliminate Persons Considered a Threat to the Kádár Regime. Other instruments of the Kádár regime for the suppression of political opposition, in addition to the summary trials, were systems of internment and police surveillance[18] which the Kádár regime reimposed on Hungary. The system of internment that had been previously abolished by the Imre Nagy regime of 1953[19]

[16] *Magyar Közlöny* of December 24 and 30, 1956, and January 11 and February 2, 1957.

[17] As used in this section, the term "internment" means confinement without trial.

[18] Fischer, Kálnoky, and LeNard, *Forced Labor in Hungary* (Washington, D.C., 1952).

[19] Resolution No. 1034/1953.

was reintroduced into Hungary by an Edict of December 13, 1956, of the Presidium.[20] This edict ordered that:

> *Sec. 1.* Whoever endangers public order or public security by his activity or behavior, especially [by his] disturbance of productive labor or transportation, may be interned.

The edict originally provided that internment had to be ordered by the competent government attorney upon proposal by the police. The Attorney General was supposed to review any internment case within 30 days of the date of internment. After 3 months, this review had to be repeated. No period of internment was supposed to exceed 6 months. According to the edict, these provisions were to remain in force for 1 year. An amendment later provided that internments were to be ordered by the police but required approval from the competent government attorney.[21]

The Minister of the Armed Forces and of Public Security Affairs issued a decree implementing these edicts on March 19, 1957.[22] The decree restated the provisions of the edicts and also permitted the interned person to request permission to converse, to receive parcels and letters, and to write letters at least once a month. Interned persons were to be put to work, for which they were supposed to receive compensation; however, the costs of internment had to be paid by those persons who were interned.

Following the outbreak of World War II, the Hungarian Government of that time issued a number of emergency provisions in order to preserve order. Among these measures was a decree of the Prime Minister permitting the administrative authorities to put any suspicious person under police surveillance, or to expel such a person from his domicile to another place, or to put such a person into a special place of intern-

[20] Edict No. 31 of 1956.
[21] Edict No. 1 of 1957.
[22] Decree No. 1/1957.

ment.[23] The Minister of Interior of the Kádár regime implemented these emergency World War II provisions when he ruled that police commissioners of all districts *(megye)* and of the city of Budapest were allowed to banish any person from his domicile and to put such a person under police surveillance if the person was considered "dangerous to the state, to public security, or to the socialist order; or disquieting from the point of view of important interests of the state; as well as detrimental for economic reasons."[24]

The person banished and put under police surveillance had to move to the place ordered by the police within 15 days. He was not allowed to leave this place of abode without permission from the competent police commissioner, and he was not allowed to use a telephone. Moreover, he was subject to an order not to leave his apartment at certain times during the day or to refrain from visiting public places. When the period of surveillance was terminated, its duration was noted in his identification record book. Thus, he was actually stigmatized without having committed a crime.

Functions of the Office of State Security Turned Over to the Regular Police. As Mátyás Rákosi, the head of the Communist Party of Hungary from 1944 to 1956 revealed, the Communist Party had always exercised control over the Office of State Security (AVO).[25] Manned exclusively by Communists, AVO had at first been nominally subordinated to the Minister of the Interior. At the end of 1949, a decree of the Cabinet had reorganized AVO to be an independent agency.[26] Thus allegedly having been removed from within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, AVO had been placed under the supervisory authority of an unnamed member of the Cabinet—this organizational setup having remained until the Hungarian Revolution of October 1956.

[23] Decree No. 8130/1939.
[24] Decree No. 1/1957.
[25] Mátyás Rákosi, *Népi demokráciánk utja* [The Path of Our People's Democracy] (Budapest: Társadalmi Szente, 1952), p. 145.
[26] Decree No. 4353/1949.

One of the prime targets of the revolutionaries was the AVO. They virtually destroyed it. No provision has been found on the dissolution of this agency by the Kádár regime, and an Edict of December 30, 1956, of the Presidium merely stated that:

> *Sec. 1.* As a consequence of the dissolution of the Office of State Security of the Ministry of the Interior, investigations of crimes against internal and external security of the state shall belong to the jurisdiction of the [regular] police.[27]

It must also be noted that an organization similar to the allegedly dissolved AVO was apparently organized because mention was made in the Hungarian press concerning the activities of the "Political Investigation Division" in the Central Office of the Police.[28]

As AVO was being destroyed by the revolutionaries, workers' guards were forming among the workers to prevent the destruction of their factories. When the Kádár regime came into power, armed workers' guards were already in existence guarding many factories. It is not clear whether these workers' guards were anti-Communists, but, judging from an Edict of December 11, 1956, of the Presidium, many of them probably were.[29] This edict stated in its preamble as follows:

> In certain establishments, criminals and counter-revolutionary elements slipped in among the workers' guards organized for defense against sabotage. They became influential there, and they endeavored to induce the workers' guards to activities contrary to their original aims and contrary to the interest of the working class.

Thus, allegedly in order to prevent certain activities contrary to the interests of the working class, the Kádár regime through this edict ordered the immediate registration of firearms and ammunition possessed by members of the workers' guards. Then, through the Edict of February 19, 1957, of the Presidium, the Kádár regime ordered the dissolution of all units of the workers'

[27] Edict No. 35 of 1956.
[28] *Népakarat,* May 31, 1957.
[29] Edict No. 29 of 1956.

guards except those units organized and controlled by the regular police forces, and called for the creation of new units to be headed by a single commander-in-chief.[30] According to the preamble of this edict, the Kádár regime made the changes:

> In order to strengthen the defense of the people's democratic political order, to assure tranquility among the toiling people and undisturbed production, as well as to create more effective protection against attempts of counterrevolutionary elements to restore [the old regime] . . .

Amnesty Offered to Refugees but Increased Punishment Ordered for Those Who Assist Refugees to Cross the Border. Concerning the unprecedented emigration of Hungarians after Soviet troops intervened in the revolution, the Presidium issued 3 edicts, the first 2 amnesties and the third punitive. The first edict offered amnesty to those who "illegally crossed the border" provided that such persons returned to Hungary before March 31, 1957.[31] The second edict offered amnesty to persons who reported their wish to return to a Hungarian foreign representative before March 31, 1957. Moreover, all juveniles were promised amnesty no matter when they returned provided they were under 18 years of age at the time of their return.[32] The third edict, however, provided sharply increased punishments for those who assist others to cross the border.[33] Those who propagandize for the illegal crossing of the border were made subject to 5 years of imprisonment. Those who assist in illegal border crossings were made subject to 10 years imprisonment and confiscation of all property. Those who fail to report on others preparing or attempting to cross the border were made subject to imprisonment of 2 years.

Autonomy of Certain Bar Associations Suspended. The autonomy of two bar associations—of Budapest

[30] Edict No. 13 of 1957.
[31] Edict No. 27 of 1956.
[32] Edict No. 24 of 1957.
[33] Edict No. 12 of 1957.

and of the industrial city of Miskolc—was suspended by the Minister of Justice.[34] The Kádár regime appointed special governmental commissioners to head the two bar associations, ostensibly until new elections are held later on. It is significant that the two cities were centers of most of the anti-Communist uprisings. Since the leadership of such organizations determines who shall be a member of the bar and may also deprive lawyers of their membership in the bar, it is apparent that the Kádár regime was primarily interested in purging anti-Communist lawyers from the bar.[35]

[34] *Magyar Közlöny*, December 29, 1956, and January 22, 1957.

[35] Section 31 of Edict No. 34 of 1957 completed the division of lawyers into first, second, and third classes. Decree No. 4031/1949 earlier had merely ordered the creation of a special register of lawyers licensed to act as defense counsels before courts-martial in treason and espionage cases. Edict No. 20 of 1950 then ordered the licensing of other lawyers acting before courts-martial in other cases. The latest edict ordered that in all criminal proceedings, "if it is markedly required for the protection of the interests of the state," only those lawyers may act as defense counsels who are listed in a special register of the Ministry of Justice.

[*Editor's Note*] According to reliable sources a purge of the Hungarian Bar Association was carried out during August and September, 1958. As a result of this purge more than 800 lawyers out of 3,100 have been dismissed. Henceforward, lawyers can only function as members of *lawyers "collectives."* It was also announced that the bar membership will be reviewed annually by the Ministry of Justice and that all lawyers must carry identification cards at all times.

Reliable sources have also indicated that 2,500 Freedom Fighters have been executed, 12,000 have been deported to the Soviet Union, 25,000 are political prisoners in jails and 15,000 are in concentration camps in Hungary.

HUNGARIAN MINORITIES UNDER COMMUNIST RULE

Emerging as a loser from World War I, Hungary lost ethnically Hungarian areas and thus over three million Hungarians were shifted to a minority status. Today these Hungarians also live under Communist rule.

In Rumania, according to a 1956 census, there were 1,652,000 persons whose mother tongue was Hungarian; in 1930 there were 1,554,500. In Yugoslavia, according to the census of 1953, there were 506,000 Hungarians as against 468,200 in 1931. In Czechoslovakia—within her present borders exclusive of Carpatho-Ruthenia—603,800 Hungarians were listed in 1930. A post-World War II census in 1950 resulted in conflicting data as to the ethnical make-up of the population. According to a textbook of economic geography, *Hospodárska Geografie Československa,* published in 1953, for the Economic College in Prague, the total Hungarian population in 1950 was 592,400. On the other hand, data compiled by the Czechoslovak National Statistical Bureau and issued January 1, 1957, puts the total number of Hungarians at 404,300. The difference of 200,000 stems from the fact that the textbook disregards, but the Statistical Bureau takes account of, the so-called process of re-Slovakization during 1946-1947. Thus, in one place the re-Slovakized persons are listed as Hungarians, in the other as Slovaks. As a result, in present day Slovakia there are 200,000 persons whose mother tongue is Hungarian but whose nationality is uncertain.

No census was taken in the Soviet Union since the end of World War II, therefore we have no direct data on the total number of Hungarians in Carpatho-Ruthenia. Radio Kiev, on November 25, 1956, put the number of Hungarians belonging to the Reformed Church at 95,000. Next day the TASS agency gave the number of Uniate Hungarians—now perforce belonging to the Greek Orthodox church—as 21,000. Thus, the Hungarians of these two denominations—minus the Roman Catholic, Evangelical, and Jewish Hungarians—

totaled 116,000 in 1956. Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia, at the time of the 1930 Czechoslovak census, totaled 115,800.

In 1930, 74.5 per cent of all Hungarians lived in Hungary proper, and 25.5 per cent in three neighboring countries, not counting Austria. The percentage today stands at 76.2 per cent for Hungarians in Hungary and 23.8 per cent for Hungarians in the three neighboring Communist states and Carpatho-Ruthenia. (If we do not count the 200,000 Slovakized persons in Slovakia, the percentage would be 77.5 per cent for Hungary and 22.5 per cent beyond the frontiers of Hungary.)

According to official data on demographical trends of population in the respective countries—with the exception of Yugoslavia—Hungarian minorities are increasing at a surprising rate. The rate of natural increase for Hungarians in Czechoslovakia in 1955 is 15.5 per thousand, in 1956 15.4 per thousand as against 6.6 per thousand for the year 1936. The rate of population growth among Hungarians in Rumania between 1948 and 1956 averaged 14.5 per thousand per annum, while population growth for the same group between 1934 and 1937 averaged 5.7 per thousand per annum. The rate of increase for these two Hungarian minority groups is, at present, higher than that for the population of Hungary which—in 1955, the year preceding the Freedom Fight—showed an 11.5 per thousand rate of natural increase. The yearly average rate of population growth for Hungarians in Yugoslavia between 1948 and 1953 was only 3.8 per thousand, which cannot be compared with the situation between the two World Wars, as Yugoslav statistics for those years have not dealt separately with the development of minority populations. Members of the Reformed Church in Carpatho-Ruthenia—comprising the overwhelming majority of Hungarians in that region—between 1930 and 1956 showed an average yearly increase of 10.3 per thousand. In 1936, the rate of natural increase was 9.0 per thousand for Hungarians in Carpatho-Ruthenia.

Hungarian ethnical groups in Slovakia and in Carpatho-Ruthenia have preserved their linguistic frontiers. Although the Slovak population exchanges and settlements have considerably inflated Slovak and Ruthenian-Ukrainian minority groups, the national character of Hungarian linguistic areas has remained unchanged. The situation is similar in Transylvania: no changes have taken place in the territorial distribution of Hungarians. 34.8 per cent of Hungarians in Romania live in the Hungarian Autonomous Region forming a 78.8 per cent majority. 88 per cent of Hungarians in

Yugoslavia inhabit the Vojvodina [Vajdaság] making up 25 per cent of the population; 10 per cent are located in the Croatian, and 2 per cent in the Slovenian Republic.

Education

While the census of Hungarian minorities between 1930 and the present shows an overall increase of 5.5 per cent, the number of schools in which the official language of instruction is Hungarian has increased as a whole by 46.9 per cent in the three countries and Carpatho-Ruthenia. The total of secondary schools and special schools on a secondary level in the four countries is 104: 51 in Romania, 31 in Czechoslovakia, 12 in Carpatho-Ruthenia, and 10 in Yugoslavia. On the university level, schools for Hungarians are as follows. *Romania:* Bólyai University of Sciences in Cluj (Kolozsvár), Medical and Pharmaceutical Academy in Targu Mures (Marosvásárhely) plus some Hungarian language faculties in the University of Timisoara (Temesvár). *Czechoslovakia:* the Hungarian Pedagogical Academy of Bratislava (Pozsony), Hungarian Language and Literature Faculties in the University of Bratislava (Pozsony). *Carpatho-Ruthenia:* Hungarian Pedagogical Faculty in the University of Uzgorod (Ungvár). *Yugoslavia:* Hungarian faculty in the University of Novisad (Újvidék).

Literary groups: Hungarian Department of the Slovak Writers' Association, Hungarian Section of the Romanian Writers' Association, the Literary Association of the Vojvodina (Vajdaság), and the Hungarian Literary Association in Carpatho-Ruthenia. Publication of Hungarian books: 437 in Romania for 1956, 60 in Yugoslavia for 1957, and 40 in Czechoslovakia for 1957. The average number of books published is roughly the same every year. As to the contents, the book are works of Communist and Russian authors, Hungarian classics, a rather high percentage of translations of works by authors in the respective countries, works of progressive authors of world literature and—with the exception of Romania—a small percentage of works by Hungarian minority authors. Each year one or two Hungarian anthologies have been published in Carpatho-Ruthenia. Publishers for Hungarian minority groups are: a Hungarian editorial office in the Slovak Publishing House for Creative Writing which has replaced the recently abolished Hungarian Publishers in Czechoslovakia; the Hungarian Department of the Romanian National Publishers of Literature and Art, the Hungarian Department of the Fraternity-Unity Publishing

House in Novisad (Ujvidék), and the Hungarian Department of the Trans-Carpathian Publishers.

Hungarian minorities have eleven legitimate theatres: the Hungarian Regional Theatre in Komarno (Komárom), the Hungarian Ensemble of the National Village Theatre Company in Bratislava (Pozsony), the Hungarian Opera House and Theatre in Cluj (Kolozsvár), the "Székely Theatre" in Targu Mures (Marosvásárhely), the National Hungarian Theatres of Satu Mare (Szatmár), Oradea (Nagyvárad), Timisoara (Temesvár) and Sfantu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyörgy), the Hungarian Ensemble of the Subotica (Szabadka) People's Theatre, and the Hungarian People's Theatre of Topola (Bácstopolya). There are in addition, three professional, or semi-professional, people's ensembles of national importance: the Young Hearts Hungarian People's Ensemble of Czechoslovakia, the National "Székely" People's Ensemble, and the Hungarian People's Ensemble of Carpatho-Ruthenia.

The total number of Hungarian language newspapers and periodicals in the four countries is 72: important dailies are Előre of Bucharest with a circulation of 110,000 *Uj Szó* of Bratislava (Pozsony), circulation 100,000, and *Magyar Szó* of Novisad (jvidék) with a circulation of 30,000.

A Hungarian radio station was set up in Targu Mures (Marosvásárhely) early in 1958. The radio stations of Bratislava (Pozsony), Kosice (Kassa), Uzgorod (Ungvár), Cluj (Kolozsvár), and Novisad (Ujvidék) all have Hungarian editorial offices and Hungarian-Language broadcasts.

The Leninist Policy of Nationalities

Unlike the situation between the two World Wars, the Hungarian minorities of today are not covered by any internationally valid agreements guarding the rights of minorities. The Communist countries treat their minorities on the basis of the so-called Leninist policy of nationalities. The essence of this policy is a tolerant attitude toward the use of the mother tongue, a preservation of national "peculiarities," concessions regarding the cultivation of national traditions which are augmented or restricted according to the momentary stance by which the respective governments attempt to win the sympathy of minorities for cooperation in the "building of socialism." Like all other matters, the policy on nationalities is handled inconsistently, on the basis of expediency. In the minority policies of Romania and Czechoslovakia the remnants of the minority of the *Little Entente states,* based on proportional nationality figures, is still

recognizable while in Yugoslavia the nationalities are made to accept a supra-national concept of the Communist Yugoslav nation.

A lengthy article in *Magyar Szó* of (Ujvidék) of April 17, 1954, dealing with the problem of minorities, gives perhaps the most concise summary of the nationality policies of the Communist governments in the three neighbor-states: "The process of democratization has created the possibility of a true rapprochement of peoples, and what is more, for their amalgamation into one community. The social management of economy has swept away the administrative solution of the minority problem on the basis of nationality figures and has made possible in its place the realization of a true equality of rights."

What insecurity this vague conception of equal rights means to the minorities is evident from a frank statement made by Gyula Duba, Hungarian writer of Czechoslovakia (June 9, 1956): "Unfortunately we have not been told yet where the limits of our obligations toward our mother tongue and Hungarian nationality are, and where the area of chauvinism and bourgeois nationalism begins."

The respective Communist governments, in order to win over their Hungarian minorities and to manufacture a tradition of evolution for the consolidation of minority groups as advocated by them, identify themselves with the struggle of pre-World War II nationalities to maintain their existence and speak as if these efforts had been precursors of today's actions. Zoltan Fabry, a veteran Hungarian Communistic theoretician in Czechoslovakia writes (March 2, 1954): "The minority question was a painful reality: a degrading state corroding the subsistence of the Hungarian language—it was necessary to defend ourselves. It was a fight of honor and non-compromise."

This standpoint is complemented by a policy condemning the bourgeois methods of the three states with regard to their minorities. Laszlo Banyai, the Romanian Deputy Minister of Education, who is a Hungarian, writes thus on Romania between the two World Wars (September 1, 1957): "In the past, the exploiter classes of our Fatherland, in order to assure their oppressive rule and to split up the worker class, engaged in a policy of chauvinistic hate-mongering, oppression and the forcible assimilation of national minorities."

As against this past, the present policy loudly advocates the consolidation of minorities, claiming that the problem of Hungarian nationalities has been solved by the respective

Communist governments and Hungarians no longer desire national integration. However, such claims are swept away by the flood of news, complaints and threats proving the exact opposite. On April 17, 1954 *Magyar Szó* of Yugoslavia, for instance, writes thus: "Pressure is almost constant on the minorities to isolate them, to make them fight for various national demands and privileges . . . because of national isolationism the trend of developing a Hungarian consciousness breaks constantly through the surface and sometimes becomes dominant."

The 61 member Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party has 6 Hungarian members, the 70 member Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, 5 Hungarian members. The Romanian Parliament has 44 Hungarian Communist deputies, the Czechoslovak Parliament 8, the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Deputies 6. In the Slovak National Council, (a Regional Parliament of Slovakia), there are 13 Hungarian Communist deputies, in the Federal Assembly of the Vojvodina 29. The rights stipulated in the Constitutions and representation on high legislative bodies is practically meaningless for the inner life of the Hungarian minorities, the importance of this lies rather in the fact that they give evidence to the outside world of their continued existence.

Cultural Activities

The present national life of Hungarian minorities unfolds only in two areas: in the Local Councils and in cultural activities, mostly in the latter.

Transylvanian Local Councils and lower-grade administrative councils have more than 13,000 Hungarian members (1956). According to Joseph Arvai, a deputy from Southern Slovakia, "representatives of national groups were sent to the councils and elected according to the proportions of national stratification." (June 6, 1954.) According to an official announcement, 22.6 per cent of Local Council members in the Vojvodina (Vajdaság) are of Hungarian nationality.

As regards Local Councils, Ivan Galy, a spokesman for the young generation of the Hungarian Communist intelligentsia in Slovakia, voices the following complaint (June 11, 1955): "Bourgeois nationalism is responsible for the mistrust of state organs felt by part of our Hungarian workers. Despite the fact that . . . in all organs of state administration there are a great number of Hungarian workers to par-

ticipate in the management of public affairs, the view is rather widespread that the Local Councils are 'agencies alien to us,' what is more, there are some who regard [the councils] with more skepticism than the parish hall of older times." The Hungarian minorities instinctively avoid participation in the local work of Local Councils directed from above. Participation, they feel, would amount to surrendering their right to self-determination.

The Hungarian minorities unfold their national life in cultural movements within which they preserve their national existence and foster their culture. The Communists advocate cultural work which is "socialist in content and national in form" but our minorities have learned how to put the emphasis on the latter. The cultural activities of Hungarian minorities have such verve, that the Communists, willy-nilly, are swept along, too.

Cultural festivals held by Hungarian minorities are the highlights of today's minority life. Whether these festivals be of national or only regional importance, thousands of performers and spectators gather each time to enjoy the spirited performances of their traditional folk-groups, actors, singers and dancers.

In Czechoslovakia cultural activities are carried on within the framework of the organization called Csemadok [Cultural Association for Hungarian Workers of Czechoslovakia]. In Romania, Hungarians have no nationwide cultural organization, cultural organs of the administration are responsible for the management of Hungarian cultural life. In Yugoslavia, the Hungarian Cultural Association, founded in 1948, was abolished in May 1956. The cultural organizations of different nationalities have been replaced by a united Cultural Community. *Magyar Szó* explains (May 8, 1957) that experiments are being made with new forms of working organizations in order to fight more effectively against retrogressive nationalist and petit bourgeois phenomena which are discouraging features of rural cultural life.

Effect of the Hungarian Revolt

During the Hungarian Revolt of 1956, the world press carried news day by day on the unrest among Hungarian minorities. It was reported, for instance, that, because of demonstrations, the Hungarian inhabited regions of Slovakia had been occupied by troops of Czech nationality. The same was reported from Transylvania where, because of demonstrations, Romanian troops were concentrated and for-

eigners banned from areas bordering on Hungary. *Newsweek* of New York (November 11, 1956) carried news of a widespread rising among Hungarians in Carpatho-Ruthenia. *The New York Times* of July 26, 1957 reported that Romanian Communists finally had admitted to internal troubles at the time of the Hungarian Revolt. A staff writer of the *Neue Zuricher Zeitung* wrote on August 14, 1957, that he hardly met anyone in Southern Slovakia who did not at once start talking about the Hungarian Revolt. There was general sympathy with the Hungarian cause, disturbances occurred in several places.

A few quotations from the satellite press will help to make this picture even clearer:

Edgar Balogh, Hungarian university professor in Romania, a minority Communist intellectual, declared on November 6, 1957: "Let us not fool ourselves. The counter-revolution of last October in Hungary, and its waves reaching us, have given ample proof that Hungarian nationalism is still rampant." Laszlo Batky, a Hungarian columnist of Slovakia, writes on June 27, 1957: "We have no right to claim that we are living in an atmosphere free of the after-effects of the Hungarian events of last fall. It is evidently the confused echo of last year's events that finds expression in the views and behavior of certain persons, in the evaluation of events. And since these people do not live in an isolation booth . . . there is a danger of contagion against which we have to protect ourselves." *The New York Times* of December 10, 1956, reported that Hungarian events strongly affected 500,000 Hungarians of the Vojvodina (Vajdaság); they became aroused and awaited with feverish excitement the outcome of happenings in Hungary.

Eight Hungarians of Rumania are reported to have been executed and forty-four others sent to prison for terms ranging from five years to life for "separatist plotting" in Rumania at the time of the Hungarian uprising (*The New York Times,* September 6, 1958).

According to latest news, 50,000 Hungarians are going to be deported from Transylvania to Soviet Russia. The reason: a big and active anti-Red underground. Soviet security boss, General Ivan Serov, arrived in Rumania to look into the matter. He recommended the deportation of these Hungarians as a lesson to all (*Newsweek,* New York, October 6, 1958.)

Minority youth has fully adopted the views and attitudes of the older generation. *Magyar Szó* of Novisad complains that, at a meeting of university students in Zenta, demands

were voiced for the establishment of an Association of Hungarian University Students of Yugoslavia (April 17, 1954). The same paper reports that Hungarian youth of Yugoslavia are "of a destructive, corrupt mentality" and cannot get along with their Serbian counterparts (May 10, 1957). After fourteen years of Russian rule, a Hungarian language youth paper published by the local Komsomol appeared in February of this year in Carpatho-Ruthenia. In Bratislava Laszlo Batky complains that nationalist and revisionist manifestations of the Hungarian Revolt had a tremendous effect, above all, on the Hungarian intelligentsia of Slovakia. One must add—he writes—that the overwhelming majority of this intelligentsia are young people of twenty or younger, who could hardly have any personal contact with Hungarian revisionist efforts. (July 23, 1957.)

Hungarian minorities of today are more insistent in their claims for a national existence than ever before. This attitude developed not as a result of submissiveness to the Communist cause but quite otherwise, it is due to their consistent and firm exploitation of given possibilities and a conscious effort to increase their weight and importance.

PART SEVEN

Appendix

ETHNIC AND SOCIAL DATA

The 93.011 square kilometer (35.893 square mile) territory of Hungary lies largely in the main basin of Central Europe, the Middle Danube depression, also called the Hungarian Carpathian, or Pannonian Basin. Hungary occupies a compact area, approximately 122 miles wide and 280 miles long. It falls between 45° 48′ and 48° 31′ north latitude and between 16° 01′ and 22° 58′ east longitude. Hungary has only two stretches of natural frontier, the Danube and Ipoly rivers along the western half of the northern border, and the Drava and Mura rivers in the southwest. The total length of the present boundaries is approximately 1,400 miles, of which 228 miles border on Austria in the west, 446 miles on Czechoslovakia in the north, 66 miles on the Soviet Union in the northeast, 268 miles on Romania in the east, and 397 miles on Yugoslavia in the south.

The almost perfectly flat plain covers almost two-thirds of the central and eastern parts of Hungary. On the basis of the geological setting, relief, and climate, Hungary may be divided into three major geographical regions: Transdanubia, the Great Plain, and the Northern Upland. Lake Balaton, covering 160 square miles, the largest lake of East Central Europe, lies in Transdanubia.

Hungary's population of 9,825,000 on July 1, 1958 is an estimate based on official Hungarian projections. The following figures show an average annual increase of about 90,000 with a drop of 45,000 since the revolution.

TABLE 1. TOTAL POPULATION AND POPULATION DENSITY

Year	*Population*	*Density per Square Mile*	*Net gain or loss*	
			Number	*Per Cent*
1920	7,986,875	222.5	374,761	4.92
1930	8,685,109	242.0	698,234	8.74
1941	9,316,074	259.5	630,965	7.27
1949	9,204,799	256.4	−111,275	−1.19
1950	9,289,000	258.8	84,200	0.90
1951	9,378,000	261.3	89,000	0.95
1952	9,459,000	263.5	81,000	0.86
1953	9,537,000	265.7	78,000	0.82
1954	9,632,000	268.3	95,000	0.99
1955	9,750,000	271.6	118,000	1.21
1956	9,870,000	275.0	120,000	1.21
1958	9,825,000	274.0	− 45.000	−0.51

Hungary is the most densely populated country in East Central Europe: on July 1, 1956, her population density was 275.0 per square mile, considerably above the European average of 209.6 per square mile.

Before 1950, Hungary consisted of twenty-five counties, traditional administrative units of various sizes. In that year, their number was reduced to nineteen by merging the smaller ones and their sizes became more or less proportionate. The counties (megye) are in turn subdivided into districts (jaras).

Communities, towns, and cities numbered 3,291 in 1941, and 3,288 in 1947. This number declined to 3,222 in 1950, as a result of administrative mergers. The absorption of 24 suburbs and towns to create Greater Budapest was one of the important mergers.

The increase in the number of smaller communities and the population increase of the industrial settlements indicates a steady trend toward urbanization. This trend is more clearly observable in the table below which shows the urban and rural populations in 1941, 1949, 1954 and 1956.

TABLE 2. URBAN AND RURAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

(in per cent of total population)

Category	*1941*	*1949*	*1954*	*1956*
Urban including Budapest	38.2	36.5	40.0	40.6
Budapest	18.4	17.3	19.0	19.5
Rural	61.8	63.5	60.0	59.4

Major Cities and their Population:

Budapest	1,757,000
Miskolc	136,000
Debrecen	113,000
Szeged	88,000
Pecs	87,000
Gyor	66,000

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS

(in per cent)

Year	*Under 15 Years*	*15-39 Years*	*40-60 Years*	*Over 65 Years*
1910	34.8	38.6	21.7	4.9
1920	30.6	41.3	22.6	5.5
1930	27.5	42.6	23.6	6.3
1941	26.0	40.7	26.3	7.0
1949	24.6	37.5	30.1	7.8
1956	25.0	35.0	31.0	9.0

The average age was 27.2 in 1910, 28.7 in 1920, 29.8 in 1930, 31.6 in 1941, and 32.4 in 1949, according to Hungarian official figures.

TABLE 4. CRUDE VITAL STATISTICS

(Number of births and deaths per thousand inhabitants, excluding stillbirths and wartime military deaths)

Year	*Births*	*Deaths*	*Natural Increase*
1911-13	34.3	22.9	11.4
1916-20	21.7	21.7	—
1921-25	29.4	19.9	9.5
1926-30	26.0	17.0	9.0
1931-35	20.4	15.8	4.6
1936-40	20.1	14.2	5.9
1941-45	19.3	15.9	3.4
1946-50	20.4	12.5	7.9
1952	19.6	11.3	8.3
1954	23.0	11.0	12.0

Ratio of Men to Women: 100: 107

TABLE 5. AVERAGE SIZE OF FAMILIES AND RATIO OF DEPENDENTS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Occupational Group, Active and Passive Persons	*Number of Persons 1,000 Families*			*Ratio of Dependents per 1,000 Families*
	Total	*Earners*	*Dependents*	
All occupational groups	357	153	204	133.3
Farmers owning				
0-5 cadastral yokes	351	151	200	132.5
5-10 cadastral yokes	412	178	234	131.5
10-25 cadastral yokes	425	192	232	115.8
Over 25 cadastral yokes	395	183	212	115.8
Agricultural workers	342	138	204	147.8
Nonagricultural, economically independent persons	358	142	216	152.1
Nonagricultural wage earners	335	144	191	132.6
Not classified	262	102	160	156.9

TABLE 6. ETHNIC COMPOSITION

(in per cent)

Mother Tongue	*1910*	*1930*	*1941*	*1956*
Hungarian	88.4	92.1	92.8	97.0
German	7.3	5.5	5.1	2.2
Slovak	2.2	1.2	0.8	0.1
Romanian	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1
Serb and Croat	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.3
Other	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.3

Of these, the Germans are settled mainly west of the Danube, with a small group in the southeast. The Slovaks are scattered, except for a small group in the southeast. The Romanians are near the Romanian frontier and the Yugoslavs near the Yugoslav, but there is dispersal here too.

TABLE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY RELIGION
(in per cent)

Religion	*1910*	*1930*	*1941*	*1956*
Roman Catholic	62.8	64.9	65.7	67.0
Greek Catholic	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.5
Protestant	27.8	27.0	26.8	27.3
Jewish	6.2	5.1	4.3	1.5
Others	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.7

LITERACY

The last two decades have shown a gradual decrease in the number and proportion of the illiterate population. The proportion of illiterate Hungarians over 10 years of age, was 9.3 per cent in 1930. The same category comprised 6.0 per cent of the population in 1941. In 1949, it was 5 per cent and in 1955 slightly above 4 per cent.

TABLE 8. DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, BY OOCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Occupational Group	1910	1930	1941	1949	1952
Agriculture	1,684,400	2,031,451	2,153,455	2.031,000	2,050,000
Mining and Smelting	29,100	35,182	55,281	70,000	110,000
Industry	684,200	886,676	1,057,196	855,000	1,185,000
Trade and Banking	151,700	226,083	260,456		
Transportation	100,800	113,289	140,286		
Armed Forces	53,400				
Public Administration and self employed persons	126,400	238,083	358,104	1,005,000	992,000
Servants and day laborers	192,200	236,834	201,475	132,000	87,000
Others and unspecified	127,200	62,204	276,864	232,000	201,000
Total:	3,145,400	3,829,752	4,503,117	4,325,000	4,625,000

Since the Communist coup d'état of 1947, Hungary has undergone a social transformation. By 1954, at the end of the first Five-Year Plan, nearly 1,400,000 persons were employed by the nationalized industries of mining, manufacturing, construction, and in private handicrafts. Extensive nationalization has tremendously increased the category of "wage earners," at the expense of those in private enterprise and the free professions. Although the forced collectivization of agriculture has put tens of thousands of farmers into the category of wage earners, the consequences of the 1945 land reform are still observable: the category of "independent small producers" is still higher than it was in 1930. The "capitalist" class—in the Western sense—has been completely eliminated. If there is still a category under this title, it apparently refers to "kulaks"— small landowners who work with hired farm labor. Table 9 shows these changes.

TABE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY SOURCE OF INCOME

	1930		1954	
Group	*Population*	*Per Cent*	*Population*	*Per Cent*
Dependent on wage and salary	5,056,300	58.3	5,720,000	59.4
Independent small producers	2,490,200	28.6	3,009,300	31.2
Collective cooperative members			776,800	8.1
Capitalists	953,500	11.0	58,400	0.6
Others	182,300	2.1	67,600	0.7
Total	8,682,300	100.0	9,632,100	100.0

ECONOMIC DATA

The labor force (excluding agricultural workers) consists of 2,435,000 persons, of whom about one third are female. Half of the country's industrial output comes from in and near Budapest. A major steel mill was put into operation at Dunapentele (Sztalinvaros), in 1950, then partially abandoned in 1953; but work towards its speedy completion has started again. Dunapentele is about 50 miles downstream from Budapest. Miskolc is the center of iron smelting industries, Gyor of finished metal products, Pecs of coal

mining, Szeged of the textile industry and Debrecen of light and agricultural industries.

INDUSTRY, RESOURCES, TRANSPORTATION AND TRADE

Steel milling, bauxite mining and refining, textiles, grain milling, and wine are among Hungary's major industries. The engineering industry is being developed rapidly.

Major Natural Resources

Coal and Lignite	Bauxite
Manganese	Petroleum

Hungary relies entirely on imports of iron ore. The country has ten coal regions, the best being in the Pecs-Komlo area. Her bauxite deposits are rich. Known petroleum resources have twenty years reserves, approximately.

Transportation

Railways	9,050 km.
Road and Highways	33,500 km.

Foreign Trade

About $1,150,000,000 annually

Exports to the Free World	$140,000,000 (approximately)
Exports to the Soviet Bloc	$460,000,000 (approximately)

Principal Exports

River vessels	Automotive equipment
Derricks	Machine tools and electrical apparatus
Medicines	Textiles
Armaments	Turbines
Grains	Livestock and livestock products
Vegetables	Fruit

These and many other goods make up Hungary's exports. About one quarter of her exports are in semi-finished materials; the remainder is evenly divided between raw materials, foodstuffs, and finished products.

Principal Imports

Iron	Alloy metals
Cotton	Hides
Automobiles	Wood and wood products
Glass, china	Agricultural machinery
Fertilizers	Salt

AGRICULTURE

Land measures in Hungary are a rather complicated affair, insofar as there are a variety of terms for different areas. However, the cadastral yoke (sometimes called cadastral acre, and in Hungarian *katasztralis hold,* or merely hold) is the most common form of measurement and equals 1.42 acres; 1.74 cadastral holds equal one hectare.

Two other land measures are common; the "small hold" (kishold) which equals ⅝ of a cadastral hold, and the "Hungarian hold" (Magyar hold) which equals ¾ of a cadastral hold.

Total area	22,900,000 acres
Pasture and meadowland	3,910,000 "
Forests	2,780,000 "
Vineyards	534,000 "
Orchard and vegetable gardens	322,000 "
Arable land	13,800,000 "

The rest of the land is uncultivated or marshland.

The land reform which was carried out in 1945 under the coalition government, affected 8,040,000 acres. (4,150,000 acres were arable, the rest being vineyards, forests, etc.) Of this land, 4,670,000 acres were distributed among 642,000 peasants, an average of about 7.3 acres per peasant. The remainder of the land was kept in reserve by the State, with the exception of small areas granted workers as kitchen gardens. In 1948, another 358,000 acres were distributed from lands held on lease.

Collectivization was commenced in 1949. At present, there are 2,800 collective farms in Hungary totalling 2,300,000 acres. State farms, formed on government land and worked as national enterprises, cultivate 1,710,000 acres, with 17,000,000 full-time employees. The "Socialist sector"—i.e., the collective and State farms—encompasses 29 per cent of the country's total arable land.

The principal agricultural products in metric tons (one metric ton equals 2,204.6 lbs.):

Bread grains	2,300,000
Corn (maize)	2,630,000
Other grains	1,120,000
Potatoes	2,260,000
Sugar beets	2,300,000
Tobacco	2,300,000

Current Livestock

Cattle	2,000,000
Pigs	7,000,000
Sheep	1,500,000
Horses	750,000

WORKING CONDITIONS, LIVING STANDARDS

The average work week is 48 hours, for which the following are typical monthly wages:

White collar worker	1,300 Forints
Miner	1,400 "
Machinist	1,250 "
Unskilled laborer	950 "

The *forint* is the unit of currency, and contains 100 *filler.* One U.S. dollar equals 11.74 forints. (Black-market price 40-45 forints.)

TABLE 10. LIVING COSTS IN THE WEEKLY BUDGET OF AN AVERAGE FOUR-MEMBER WORKER FAMILY

Expenses	*1949*	*1951*	*1952*	*1958*
Food	90.36	217.75	223.06	189.61
Household	14.08	14.08	25.50	25.50
Clothing	25.56	31.49	42.72	38.45
Total	130.00	201.42	291.28	253.56
Index	100.00	154.90	224.10	195.00

MISCELLANEOUS DATA

Major Universities

Lorand Eötvös University of Sciences in Budapest
University of Debrecen
University of Szeged

University of Pecs
Technological University in Budapest
University of Architecture in Budapest
Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest
Agricultural University in Budapest
Agricultural University in Gödöllő
University of the Heavy Industries in Miskolc
Chemical Industrial University in Veszprem
Mining and Forestry University in Sopron

Legal Holidays

New Year's Day
April 4 ("Liberation Day")
May Day
August 20 (Constitution Day)
November 7 (Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution)
Christmas

CHRONOLOGY

1944

March 19. Nazi Germany occupies Hungary.

October 15. In a radio-address, Regent Horthy declares armistice. The Germans nominate Ferenc Szalasi, Arrow-Cross leader, as the head of a Puppet Government. Regency Council formed by General Beregffy, Dr. Ferenc Rajniss and Dr. Sandor Csia.

December 21. Under the Presidency of Dr. Bela Zsedenyi, the Provisional National Assembly convenes in Debrecen.

22. With Bela Dalnoki Miklos as Prime Minister, a Provisional Government is established.

23. The Hungarian Provisional Government declares war on Germany.

24. Russian troops besiege Budapest.

1945

January 20. Armistice agreement signed in Moscow.

February 18. Budapest is "liberated."

25. Secretary General of the Communist Party, Matyas Rakosi addresses the workers in the capital for the first time.

March 15. Land Reform Bill issued.

20. The National Committee of Budapest elects Arpad Szakasits, a Social Democrat, President.

25. Central organ of the Hungarian Communist Party, *Szabad Nep,* starts publishing.

27. Government decree dissolves the rightist parties; fascist books ordered destroyed.

29. Discrimination against the Jews is outlawed.

April 4. The whole territory of Hungary is "liberated."

13. The Provisional Government moves to Budapest.

May 15. Ferenc Nagy becomes Minister of Reconstruction; Erno Gero the Minister of Commerce.

May 16. Zoltan Vas elected mayor of Budapest.

June 3. The National Assembly enrolls 150 new representatives from the Trans-Danubian District. Social Democrat Antal Ban becomes Minister of Industry.

12. Hungarian-Soviet Cultural Society formed.

24. War reparations to Russia set at $200,000,000. It is to be paid until January 20, 1951.

29. The governments of Carpatho-Ukraine and the USSR agree that the former Hungarian province be incorporated into the Soviet Union.

July 7. Social Democrat Agoston Valentiny, resigns as Minister of Justice because of ideological differences with the communists. Dr. Istvan Ries follows him on July 10.

25. According to Radio Moscow, 22,000 Nazis and members of the Volksbund were arrested in Budapest.

August 22. The new leader of the Smallholders' Party is Zoltan Tildy. President: Ferenc Nagy; Managing President: Msgr. Bela Varga; Secretary General: Bela Kovacs.

23. St. Stephen's right hand is brought back from Austria to Budapest.

26. The Social Democratic Party elects Arpad Szakasits as Secretary General.

29. Communists and Socialists declare joint list for municipal elections in Budapest.

September 5. First meeting of the Provisional Assembly in Budapest.

30. United States and the USSR recognize the Hungarian Government.

November 4. Elections for National Assembly. Smallholders 2,547,000, Social Democrats 772,000, Communists 747,000, National Peasants 301,000 votes.

15. Cabinet under Zoltan Tildy formed.

17. Great Britain recognizes the Hungarian Government.

18. Jozsef Kovago becomes Mayor of Budapest.

1946

January 1. In a radio message Cardinal Mindszenty summons the Hungarian people to examine their consciences. The Primate also denounces terrorism.

6. Msgr. Bela Varga resigns his post as member of the Supreme National Council.

9. Hungarian Minister to the U.S., Aladar Szegedy-Maszak, arrives in Washington.

11. War-time Prime Minister Laszlo Bardossy sentenced to death.

17. USA lifts restrictions on trade with Hungary.

February 1. Hungary proclaimed a republic.

2. The National Assembly elects Zoltan Tildy as President of the Republic by popular acclamation.

5. Ferenc Nagy is the new Prime Minister.

8. The National Assembly unanimously elects Msgr. Bela Varga its President.

12. Agreement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed for exchange in population.

23. $10,000,000 U.S.A. loan granted to Hungary, to be paid back within 30 years.

March 2. Ferenc Szalasi, Gabor Vajda, Jenö Szöllösi, Sandor Csia, Baron Gabor Kemeny, Jozsef Gera and Karoly Beregffy, former leaders of the Arrow-Cross Party, sentenced to death.

13. Leftist Bloc of Communists, Socialists and Peasant Party formed.
The Smallholder Party accepts the conditions set for cooperation: 1. Nationalization of bauxite mines, oil industry, electric power, the five largest heavy industrial enterprises; 2. state control of the banks; 3. civil service dismissal list; 4. completion of land reform; 5. strict measures against corruption.

21. Laszlo Rajk becomes Minister of Interior.

29. Hungarian Minister to the USSR, Gyula Szekfü presents his credentials to President Svernik.

April 9. Hungarian-Soviet bauxite-aluminum treaty signed.

10. Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, Deputy Prime Minster Arpad Szakasits, Foreign Minister Janos Gyöngyösi, and Minister of Communications Ernö Gerö fly to Moscow for negotiations.

12. Prime Minister Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov receive the Hungarian government delegation.

18. Sixteen members of the National Assembly who have resigned from the Smallholders' Party, form a new party under the leadership of Dezsö Sulyok.

Police report "Fascist conspiracy" of the Piarist Gymnasium. Students arrested.

26. According to an official statement, Allied Control Commission's permit is necessary for the formation of political parties.

July 4. Deputy ACC Chairman General Sviridov demands that severe measures be taken against Roman Catholic clergymen accused of inciting the population against Russian forces.

24. Minister of Interior Laszlo Rajk dissolves nearly 1,000 organizations, among others the Catholic Youth Organization and the Boy Scouts.

September 7-9. *Peasant Days* in Budapest with the participation of 400,000 peasants.

November 23. The five largest heavy industrial enterprises nationalized.

December 9. Deputy Ferenc Vidovics arrested.

1947

January 20. Seven Smallholders' Party members of the National Assembly, among them, Sandor Kiss, arrested on charge of plotting to overthrow the Government.

February 10. Hungarian Peace Treaty signed in Paris.

25. Bela Kovacs, Secretary-General of the Smallholders' Party arrested by the Russian occupation forces.

April 16. General Lajos Dalnoki-Veres and two others sentenced to death on charges of plotting to overthow the government.

May 30. Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy submits resignation under pressure.

31. Government resigns. At request of the Soviets, Lajos Dinnyes of the Smallholders' Party, Minister of Defense, forms a new coalition government.

June 1. Msgr. Bela Varga, President of Parliament, leaves the country.

6. Mayor Kovago resigns from all his posts.

7. Ferenc Nagy, in announcement made in Switzerland, denies charges that he and Bela Kovacs took part in conspiracy against the Hungarian Republic.

Aladar Szegedy-Maszak, Ambassador to Washington, and Paul Auer, Ambassador to Paris, resign.

10. The United States recognizes the new Hungarian government.

15. Soviet-American exchange of notes in the Ferenc Nagy affair.

26. Msgr. Bela Varga and other members of the National Assembly in Exile, deprived of their citizenship.

August 1. Three Year Plan launched.

29. General elections. Communist Party 22%, Democratic People's Party headed by Istvan Barankovics 16%, Smallholders' Party 15.1%, Social Democratic Party 14.6%, Independent Party led by Zoltan Pfeiffer 14%, National Peasant Party 9%, Balogh Party 5%.

September 15. Peace Treaty, deposited in Moscow, comes into force.

16. New Parliament holds first meeting. Imre Nagy elected Chairman.

October 10. Labor tribunals established.

24. Nationalization of banks.

November 4. Dr. Zoltan Pfeiffer leaves Hungary.

11. National Assembly passes a bill authorizing government by decree.

20. The Government dissolves Pfeiffer's Independent Party.

1948

January 13. The National Assembly ratifies a "good relationship treaty" with Yugoslavia.

24. Hungarian-Romanian friendly relations, cooperation and aid treaty signed in Budapest.

February 6. The National Assembly passes a bill to nationalize bauxite mines and aluminum industry.

7. Deputies Ferenc Barkanyi and Ferenc Vandor sentenced to 8 years each.

16. Karoly Peyer sentenced to 8 years, Frigyes Pisky to 10 years, and Robert Gabor to death, in-contumacia.

18. A friendly and mutual aid treaty between Hungary and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow.

Anna Kethly and many other anti-communist leaders are expelled from the Social Democratic Party.

March 4. Social Democrat Gyula Kelemen receives life sentence.

22. The Social Democratic Party withdraws its membership from the International Bureau of Social Democratic Parties.

April 27. Istvan Barankovics protests against surprise nationalizations.

28. Factories, employing more than 100 workers, nationalized.

May 4. The National Assembly passes a bill ordering the sequestration of the properties of refugees and the cancellation of their citizenship.

14. Propaganda campaign launched for the secularization of Catholic schools.

June 12-15. The Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party announce the unification of the two parties. The joint Congress elects the central directorate of the Hungarian Workers' Party. The central directorate elects Matyas Rakosi as Secretary-General and Arpad Szakasits as President.

16. School nationalization bill passed over opposition of the Barankovics' Party.

July 23. Director of the Actio Catholica, Zsigmond Mihalovits sentenced to 10 years in prison. Co-defendants receive prison terms ranging from ten months to ten years.

30. President of the Republic, Zoltan Tildy resigns. His son-in-law, Viktor Csornoky arrested.

August 3. The new President of the Republic is Arpad Szakasits.

5. Laszlo Rajk nominated Minister of Foreign Affairs; Janos Kadar the new Minister of Interior.

September 2. The Political Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party bars admission, and orders purge of rank and file members.

9. Istvan Dobi announces the dissolution of the Peasant Union, a powerful professional organization.

10. Istvan Farkas is the new Minister of Defense, Ferenc Erdei Minister of State.

October 1. Bishop Lajos Ordas sentenced to two years imprisonment.

25. Aurel Varannai, Budapest reporter for Reuters News Agency, sentenced to 8 months in prison.

November 15. Viktor Csornoky sentenced to death on charges of high treason, espionage.

December 9. Prime Minister Lajos Dinnyes resigns; Istvan Dobi appointed Prime Minister.

Professor Simon Papp sentenced to death in the so-called MAORT-trial.

16. New military criminal code issued.

Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty, Primate of Hungary, and thirteen other persons arrested on charges of treason, espionage, and currency speculation.

1949

January 21. The foundation of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid.

February 1. Independent People's Front established. President: Matyas Rakosi.

4. The Democratic People's (Barankovics) Party announces its dissolution. Istvan Barankovics flees the country.

8. Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty sentenced to life imprisonment.

May 15. Elections with a single list: 96.5% for the Independent People's Front.

June 10. New National Assembly convenes. Istvan Dobi remains Prime Minister, Matyas Rakosi Deputy Prime Minister. Ernö Gerö is the President of the People's Economic Council.

18. The Hungarian government declares the Hungarian-Yugoslav economic pact invalid.

August 20. New Soviet-type Constitution for Hungary declared.

The President of the Presidium of the People's Republic is Arpad Szakasits.

27. The Hungarian Government rejects "the attempts of the Americans and the British to interfere in Hungarian internal affairs," on the charge that Hungary has violated the Peace Treaty.

September 6. Religious instruction in school made optional.

24. Laszo Rajk and Tibor Szönyi sentenced to death and executed on October 15, 1949.

October 21. General Görgy Palffy and Colonel Andras Korondi sentenced to death by Military Court.

December 2. State Control Commission on Soviet pattern is set up to exercise control over all ministries and government agencies.

28. All industrial and trade organizations with more than ten employees nationalized.

29. AVH (Security Police) becomes an independent organization responsible only to Council of Ministers.

1950

January 1. Five Year Plan starts.

14. The bishops of the Reformed and Evangelical Churches take loyalty oath to the Republic of the Hungarian People and the Constitution.

February 21. Robert Vogeler sentenced to 15 years, George Sanders to 13 years, two Hungarians to death, and three others to prison terms, ranging from five to ten years, in the International Telephone and Telegraph and Standard Electric Companies trial.

March 10. Deputy Jozsef Adorjan arrested.

April 26. Arpad Szakasits resigns as President of People's Republic.

June 6. Former Social Democratic leaders Anna Kethly, Agoston Valentiny, Imre Györky, Ferenc Szeder and 4,000 party functionaries arrested.

13. Free mason lodges dissolved.

18. Former Smallholders' Party leaders arrested.

19. Former left-wing Social Democrats (Istvan Ries, Arpad Szakasits, György Marosan) arrested.

August 31. Agreement concluded between the Government and Catholic bishops.

September 24. Foreign Ministers of Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, German Democratic Republic, and Hungary hold conference in Prague.

October 22. Trade unions take over social security.

November 23. Mayor Kovago sentenced to life by secret court.

1951

February 1. New Labor Code issued.

9. Manpower recruitment starts.

April 25. Headquarters of Democatic World Youth Organization transferred to Budapest.

27. Robert Vogeler released from prison.

May 13. Foreign Minister Gyula Kallai, Interior Minister Janos Kadar, State Secretary Geza Losonczy and Ferenc Donath arrested with several other government officials.

17. Establishment of State Office for Church Affairs.

28. Government decree issued on general schools and compulsory schooling.

June 17. Deportations from Budapest ordered.

28. Archbishop Grösz sentenced to life imprisonment.

July 21. Roman Catholic bishops take oath of allegiance to Hungarian People's Republic.

August 17. Gen. Béla Kiraly arrested.

December 14. Agricultural Cooperative Council is established.

16. Stalin Statue unveiled in Budapest.

1952

February 19. Nationalization of real estate.

August 14. National Assembly elects Matyas Rakosi Prime Minister, Istvan Dobi chairman of Presidium, and Sandor Ronai chairman of National Assembly.

October 3. Sixty-nine Soviet firms in Hungary pass into Hungarian ownership.

November 24. Presidium issues decree dissolving People's Economic Council and transferring functions of Council to Council of Ministers.

1953

January 17. Lajos Stockler, president of Hungarian Jewish Community arrested.

20. Hungarian People's Republic fulfils reparations obligations to Soviet Union.

March 8. National Assembly passes law on "preservation of Stalin's memory." Matyas Rakosi and other members of Hungarian delegation stand guard at Stalin's bier.

May 17. National Assembly "elections."

June 28-30. Central Committee of Hungarian Workers' Party reorganize Politbureau, abolish the position of Secretary General.

July 4. Imre Nagy, new Prime Minister, delivers his program to National Assembly.

26. Amnesty for political prisoners.

August 1. Government decree increases the size of household lots in the collective farms.

9. New trade licenses granted.

23. Tax reduction for peasants.

30. Presidium decree reduces crop deliveries for independent farmers 10 per cent and lifts marketing restrictions on grains and fall hoed crops.

September 2. Credits for handicraftsmen.

6. Price cuts.

19. New system of crops gathering adopted; delivery quotas lowered, consolidation of kolkhozes and further privileges granted to raise the living standard of kolkhoz members.

October 31. At Hungarian Workers' Party's Central Committee meeting Rakosi reports alterations on economic policy.

December 13. Endre Zakar, former Secretary of Cardinal Mindszenty, sentenced to 14 years for the "criminal act of organizing and heading a movement aimed at overthrowing the People's Democracy."

1954

January 10. Introduction of Identity cards.

March 11. Abolishment of summary court proceedings.

13. A Military Tribunal sentences Gabor Peter, former head of the Security Police, to life, Gyula Decsi, former Minister of Justice, to 9 years, and Istvan Timar to 11 years of prison on the charge of "criminal activities against the State and the people."

28. Government Information Bureau established.

May 19. Hungarian-Austrian agreement regulating navigation on the Danube signed.

24-30. Third Congress of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party.

July 15-31. The Danube river floods an area of 100,000 cadastral acres in the region between Gyor and Baja.

August 17. USA aid for flood relief accepted by the Hungarian government.

October 9. Janos Kadar, released from prison, is the party secretary of the Thirteenth District, Budapest.

November 8. Hungarian-Soviet announcement regarding transfer of Soviet holdings in jointly owned Hungarian-Soviet commercial enterprises to the Hungarian People's Republic.

21. Anna Kethly of the Social Democratic Party released from prison.

28. Local Council elections: one third of the new members are not Communists.

1955

February 12. Otthmar Faddy, Franciscan monk, and Lajos Bonis, a former monk, sentenced to life; Kalman Gajary, a former landowner, to 13 years of prison.

19. "Illness" of Imre Nagy announced.

March 9. A Central Committee resolution on the tasks of the Hungarian Workers' Party published in the press. The resolution condemns Imre Nagy for rightist deviation.

April 13. Charged with "conspiracy and treason," Jozsef Fiala, Kalman Toth, Ignac Gal, Balazs Gomany and Mihaly Duzsa are sentenced to death by the Budapest Municipal Court.

18. Imre Nagy expelled from the Political and Central Committees of the HCP and deprived of all party functions.

May 15. Hungary joins the Warsaw Pact.

July 17. Cardinal Mindszenty released from prison term, placed under house arrest.

August 20. The Ministry of State Control re-established.

September 25. Free marketing of grain permitted.

October 14. Arch-Bishop Joseph Grosz released from prison. Amnesty for Catholic priests Dr. Imre Hoka, Janos Horvath, Jeno Koppanyi and Jozsef Bardos.

26. Wage and Labor Council established.

November 15. Ferenc Erdei is the new Deputy Prime Minister.

December 14. Hungary's admission to the UN.

1956

January 12. Earthquake reported in the vicinity of Budapest.

15. Sentenced by the Budapest Municipal Court and the Military Tribunal of Budapest on charges of "spying for a foreign power, instigation against the State, and other criminal activities" are: Bela Kapotsy, employee of U.S. Legation, life imprisonment, Ferenc Arpas, 15 years, Kornel Balazs, 8 years, Endre Marton, 6 years, and Mrs. Endre Marton, 3 years.

February 8. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic protests to the Government of the United States against propaganda balloons.

22. Decree granting full exemption from 1956 income taxes to persons joining kolkhozes.

26. Amnesty for Dr. Jusztin Baranyai, Peter Gyetvai and other church dignitaries.

March 29. Matyas Rakosi announces the exoneration and rehabilitation of defendants in the Rajk trial and release of former Social Democratic leaders.

April 18. Dissolution of the Cominform.

May 10. The Government broadens the powers of plant managers, issues a decree on the establishment of Social Courts, and instructs the Minister of the Interior to eliminate the physical barriers on the Western frontier of Hungary.

12. Acting on a request by the Minister of Justice, the Presidium grants amnesty to Jozsef Grosz, Archbishop of Kalocsa, who returns to his diocese and assumes chairmanship of the Bench of Bishops.

June 13. Hungarian citizens are not required to have passports for travel in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria.

July 1. The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party sharply condemns the debates of the Petoefi Circle.

18. Matyas Rakosi relieved from his post as First Secretary; Janos Kadar, Karoly Kiss, Gyorgy Marosan, and Jozsef Revai are the new members of the Political Committee; Ernö Gerö appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee.

August 17. The Presidium grants amnesty to AP correspondent Endre Marton.

September 5. Gen. Béla Kiraly released from prison.

October 1. Crimea meeting of Ernö Gerö and Joseph Broz-Tito with Khrushchev.

6. A crowd of 200,000 silently demonstrates at the re-burial of Laszlo Rajk, Gyorgy Palffy, Tibor Szonyi, and Andras Szalai in Budapest.

11. Former Security Police officers arrested on charges of "grave violations of socialist legality."

An Evangelical Church Court fully rehabilitates Bishop Lajos Ordass.

13. Mihaly Farkas arrested on a warrant issued by the Chief Prosecutor.

15. Under Ernö Gerö, a party and government delegation leaves for Belgrade.

23. The revolution breaks out.

November 4. Massive Soviet military interference.

5. Fighting continues throughout the country. Soviet-controlled radio stations repeat cease-fire and return-to-work appeals. Free stations broadcast military instructions to the remaining resistance groups and repeated appeals for Western help. Fighting continues in the 8th District of Budapest, on Csepel Island, and the Lake Balaton region and in Kecskemet. Russians claim to have taken Szombathely, Miskolc, Debrecen, Szolnok, and Pecs.

6. The Kadar government appeals to friendly nations and the Soviet Military Command for food and medicine. Fighting continues in Pecs, Budapest, Dunapentele, Szombathely, Hegyeshalom, and other areas. Soviet-controlled stations broadcast an ultimatum to the patriots. Reports of continued fighting and local successes are broadcast by free radio stations, as well as appeals to Soviet troops and requests for Western help.

7. Fighting continues. Government stations claim restoration of order. Soviet fight in Szeged, Szolnok, Hodmezövasarhely, Pecs and Dunapentele. Individual free amateur and military short-wave stations continue to broadcast at intervals from unknown locations.

8. Continued resistance urged by free radios. Fighting continues in Pecs, Dunapentele, Budapest and its suburbs, and in the Bakony region. Budafok and Nagyteteny bombed by Soviet aircraft.
The government orders surrender of all weapons to Soviet troops by the evening of November 9. Those surrendering their arms before the deadline are promised immunity.
Budapest Radio announces that order has been restored in Györ, Szeged, Komarom and Szekesfehervar, but admits fighting still going on in Budapest. The government issues repeated appeals for order; ministers plead with the people to return to work, citing food and fuel shortages which endanger the health of the population.

9. Fighting continues, particularly heavily in Csepel and Kulsokobanya, as well as in the 3rd, 6th and 20th Districts of Budapest and in the suburbs. Fighting also reported in Dunapentele, Kalocsa, Gyor, Pecs and Komlo.

12. A decree undermines the authority of revolutionary committees established in the administrative apparatus during uprising. They are allowed only in advisory capacity and are forbidden to "replace leading officials."

14. Kadar holds talks with workers' delegations in an effort to put a stop to the strike paralyzing industry. Promises not to take reprisals against freedom fighters and pledges to abolish the secret police, hold new elections and include non-Communist parties in the government. He asserts that Imre Nagy is not under arrest, has not deliberately aided the "counter-revolution" and has the choice of participating in Hungarian political life. Kadar

warns, however, that Russian troops will remain in Hungary until the "danger of the reactionary attempt has passed" and rejects workers' demands for Hungarian neutrality.

18. The regime denies "hostile rumors" that young people are being deported to the Soviet Union. At the same time, instructs police to render harmless "looters, counterrevolutionaries, terrorists and armed bandits."
    Announcement that henceforth wages will be paid only to workers who show up at the job and produce effectively.
    The regime attacks journalists, students, writers, etc., who "continue to champion the cause of the senseless strike."
21. The regime issues a law on workers' councils which strips their political power. They are promised an economic role as organs of "Workers self-management," but are not permitted to take over functions performed by factory directors or Party-controlled trade union committees.
22. The workers call a new 48-hour strike in reaction to the law and to government attempts to obstruct a free election meeting of the workers' councils.
    The regime appoints special commissioners to certain enterprises in an attempt to safeguard production.
23. Official communique states that Imre Nagy has asked and been granted "permission" to go to Romania.
24. The Ministry of Agriculture announces a decree outlining provisions for withdrawal from and dissolution of collective farms.
    Police units round up large groups of youngsters heading for the borders.
25. Kadar delivers a speech in which he calls Nagy's departure for Romania "correct" because his presence would stir up trouble. He insists, however, that Nagy has not been exiled.
26. Kadar delivers a harsher speech. He pledges to "hunt down" all "counterrevolutionaries," denounces workers' councils for "squandering" public goods, and condemns revolutionary committees in offices and institutions for "behaving anarchically." Kadar then states that Imre Nagy "yielded to the demands of the counterrevolution," "shielded horrors by his name," and committed an unforgivable crime against the Hungarian people. When Nagy announced his desire to leave the country, Kadar

concludes, the Party decided to have nothing further to do with him. The Premier also denounces the UN debate on Hungary and claims that the Soviets acted legally at the request of the Hungarian government.

27. Amnesty is announced for emigres who seek repatriation.

29. The regime requests that the Austrian Government help young Hungarian emigres to return home.

December 3. Special wages are granted to miners, and the government promises to start investigations of former Security Police officers.

4. Hungarian women in Budapest hold a demonstration for their dead and are fired on by Soviet guns. Minister of Defense Münnich abolishes revolutionary committees on the grounds that they "hamper lawful authorities" and do not carry out any activity in the interests of the public.
Army officers are made to sign pledges supporting the government.

5. New waves of anti-regime outbursts occur. Hungarian writers issue a proclamation denouncing Soviet intervention.

6. The regime condemns the flood of posters and leaflets calling on Budapest citizens to strike, demonstrate, and engage in armed action. Several leaders of the Revolt are arrested, including Gyula Obersovszky, accused of distributing anti-State pamphlets.
The Budapest Workers' Council sends the government a telegram protesting the arrests of the workers' elected leaders.
A clash occurs between Budapest workers and a group of Kadar supporters marching under a red flag.

7. New strikes and street fights break out. The Budapest Workers' Council issues a proclamation charging that the continued jailing of workers' leaders will end in a general strike and a new national tragedy. Thousands of workers stay away from their jobs.

8. A Party resolution condemns "counterrevolutionary" activities and attempts to exclude Communists from the workers' councils. On the other hand, the resolution stresses the need to break with the Stalinist past, to democratize the Party, to "construct Socialism" according to Hungarian

conditions and to revise economic policy with a view to raising the workers' living standard and increasing agricultural production in both the private and collective sectors. The resolution supports a policy of close cooperation with the Soviet Union and the "People Democracies" on the principles of national independence and sovereignity.

9. The regime outlaws the Budapest Workers' Council and all councils outside factories and declares martial law. Summary jurisdiction is to apply to anyone in illegal possession of arms or guilty of attempts to commit murder, manslaughter, arson, robbery or looting.

12. A general strike goes into effect.
The regime announces that no public meetings or demonstrations can be held without official approval for one month.
The strike continues. Sandor Bali and Sandor Racz, leaders of the outlawed Budapest Workers' Council, are arrested.
The government announces that anyone whose activities "endanger public order," or who interferes with smooth production or transportation, must be taken into custody.

18. The radio begins to broacast almost daily announcements of arrests of "counterrevolutionaries."

24. The Party press discloses that 1956 coal production fell ten million tons short of the plan and that the national income had dropped by almost 10 billion forint.

26. The Ministry of Agriculture condemns illegal sales of collective farm property and issues instructions that all property and equipment of former collectives must be handed over to other collectives, State farms or machine stations.

29. The government reveals that between the end of September and December 20 the total number of collective farms declined from 3,930 to about 2,000. Minister of Finance Istvan Kossa states that 1957 investments will be cut by 5 billion forint. Savings will be made by reducing expenditures for the armed forces by reorganizing the State apparatus. All large-scale construction will be stopped. Kossa estimates the total number of unemployed, including civil servants, at 250,000.

30. Ministerial mergers reduce size of State apparatus. The Ministry of State Control is abolished.

January 3. Announcement that the reconstituted post-Revolt Party has 100,000 members.
Statement that Soviet troops will leave Budapest if "order" is restored.
Soviet CP First Secretary Khrushchev and leaders of the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Hungarian Communist Parties met in Budapest to discuss Soviet-bloc internal and foreign policies. A communique issued in Moscow on January 6 said that the Russian and satellite leaders had pledged to support Premier Kadar's Hungarian government against "counterrevolution" and "encroachments of aggressive imperialist forces."

6. Premier Kadar curbed hopes for liberalization of his rule with a statement reaffirming the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Hungary. The statement pledged both "strengthening of the state power" and "further democratization" with liberty for all "except" those who are "enemies of freedom and socialism."

8. The Central Council of Trade Unions postpones general union elections.
The workers' council of Csepel resigns, claiming that the government has deprived it of authority and is arresting the workers' elected leaders.

10. Kadar confers in Moscow with Soviet leaders, then goes to see Chinese Communist Premier Chou-En-lai.

12. Eight student leaders are arrested for drafting resolution re-endorsing October 23, 1956 demands.

13. Strikes and every effective form of opposition are made subject to the death penalty.

15. The government assumed direct control over all organizations and associations.

16. Kadar criticizes "bourgois tendencies" in the press, denounces "reformist" views among intellectuals, and insist that "democracy" must have "class content."

17. The Ministry of Interior suspends Writers' Union for "anti-State activities."

19. Jozsef Dudas and Janos Szabo, leaders during the Revolt, are executed. The Ministry of Interior appoints an overseer for the Journalists' Union.

20. The Ministry of State Security takes over control of all associations.

25. Five Communist writers and two journalists are arrested on "suspicion of counterrevolutionary activity."
Minister of the Armed Forces Ferenc Münnich announces army reorganization.

26. A new Ministry of Labor is created.

27. Minister of State Gyorgy Marosan warns students not to demonstrate on March 15, "Independence Day." He also opposes demands for university autonomy and rejects student protest against courses in Marxism-Leninism.

February 2. Kadar denounces "national communism," blames Imre Nagy for fomenting the Revolt, and warns that the "counterrevolution" will pay high price for any new "provocation." He condemns hostile activities in the countryside and among the Communist intelligentsia, and discusses pressures exerted by believers and non-believers in the field of religious education.

6. Tightening measures against refuges, the regime increases penalties for illegal border crossings.

17. The regime appoints new army leadership and announces that henceforth the Party will play a greater role in shaping the army's "political content."

28. The Central Committee is expanded from 23 to 37 members. The Party leadership attacks "revisionist" tendencies, and issues a sweeping denunciation on Imre Nagy.

March 1. The government announces that manifestations of student unrest are to be treated as "provocation" and checked by police.

2. Announcement that Russian will be compulsory in all elementary schools. It will be not compulsory in secondary schools but will be given administrative preference.

7. Theoretician Jozsef Revai publishes most outspokenly "Stalinist" article to appear since the Revolt. Attacks Nagy "revisionism" as main threat to Communism, while only mildly criticizing "Rakosism."

17. A new Communist Youth League (KISZ) is formed to replace the pre-Revolt youth organization (DISZ).

19. A decree is passed sanctioning internal deportations of "troublesome individuals."

20. Kadar visits Moscow. He lauds USSR intervention in Hungary, denounces Nagy, promises to take a categorical stand against "revisionism" and to in-

crease "punitive aspects" of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." He announces that the new Communist Party will be smaller than the pre-Revolt Party and include only "true Communists." He also promises to reinforce the Warsaw Pact, commends presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, asserts "equality" of Soviet-Hungarian relations and obtains a long-term economic loan.

23. A new decree calls for government approval of Church appointments made since October 1956 and in the future. A second decree announces that the "full rigor of the law" will be applied against individuals who use religious instruction for "anti-State purposes" and who exert pressure for or against religious instruction.

24. Announcement that the population must have identity cards checked.

April 8. Three death sentences passed in first major show trial of "counterrevolutionaries."

11. Report that Gyorgy Lukacs, Minister of Culture under Imre Nagy and in Romania with Imre Nagy, had asked to return home.

21. The Writers' Union is dissolved and writer Tibor Dery is arrested.

25. Mihaly Farkas, Defense Minister under Rakosi, is sentenced to 16 years in prison for "violations during his term of office."

May 5. Announcement that the new Party has 300,000 members and that many former members did not apply for re-admission.

7. Death sentences given to three followers of Jozsef Dudas.

9. Kadar announces postponement of promised general elections at opening session of National Assembly. The Premier rejects demands for multiparty system, saying that it would only create ideological disunity.
The first session of the Hungarian National Assembly since the Revolt opens in Budapest.

27. Signing of Soviet-Hungarian "agreement" on "temporary" stationing of Soviet garrison in Hungary.

June 3. Hungary announces 1957 budget and economic plan, revealing that the country will not be economically self-supporting this year.

9. 13 Mosonmagyarovar "counterrevolutionaries" and a five-member group in Györ convicted.

11. There have been 89 death sentences according to official announcement.

22. Bitter attacks in the press to UN Report concerning the Revolt.

The Budapest law court sentences to death Zsigmond Sipos and two "accomplices" who were charged with the assassination of a security forces major.

27. First national conference of the post-Revolt Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party opens in Budapest.

28. Miss Ilona Toth and three of her co-defendents executed.

July 8. Few details have been published in the party press on the strike, which begun July 1 and was crushed July 5, of workers of the Sajoszentpeter mining region.

12. The Budapest People's Court starts proceedings against fourteen members of the Christian Youth Association, formed on October 23, 1956.

21. Thirteen "counterrevolutionaries," active in Budapest's Sixteenth District during the Revolt, sentenced by the Budapest City Court. The two leaders of the group, Ferenc Horvath and Gyorgy Spamberger, receive the death penalty, and the third defendant Karoly Stanci is sent to prison for life.

The system of norms and performance wages which collapsed after last October's Revolt is publicly replaced by a new system.

27. For the first time since the Revolt, the national executive committee of the Patriotic People's Front convenes to discuss future plans for its puppet organization.

August 2. The Györ People's Court sentences Sandor Berger to life imprisonment, Istvan Toth to 12 years imprisonment and Endre Csincsak to 5 years in jail as leading members of the National Council of Transdanubia.

3. Twelve members of the executive committee of the Christian Hungarian Party under the Revolt, headed by Dr. Zajgovary, arrested.

September 11. Premier Kadar attacks the U.N. General Assembly Special Committee on Hungary's report stating that the "American" resolution demonstrated that the "imperialists" had not forgiven Hungary for repelling their assault in 1956.

27. Premier Kadar welcomed to Peiping by Premier Chou En-lai.

October 5. Laszlo Balogh sentenced to death. Punishments ranging from two years to life imprisonment dealt to 15 others of an "armed group."

November 13. Radio Budapest announces that Tibor Dery, the 65-year-old dean of Hungarian writers, has been sentenced to nine years in jail. Playwright Gyula Hay received six years imprisonment, Zoltan Zelk was sentenced to three years and Tibor Tardos to one-and-a-half years imprisonment. All four writers were formerly members of the Communist Party, and all were in the vanguard of the intellectuals' fight for freedom in the Revolt.

17. Regime abolishes workers' councils, first formed during the Revolt.

22. Communist leaders, ending a series of high-level meetings in Moscow, make public the following statements of policy for Communist parties in Soviet-bloc and other nations:
1. A declaration, signed by CP leaders from every Communist state except Yugoslavia, that calls for a united front against "imperialism, capitalism," and policies of "certain aggressive groups" in the US.
2. A peace manifesto, signed by CP leaders from 64 nations, excluding Yugoslavia, that endorses Russian foreign policies as necessary to peace and urges a cooperative struggle against the "capitalistic monopolies who have a vested interest in war."

24. Istvan Szörtesy, who took part in the heroic action at Kilian Barracks during the Revolt, executed.

December 10. Announcement of the execution of Major A. P. Pallavicini, commander of the unit that freed Cardinal Mindszenty during the Revolt.

15. Two prominent intellectuals, Dezsö Keresztury, Director of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Science, and Professor Domokos Kosary arrested.

22. Geza Szenasi, Prosecutor, admits in his speech the existence of one concentration camp. He also announces that 3,012 persons have been convicted since December 1956.

1958

January 2. Laszlo Ivan Kovacs, Commander of the Corvin Block freedom fighters during the Revolt, executed.

4. Radio Budapest announces the dissolution of the Mihaly Tancsics Circle, created by the Kadar regime to replace the banned Petofi Circle.

11. In a mass trial 17 Roman Catholic priests and laymen convicted for "counterrevolutionary" activities. Father E. A. Turcsanyi receives life sentence at hard labor.

28. Janos Kadar steps down as Premier, retaining post as Party head; Ferenc Münnich assumes Premiership.

A formal description is given of the economic plan for 1958 by Arpad Kiss, President of the National Planning Office. The three objectives in 1958 to be: "maintenance of the higher living standard, without heavy reliance on foreign credit; large increase in exports; and concentration of the country's scarce investment capital on projects which will yield the quickest returns."

31. Agreement signed between the Lutheran Church and the regime.

February 2. Foreign Minister Imre Horvath dies after operation.

16. Endre Sik is the new Foreign Minister.

March 6. Andras Szabo, writer, who took part in the Revolt both in Budapest and Sztalinvaros, sentenced to eight years in prison.

10. Jozsef Nagy and Imre Farkas, former members of the National Guard of Csepel, executed as "armed counterrevolutionaries."

15. The first detachments of the 17,000 Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Hungary depart with propaganda fanfare.

16. The execution of Jozsef Kovacs, vice-president of the Szeged Workers' Council.

27. Kadar meets with Yugoslav Marshal Tito for the first time since the Revolt.

April 11. Khrushchev ends tour of Hungary, during which he tried to bolster the Kadar regime, and also reiterated the Soviet Union's intransigent stand on Eastern Europe.

23. Five victims of the drive against lawyers are Aladar Welcz, sentenced to eight years in jail, and Ivan Erdelyi and Karoly Balint, jailed for six and five years, respectively.

May 18. Four "counterrevolutionaries" executed (Geza Pech, Laszlo Balogh, Jozsef Gerlei and Bela Bekesi), two sentenced to life imprisonment and ten others to imprisonment for one to fourteen years.

June 17. Moscow and Budapest announce the execution of Hungarian Revolt leaders Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter, along with other death sentences and imprisonment of five others.

September 8. István Bibó sentenced to life.

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